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Preface 
 
Heightened urbanization in the Phil ippines has changed the context of 
ci t ies.  It  has resulted in a more complex local environment accompanied with 
problems such as lack of housing, environmental  degradation, declining l iteracy 
rates,  and rising unemployment rates.  Among these, the lack of housing is seen 
as the most poli ticized because i t  involves hu ge number of urban poor voters.  
To facili tate an improved housing program delivery, especially at  the city levels, 
collaboration (facil itated by insti tutional synergy) has been encouraged through 
structural  mechanisms such as national legislation and polic ies.  In the process, 
the strategy for program delivery has been focused more on structural  factors 
such as institutions,  rules, and laws. In view of this,  the role of policy 
decisiveness (facil itated by leadership) in program delivery is somewhat 
neglected.  While there are good reasons to emphasize the importance of 
insti tutional synergy to effectively address the rising housing demands, it  is 
also essential  to rethink the importance of leadership in facili tat ing and 
direct ing insti tutional synergy.  
This paper argues that  policy decisiveness –  which can be observed 
through the choices, decisions,  and actions of a leader –  matters because it  has 
the potential  to affect  change. The paper explores whether  policy decisiveness 
can offer a more viable option for addressing the complex challenges in housing 
program delivery. In  particular,  it  will  look into the role of policy decisiveness 
in managing the socio-poli tical  dynamics ,  the competing demands of interest 
groups,  and the different opinions of people in the communities .   In the recent 
context where popular technologies such as smart  phones,  internet,  televisions, 
and social  networking si tes  are widely accessible ,  local people are more 
empowered to know and express their voice s about the decisions and actions of 
ii 
 
their polit ical  leaders .  Under this condition, i t  is  cri tical  to know whether the 
leader is able to convene the different  voices towards a common goal and avoid 
policy gridlock in program delivery.  While i t  is  commonly thought the policy 
decisiveness can potentially improve program delivery, l i tt le at tention is given 
to this subject,  and therefore,  there is  a knowledge gap. To fi l l  this gap, this 
research has collected , documented, and analyzed  case studies to validate or 
invalidate such thought .    
In pursuit  of this research,  it  is expected that  the findings will inform 
the policies and strategies for an improved housing program delivery in the 
future.  This research is also expected  to offer new insights on policy 
decisiveness which can  be useful for academic scholars ,  students ,  and 
policymakers.    
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Abstract 
This paper attempts to apply ‘structure-agency’  analysis to understand 
housing program delivery in the Phil ippine s.  Collaboration (structure) has been 
regarded as conventional wisdom in housing program delivery, and has been 
translated into laws  and policy frameworks  with appropriate funding and 
projects.  By contrast ,  policy decisiveness (agency) is  given less attention and 
subsequently lesser pro jects  to improve housing services delivery.  This 
observation needs greater research attention because there is no clear evidence 
that  collaboration is a determinative factor for effective program delivery.  
This paper aims to challenge the conventional wisdom about 
collaboration by arguing that  greater emphasis on this approach  can be less 
productive if  it  is not reviewed along with the merits and demerits of policy 
decisiveness. More specifically,  this paper argues that  if policy decisiveness is 
exercised, program delivery will  become more effec tive.  To support  this 
argument,  four case studies of housing program delivery were compared and 
analyzed. To facil itate deeper analysis,  t he case studies were categorized into 
three dichotomies:  (i)  successful  and less successful  cases; (i i)  collaboration 
and non-collaboration cases; and (i ii) policy decisive and policy indecisive 
cases.  Each case i llustrates a unique process of program delivery, and shares 
meaningful experience with lessons to learn.  The findings  of this research  offer 
new insights about collaboration and policy decisiveness .    
 
Keywords :  policy decisiveness ,  collaboration ,  leadership ,  local government, 
housing program delivery,  Philippines  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
While housing is a basic right and has been a top agenda of different 
government administrations in the Philippines, a definitive progress on this issue 
has yet to be achieved.
1
 One of the reasons might be attributed to the approach used 
in housing program delivery. In general, the strategy for program delivery in the 
Philippines has been showing an inchoate pattern. Under the dictatorial regime of 
President Ferdinand Marcos, the approach to program delivery was largely shaped 
by the personalities of political leaders occupying the government positions. At that 
time, the government institutions were generally perceived as weak, and the 
political personalities were often characterized as dominant that usually pursue 
arbitrary governance, crony protection, and gross human rights violations  (Migdal 
1988). In effect, the social condition was defined with the reality of mass poverty, 
powerlessness of the poor, and income disparities. In view of this condition, there 
was a growing demand for social development agenda that would facilitate better 
access to livelihood, employment, basic services, social protection, security, and 
participation in decision-making (Racelis 2005). The cause of the ineffective 
program delivery was generally attributed to politics, particularly the dominance of 
political personalities who have arbitrary powers, occupying the weak government 
institutions. It is in this context, that  the administrations following the Marcos 
regime have been introducing new strategies that are focused on institutions and 
                                                          
1 Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, “Housing Sector 
Accomplishment Report”,  
http://www.hudcc.gov.ph/Stats.aspx?name=Housing%20Sector%20Accomplishment%20Report (Accessed November 
15, 2013).  
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institution building. In doing so, the new strategies have somehow totally failed to 
account the role of political personalities that had long shaped program delivery.  
 
1.1 Background 
Housing delivery has been a perennial  political issue in the Philippines 
because of high poverty incidence, which is about 30% of the total population .
2
 
Housing is highly political because out of  the estimated 51 million registered voters 
(as of May 2010), about 10 million are from the informal settlements or poor people 
who do not have appropriate houses.
3
 While poor people look up to their local 
leaders for housing support, the efforts to substantially reduce informal settlements 
have been insufficient as shown in the increasing number of housing needs year 
after year. Although there are several reasons which can be attributed to increasing 
housing needs – such as high population growth, lack of employment creation, 
rampant corruption, and insurgencies  – the politics surrounding housing program 
delivery might be one of the crucial factors for slow progress. Against this backdrop, 
it is imperative to review and analyze the complementary roles of institutions and 
leaders in program delivery. It is expected that such analysis will offer insights on 
how to effectively deliver social program that renders better results. 
 
  
                                                          
2 Asian Development Bank Institute, “Official Poverty Statistics and Poverty Reduction 
Programs of the Philippines”, http://www.adbi.org/files/2013.05.08.cpp.sess4.3.poverty.reduction.philippines.pdf 
(Accessed November 12, 2013).   
3 Commission on Elections, “Statistics”, 
http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Archives/RegularElections/2010NLE/Statistics (Accessed November 12, 2013).  
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1.1.1 Organizing Concepts  
 This paper applies the “structure-agency” analysis of political science (fully 
discussed in Chapter 2) to understand housing program delivery. As used in this 
paper, “structure” pertains to institutions, rules, and policies while “agency”  
pertains to personalities, decisions, and leadership.  
 In applying the structure-agency analysis, this paper examines how 
“collaboration” facilitated by institutional synergy (as structure) and “policy 
decisiveness” facilitated by leadership (as agency) affect housing program delivery. 
Collaboration and policy decisiveness are separate approaches of housing program 
delivery in the Philippine context. Of these two approaches, conventional wisdom 
shows that collaboration is the better approach to achieve effective program 
delivery and for that it has been endorsed by many policymakers and researchers . 
However, this paper attempts to challenge the conventional wisdom by arguing that 
collaboration is not the solution to the problem of ineffective program delivery 
because the quality of leaders, specifically how the leader handles the socio-
political dynamics, also matters. While the use of structure -agency analysis is 
generally exploratory, it is viewed to add value to the general knowledge of political 
science by offering analytical perspective of two approaches of delivery 
(collaboration and policy decisiveness) . Additionally, the use of this political 
science tool is crucial in this paper because housing program is a political concern 
that needs political analysis and political solution.  
 
1.1.2 Shifting Patterns: From Personalities to Institutions 
There have been two observable patterns that drive program delivery at the 
local level: personality and institution. Personality-based pattern flourished under 
the dictatorial regime and within the context of patronage politics. Under this 
pattern, the effectiveness of program delivery i s assumed to be dependent on the 
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personality of the local leader , particularly the leader’s motivation and interest . 
Institution-based pattern has been flourishing in the administrations that followed 
the regime of President Marcos. Under this pattern, the effectiveness of program 
delivery is assumed to be dependent on the institutions. In essence, there has been a 
shift of emphasis concerning program delivery from personality-based to 
institutions-based, as presented in the sections that follow.  
 
Personality based  
Personal discretion in program delivery has been practiced by local political 
leaders on the basis of patronage politics.
4
 For purposes of this research, 
patronage polit ics  refers broadly to personal bonds between poli tical  “patrons” 
and their “clients”  or followers.  These bonds are founded on “mutual material 
advantage, wherein the patron furnishes excludable resources (e.g.  money and 
jobs) to clients/followers,  and in return, the patron gains their support  and 
cooperation”  (e.g.  votes and attendance at  ral lies). 5 Patronage polit ics operates 
with patrons having considerab le wealth and control  to prolong their stay in 
power.  It  is  during local  elections that patronage polit ics is clearly highlighted. 
                                                          
4  Derick W .  Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith ,  Clientelism, Patrimonialism and 
Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming  
(Washington, DC: USAID, 2002).  
5
 For deeper description of “patron -client” politics, see Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies 
and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988) or John T Sidel, “Bossism and Democra cy in the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of ‘Local Strongmen’”, 
in Politicising Democracy: local politics and democratisation in developing countries,  edited by J.  
Harris, K. Stokke, and O. Tornquist (N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).  
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Patrons secure their votes by using combination of family t ies,  loyalty,  and 
promises of jobs,  payments,  or other material  be nefits .  In some cases,  they 
would even intimidate their cl ients to ensure votes (Sidel 2005).  Landowners  
use their traditional control  of land to draw favors from their tenants to win 
elective posit ions (Machado 1983). Prominent families build their power bases 
through relationships based on favors,  which in many instances are reinforced 
by threats and violence ( Jutkowitz ,  Stout, and Lippman 1997).  
After elections,  patronage poli t ics continues to operate as il lustrated in 
the following observations.  Mayors “enjoy discretionary powers over local 
funds and the appointment of officials in local  administration, and they can 
influence the awarding of concessions, contracts, and franchises ”  (Sidel 1999).  
In other words,  they are using this power to further control  the support  and 
cooperation of voters.  Additionally,  with such power and control,  the poli tical 
office is  oftentimes used as a vehicle for protecting and enhancing familial 
economic interests such as in agriculture,  logging operations,  transportati on, 
and shipping as a mechanism for recouping the expenses involved in attaining 
that  office (Rood 1998).  With patrons having full  control  of polit ical  power, 
they are sometimes referred to as local strongmen .  A local strongman is a local  
power holder (e.g.  mayor),  who rule his bailiwick without any intervention by 
the state.  In the description of Migdal (1988: 256),  “local strongman succeeded 
in having himself or his family members placed in cri t ical  posts to ensure 
allocation of resources according to his  own rules,  rather than the rules 
propounded in the official  rhetoric, policy statements, and legislation generated 
in the capacity of the city or those put forth by a strong implementor”.   
Two major characteristics i llustrate a “local strongman”. First ,  h e is the 
most powerful man, who rules the locali ty.  He has the monopoly of public 
offices and has the power to transfer those public offices within a family from 
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one generation to another.  Second, the local  strongman, in many cases,  engages 
in violent activities by having private armies and carrying out polit ical 
assassinations.
6
 The key attribute of a local  strongman is that  he operates the 
local  government according to his own rules and monopolizes control  over local  
resources.   
Patronage poli t ics can help explain why local strongmen , who perpetuated 
themselves in power,  affected program delivery . This explanation is known as 
the “patron-client” framework, which emphasizes both personality and social 
relations that  the leader has with his cl ients.
7
 The patron-client framework 
argues that  “‘clientelism’, ‘personalism’, polit ical  culture,  predispositions,  and 
                                                          
6 Descriptions and specific references on political violence, as exercise d by the strongmen, 
can be seen in Takeshi Kawanaka, Power in a Philippine City  (Chiba: Institute of Developing 
Economies, 2002).  
7
 Pa tron-c l ient  i s  def ined  as  “an exchange  re la t ionship  or  ins t rumenta l  f r iendship 
between two ind ividuals  o f d i ffe rent  s ta tus  in  which the  pa t ron uses his  own inf luence  and 
resources to  provide  for  the  pro tec t ion and mater ia l  wel fare  o f  his  lower  s ta tus  c l ient  and his  
fami ly,  who ,  fo r  his  par t ,  r ec iproca tes  by offer ing genera l  suppor t  and  ass is tance ,  inc lud ing  
personal  services ,  to  the  pat ron” .  The definition of “patron -client” relationship is originally 
postulated by Carl H. Lande in 1965. The patron -client framework is combined with factionalism. 
Meaning, “there are always two rival parties in each province structured by vertical chains of 
dyadic patron-client relationships extending from great and wealthy political leaders in each 
province down to lesser gentry politici ans in the towns, down further to petty leaders in each 
village, and down finally to the clients of the latter: the ordinary peasantry”. See Carl Lande, 
Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics  (New Haven: Yale University 
Southeast Asia Studies, 1965). Also see James Scott, “Patron -Client Politics and Political Change 
in Southeast Asia”, American Political Science Review  66, no.1 (1972):32.  
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particularistic demands of local  populations are essentially the cause for  
wealthy people to obtain leadership posit ion and stay in power ” .8  For instance 
in Makati City,  which is considered as the ‘most modern’ city of the Phil ippines, 
the relationship between the mayor and the urban poor communities falls  under 
the “patron-client” framework. Former mayor Jejomar Binay is  reported doing a 
“bizarre daily ri tual of jogging along the streets of poor districts and stopping 
by to break bread with local  people and street  workers because he knew that  the 
language of poli t ics most Filipinos understand is translated into a one -on-one, 
or at best a family-to-family,  relationship”  (Rocamora 1995).  Hence, instead of 
ideology or vision, patron-client framework emphasizes the reciprocal personal 
relations as the main factor in the mobilization of polit ical support  (Kawanaka 
2002).  So, in patronage poli t ics ,  mayors are generally inclined to provide 
particularistic benefits  (e.g.  public works,  government jobs,  and preferential 
access to government funds and resources) to those who voted for them rather 
than promoting comprehensive local development.
9
 Patronage poli t ics 
essentially enhances the control  of local  strongman who operates the local 
government according to his own rules, hence, blurring the distinction of what 
is  private and what is  public.  With patronage poli tics,  program delivery is 
generally in the discretion of a local leader.   
                                                          
8  Joel S. Migdal,  Strong Societies and Weak States: State -Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).  
9
 See many other examples from Mary Racelis, Civil Society, Populist Politics and the 
State: Philippine Democracy Today  (Quezon: Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005) and Steven 
Rood, “Decentralization, Democracy, and Development”, in The Philippines: New Directions in 
Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations , edited by David G. Timberman (Singapore: Asia Society 
and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998).  
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Institutions based 
In order to break from discretionary pattern of program delivery by local  
patrons, various reforms that stressed the importance of institutions have been 
introduced. In particular,  the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) has been 
enforced to reconfigure the predominant context of patronage polit ics.  The LGC 
tries to build the legal  and institutional  mechanisms such as “insti tutional 
collaboration” of local  government and non-government organization  that  are 
deemed responsive and accountable to cit izens .  It  intends to instil l  credibil i ty 
of local polit ical institutions by allowing transparency in polit ical decisions, 
part icipation, and observance of the  rule of law. Under the LGC, greater 
emphasis has been given on applying insti tutional collaboration in program 
delivery to facil i tate efficiency and effectiveness (detailed discussions on 
collaboration is presented in Chapter 2) .   
With wider promotion of insti tutional collaboration through policy 
frameworks,  it  appears that  there is a growing notion that  collaboration is the 
solution to many local problems, including housing program delivery. The 
common arguments for  collaboration are  as follow:  “it  promo tes the 
combination of perspectives, resources, and skills” (Chrisl ip 2002), “it  draws 
public programs closer to locally-identified priori ties” (OECD 2001),  and “it 
converges common aims” (Huxham and Vangen 2005). However,  the persistence 
of patronage poli t ics hinders these objectives.
10
 In fact ,  nepotism and other 
favors as fostered by patrons are key factors for st ifl ing people’s  part icipation, 
subverting the rule of law, and distort ing the delivery of public services  
(Brinkerhoof and Goldsmith 2002). Moreover,  in the past  local  elections, the 
                                                          
10
 Joel Jutkowitz ,  Russell Stout, and Hal Lippman, Democratic Local Governance in the 
Philippines: Tradition Hinders Transition  (Washington, DC: USAID, 1997).  
9 
 
problems plaguing patronage poli tics st i ll  remained. Among these are “ the 
preponderance of money poli t ics,  electing leaders on the bases of personali ties 
rather than polit ical  parties, and persistent allegations o f electoral fraud”  
(Anthony 2004).  In other words,  the type and quali ty of local  leader s matter. 
Essentially,  i t  is  the local  leader who takes responsibil ity in managing the 
socio-polit ical  dynamics surrounding program delivery. In  fact ,  in a study 
conducted in developing countries concerning institutional reforms, Leftwich 
(2010) found that leadership played important role in steering the insti tutions, 
and pointed the l imitations of insti tution as a concept by asking the followin g 
questions:  “How are institutions, understood as rules of the game, established? Who 
shapes, agrees, and implements them? How is institutional robustness and 
enforceability obtained? What are the processes whereby people come to discuss, 
agree, define, and accept the rules of any particular ‘game’ and both systematically 
apply and abide by them?”  
There are some reasons to suspect that the institutional reconfiguration under 
the LGC may continue its turtle-phasing progress if the role of human agents, 
particularly the local mayors, are side-tracked in the policy reform process. It is 
generally known that institutions are not stand alone mechanisms that can deliver 
the program without the dynamic element of a leader. However, this knowledge 
seems to have been forgotten, as most policymakers put greater emphasis on 
institutions and side-lining the role of leaders. For better grasp of the issue, the 
delivery of housing program can be taken as a case point for analysis.  
 
1.1.3 Housing Program Delivery: The Case Point for Analysis 
 To analyze the interplay between collaboration and policy decisiveness, the 
housing program is taken as a case point.  
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Housing Situation  
Improvement in housing services remains a crucial challenge for ci ty 
governments  in the Phil ippines .  The country’s urbanization rate (i .e.  percentage 
of total  population l iving in areas classified as urban) as of 2009 is 52%.
11
 This 
rate has been putt ing tremendous pressure on most ci ties in providing viable 
options for affordable housing and i ts related services such as proper waste 
management  and sustainable economic activit ies .  With urbanization overtak ing 
the local  government’s abil i ty to cope with the housing issue ,  the provision of 
these services is  compromised (Asian Developm ent Bank 2009).  In fact ,  
urbanization has resulted in over-crowding making housing substandard and 
access to basic services  inadequate. 
12
 Moreover,  urbanization leads to a rapid 
increase of informal sett lements,  which hinders urban development.   
To understand the housing issue, it  is important to know the causes of 
high urbanization rate in the Philippines .  Essentially,  the high urbanization rate 
can be attributed to three factors.  First ly,  the high birth rate causes an annual 
population growth of 2.36%. Hence, as of May 1, 2010, the official population 
count stood at  about 92.3 mill ion.
13
 Secondly, rural  population continues to 
migrate to urban areas primarily to search for better economic opportunit ies. 
Finally,  the redefinition of “urban” area by the National Statistics Office based 
on population density (i .e.  1000 residents/km
2
) which is sl ightly higher than 
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 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia Pacific, “Statistical Yearbook 
for Asia and the Pacific 2009”, http://www.unescap.org/publications/detail.asp?id=1380 (Accessed August 5, 
2011). 
12
 The Philippine Urban Forum, Ang Bahanggunihanan  (Manila: PUF Publications, 2004) .  
13  National Statistics Office, “Philippines in Figures”, http://www.census.gov.ph/ (Accessed 
February 17, 2013).  
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traditional rural areas also contributed in high urbanization rate.  Considering 
these factors,  the national and local governments need a better strategy in  
providing housing services and facil it ies.  
 
National Performance 
While the legal frameworks put emphasis on role of insti tutions,  actual 
performance in housing delivery can be highly attributed to personalit ies .  A 
brief review of past administrations performance will  i l lustrate this point .  For 
the period 2005-2010 alone, the housing need was projected at  3.75 mill ion 
units (Table 1.1).   
 
Table 1.1 Housing Needs for 2005-2010 
Category Total 
 
Housing Backlog 984,466 
    -Doubled-Up Housing 387,315 
    -Replacement/Informal Settlers  588,853 
    -Homeless  8,298 
Substandard (upgrading)  186,334 
New Households  2,585,272 
Total 3,756,072 
       Source:  Housing  and  Urban Development  Coord ina t ing  Counci l  2007  
 
Metro Manila,  being the country’s biggest  urban center,  has exhibited 
the ugly side of high urbanization and housing problem. Among its over 10 
mill ion residents, an estimated 3.5 mill ion belong to urban poor who live in 
inadequate housing conditions along waterways, railroad tracks,  and riverbanks. 
Others live in public and private lands earmarked for government infrastructure  
development .  Consequently,  i t  created more congestion and serious concerns 
l ike traffic jams, health issues,  and environmental  degr adation. Based on the 
2007 reports issued by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating 
12 
 
Council  (HUDCC), other big cit ies in the country such as Cebu and Davao are 
also experiencing similar housing problems . This finding indicates that  the 
unabated growth of informal settlements entails  environmental ,  economic, and 
polit ical  consequences .  The implication of these observations is clear:  the 
provision of housing services must be closely l inked with other services such as 
health,  l ivelihood, and other social  and economic requirements of people l iving 
in these highly urbanized areas.   
A glimpse of how the different government administrations tried to 
address this housing problem can provide some idea that program delivery is 
generally associated with poli t ical leadership and not much on insti tutions . 
During the t ime of President Ferdinand Marcos,  he promulgated Presidential 
Decree 772 in 1975 that criminalized informal settlements or “squatt ing”. The 
enactment of this decree branded squ atters as criminals and effectively 
condemned an estimated 10 mill ion urban poor Fil ipinos who cannot afford 
legal housing. The decree,  in many cases,  had been used as a basis for the 
criminal conviction of squatters with about 100,000 families evicted yea rly 
from 1986 to 1991 as reported by the UN Committee on Economic, Social ,  and 
Cultural Rights (2000).  Regarding the performance of other past presidents,  
data from HUDCC (2007) showed that  during the Cory Aquino administration 
(1986-1992),  the total  housing need was estimated at 2.6 million but 
government could only provide 268,279 units of shelter security.  During the 
Ramos administration (1992-1998), the estimated need had risen to 3.72 mill ion 
housing units , and the government provided 623,053 housing units  through the 
National Shelter Program (NSP) . During the Estrada administration (1998 -2001), 
the total housing need was estimated at  3.3 mill ion units ,  but  the aborted 
Estrada presidency managed to provide 274,727 housing units in his two -and-
half year-rule.  During the Arroyo administration (2001 -2010) the housing need 
13 
 
for the period 2001-2004 was 3.7 mill ion housing units.  The Arroyo government  
tried to close this gap by targeting the provision of at least 1.2 million housing 
units until  the end of 2004 with a budget requirement of PhP215.16 bill ion.
14
 
From this target ,  882,823 housing units were actually accomplished (Table 1.2).    
 
Table 1.2 Housing Targets and Accomplishments  
Housing 
Program 
Target 
(2001-
2004) 
Actual Accomplishments  
2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Socialized  880,000 207,940 118,716 84,716 81,853 493,496 
Low Cost  320,000 54,447 74,306 114,507 146,067 389,327 
Total   1,200,000 262,387 193,293 199,223 227,920 882,823 
    Source:  Housing and Urban Development  Coord inat ing  Counci l  200 7  
 
Table 1.2 implies that  al though insti tutions  and incentives were put in 
place to carry out the housing programs , the desired distributive objectives have 
not been fully realized. The review of national performance indicated the 
following trends.  First ,  housing has always been in the agenda of past 
administrations but definitive progress is  yet  to be achieved. Second, housing 
needs has been always increasing, indicating clear l imita tions on how the 
programs are delivered. Thirdly,  progress in housing is generally associated 
with personali ties of leaders. For instance,  President Estrada p layed up to his 
image as “president of the masses” visiting big urban communities to distribute 
land to the poor that  somehow made them a tangible force .
15
 Although Arroyo 
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 The exchange rate of Philippine Peso to Japanese Yen as of July 4, 2010 is PhP1 = 1.88 
JPY, http://www.xe.com/ucc/ (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
15
 There are reports indicating that the land titles distributed by President Estrada to the 
poor were not original, and were only made for building up his image. See Maricris R . Valte, “A 
House for Every Filipino: A Pipe Dream in the Land of Promise?”, in Philippine Governance 
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made a strong commitment to address housing issue by “waging war against  
poverty”,  many urban poor communities were against  her. 16  These examples 
show that the masses’ response to the housing programs depends on the abil ity 
of the leader to manage the socio -poli tical  dynamics.  In addition, i t  sends a 
clear message that  urban poor’s lack of access to shelter security is  not just  a 
matter of social justice but also of poli t ical survival.  Understanding how the 
housing issue is tackled at  the local government level will be insightful for 
improving housing program delivery.  
 
Housing Programs 
There are two categories of housing programs: the “Regular Housing 
Programs”, which is intended for the i nformal sett lers or squatters and the 
“Special Government Housing Project”, which is intended for low income-class 
families who are affected by government development projects.  To ensure that 
these programs are implemented, seven key government agencies are involved , 
namely: “ the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council ,  National 
Housing Authority,  Home Development Mutual Fund, National Home Mortgage 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Report: Studies on the Management of Power , edited by Jose Ibarra A. Angeles, (Makati: Ateneo 
School of Government Publications, 2002).  
16
 Estrada was ousted in 2001 and then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came to 
power by extra-constitutional means that most Filipinos called as “People Power II”. The Estrada 
camp, i.e.  the urban poor who went for an uprising against Arroyo in May 20 01, is known as 
“People Power III”.  
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Finance Corporation, Home Guarantee Cor poration, Housing and Land Use 
Regulatory Board, and Social  Housing Finance Corporation. ”17  
In implementing the regular housing program, two financing schemes 
were developed: the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) and the Land Tenure 
Assistance Program (LTAP). Funding for the CMP has been institutionalized in 
the government system through the Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter and 
Finance Act (CISFA) which is  handled by the National Home Mortgage Finance 
Corporation (NHMFC). In CMP, a group of squatters can apply for assistance to 
own a piece of land with originators/guarantees from either the local 
government or an NGO. After fulfi ll ing the legal requirements,  the group of 
squatters will  be given land ti tles which will  stay w ith their community 
association unti l  the beneficiaries have the full  amount of the loan.
18
 In most 
cases,  local  governments act  as originators of CMP .
19
 The LTAP is a similar 
program to CMP but with higher interest rate of 12% per annum compared with 
only 6% per annum under CMP. In addition, LTAP has a shorter payment period 
(2 to 10 years) compared long payment period (25 years) under the CMP (Local  
Government Support Programme 2010) . 
                                                          
 
17
 For detailed information about the role of these agencies, see Housing and Urban 
Development Coordinating Council, “Key Programs and Projects”, http://hudcc.gov.ph/index.php?p=149, 
(Accessed August 5, 2011).  
18 Philippine Institute for Development Studies, “The State of Philippine Housing 
Programs”, http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/ris/books/pidsbk01-housing.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2013).  
19 Many cities are originators of CMP. Among these cities are Marikina, Naga, Cebu, Las 
Piñas, Bacolod, and Mandaluyong. See Local Government Support Program, “Enhancing Shelter at 
the Local Level”, http://www.lgspa.org.ph/kp/c_b.php?KnowledgeProductID=7 (Accessed July 4, 2010)  
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The special  housing projects  are called “special” because this happens on 
a case-to-case basis,  where the government applies its  power of imminent 
domain and compensate communities whose housing tenure are affected by 
development projects .  One example of this is  an “off-site and off-city relocation”  
of affected communities in Muntinlupa City,  Metro Manila . In this case,  the 
families  who were residing in the proposed development project  si te were 
relocated to nearby cit ies.
20
 This type of housing project  is  not covered in the 
case studies but mentioned here for reference.  
The message from this section is that  housing programs are 
insti tutionalized with corresponding funding schemes  to be implemented using 
collaboration approach . This action implies that  policymakers and researchers 
put greater emphasis on institutionalization and  l imited, if any, emphasis on 
programs that encourage better leadership to facil itate effective housing 
services delivery.  
 
1.1.4 Collaboration: Structure-focused Approach 
Collaboration in housing program delivery is not only institutionalized with 
appropriate funding schemes, but also, mandated in two most prominent legal 
frameworks, namely: the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) 
and the Local Government Code of 1991. The UDHA recognizes the legit imate 
rights of the poor and has specified the roles of the Local Government Units 
(LGUs) which are fully l isted in Sections 6 to 30  of the said framework . In  
particular, the UDHA specifically defines the responsibil i ty of LGUs to 
collaborate with NGOs and other sectors ,  including private sector,  to attain 
                                                          
20 See more examples at Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council,  “Special 
National Government Housing Projects”, http://www.hudcc.gov.ph/ (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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effective shelter provision.
21
 The LGC on the other hand, identifies and spells 
out the roles and responsibil it ies of LGUs in protecting the general  welfare of 
their constituents by delivering basic services and facil it ies  as stated in Section 
16 of the Code.
22
 Both these legal frameworks suggest  institutional 
collaboration as means to achieve effective services delivery.   
Under the UDHA Framework, the government’s main task is to develop 
the housing sector and provide homes for all  i ts intended bene ficiaries. To 
fulfi ll  this task, the government’s objectives are to:  (i)  ensure that  land is 
available for housing, and (i i)  ensure that  an affordable housing facil i ty is  
provided. In ensuring that  land is available for housing, local  governments are 
expected to conduct an inventory of all  kinds of lands and identify the si tes for 
housing. The modes of acquiring lands include community mortgage, land 
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the 
government,  joint -venture agreement,  and negotiated purchase.
23
 In ensuring 
that  an affordable housing facil i ty is  provided, the local  governments are 
expected to develop or tap exist ing housing programs such as the socialized 
housing or the low-cost  housing. Based on UDHA, socialized housing  is  a 
“house and lot package with a value of PhP225,000 and below”. By contrast ,  
low-cost  housing  is a “house and lot package with a value ranging from 
                                                          
21 See Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, Sections 6 -30, http://hlurb.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/laws-issuances/mandates/ra_7279.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2013).  
22
 See Local Government Code of 1991, “Section 16 General Welfare”, 
http://www.dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/reports_resources/DILG-Resources-201162-99c00c33f8.pdf (Accessed November 
12, 2013).  
23
 See UDHA for definitions of various modes of land acquisition, http://hlurb.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/laws-issuances/mandates/ra_7279.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2013) .   
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PhP225,000 to PhP500,000, usually a single detached or duplex type of house”. 
Complementing the UDHA, the LGC provides that local  governments can 
insti tutional ly partner with non-government organizations or private institutions  
so that  housing programs can be effectively implemented.  
As observed, the emphasis of both policy frameworks  is  on the 
insti tutional collaboration . In fact ,  the performance measure for housing 
program delivery is based on the capacity of the “ insti tution”  and the abil ity to 
collaborate with other insti tutions . In particular, the performance measure looks 
into nine key inst i tutional indicators:  “(i)  existence of the local  housing board, 
(i i)  existence of local  shelter plan, (i i i) support  extended to the local  
development council,  (iv) conducted monitoring and regulatory functions,  (v) 
conducted inventory of al l  lands within the locali ty,  (vi) identified suitable 
si tes for socialized housing projects,  (vii)  conducted regular consultations with 
the mayor and legislative council ,  (viii) coordinated with related government 
agencies and instrumentali t ies,  and (ix) the local  housin g board holds meeting 
at  least once a month.”24  
Noting that  the housing policy frameworks put greater emphasis on 
insti tutional collaboration , i t  is  cri tical to ask the question s:  Is insti tutional  
collaboration alone sufficient to achieve  effective program delivery?  At onset, 
this paper doubts the determinative value of institutional collaboration, and 
therefore i t  is  offering an alternative view –  wherein the rationale is presented 
below.  
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 Department of the Interior and Local Government, “Local Governance Performance 
Management Systems: Simple Measures, Grea t  Results”, http://www.blgs.gov.ph/lgpms/ (Accessed 
August 5, 2011).  
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1.1.5 Policy Decisiveness: Agency-focused Approach 
Policy decisiveness , which highlights the abili ty of the leader to manage 
the socio-polit ical dynamics in program delivery, can be observed through the 
choices,  decisions,  and actions of individual leader (e.g.  mayor) .  The simplest 
way to view policy decisiveness  is  to look at  it  as a defining feature of 
leadership (see detailed discussions in Chapter 2).  This research presents at 
least  three reasons why policy decisiveness should be studied and analyzed in 
housing program delivery.  
First ly,  there is  so much polit ics in housing program, so i t  is  important to 
know whether policy decisiveness  plays a cri t ical  role in appropriately handling 
the polit ical  dynamics of program delivery .  In most cit ies, there is  a continuing 
proliferation of informal sett lers or squatters due to increasing urbanization. 
There is  no gainsaying that  people living in informal sett lements constitute a 
huge pool of votes that  can create pressure to polit icians to do something to 
improve housing services.  In other words,  housing programs ar e oftentimes 
implemented with polit ical  calculations. In most cases,  the abil ity of the local 
polit ician to identify with people who do not have proper housing, could be 
seen as another barometer for staying in power and maintaining his poli tical  
leadership posit ion.
25
 This situation implies that  how the leader decides and 
acts on the demands of the informal sett lers (or squatters) really matter for 
polit ical  survival.   
Secondly, as most polit ical leaders obtained their posit ions by belonging 
to a polit ical  clan, i t  is  important to know whether it  pays to be policy decisive 
leader in program delivery in the context of patronage .   As explained in the 
                                                          
25  Local Government Support Program, “Enhancing Shelter at the Local Level”, 
http://www.lgspa.org.ph/kp/c_b.php?KnowledgeProductID=7 (Accessed July 4, 2010).  
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“patron-client framework” ,  one can stay in power by simply belonging to a 
wealth family or clan .  The issue associated with this kind of patronage poli tics 
is  that  the programs and services are not necessarily developmental  but more 
relational (patron and client).  However,  this manner of obtaining polit ical 
leadership is a bit  changing. Current l iterature shows new patterns of leadership 
recruitment.  In some areas,  old leading families are replaced by “upwardly 
mobile men” from more humble backgrounds during elections. Additionally,  
men whose poli tical involvement is  essentially “vocational” are replace d by 
“professional” poli t icians in leadership positions. 26 These patterns indicate that 
some groups of people are showing the tendencies to elect  leaders who 
demonstrate leadership that exercise policy decisiveness and with greater 
capacity to govern rather  than relying on favors or vote buying. Subsequently,  i t  
changes the poli t ical  dynamics (including pressure from interest  groups, 
polit ical rivals,  and urban poor communities) . It  is  therefore important to 
understand the role of policy decisiveness in this  context.   
Thirdly,  the socio-polit ical  dynamics in housing program is gett ing more 
complex, so it  is  important to know whether policy decisiveness can effective ly 
manage such complexities.  The so-called People Power Revolution of 1986 for 
instance, led to a series of changes in the socio -poli tical  arena –  both national 
and local.  Among others,  it  resulted in the framing of the 1987 Consti tution that 
restored the democratic elections at  local levels and institutionalized the role of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil  society organizations 
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 Masataka Kimura, “Changing Patterns of Leadership Recruitment and the Emergence of 
the Professional Politician in Philippine Local Politics Re -examined: An Aspect of Political 
Development and Decay”, http://hdl.handle.net/2433/56678 (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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(CSOs).
27
 Within this changing context,  urban poor people have become more 
engaged in expressing their demands with support of NGOs, and oftentimes, 
with addit ional support  from other interest  groups and stakeho lders.  In response 
to the new situation, the abili ty of the leader to manage this kind of social  
dynamics is crucial . As observed, there has been an emergence of “new types of 
mayors” who are known to promote local  vision for their respective localit ies  
by applying decision-making skil ls acquired from their experiences in the 
private sector.  The emergence of these new types of mayors can no longer be 
explained using the “patron -client” framework alone. According to Sakuma 
(2005),  these new types of mayors seldom or never exercise i llegal coercive 
powers,  e.g.  as having private armies or doing the usual “favors” such as 
protecting i l legal vendors on streets and squatters in private or public 
properties.  Additionally,  globalization has somehow affected the loc al  polit ical 
dynamics.  Through the use of technologies l ike internet, smart  phones, and 
social  networking sites ,  the global cit izen virtually knows what a small  town in 
any parts of the world is  doing . Access to these technologies makes concerned 
                                                          
27 The terms NGO/CSO, as used in this paper, refe r to those organizations that fall into the 
structural-operational definition of NGO/CSO. Five key features define NGO/CSO, and as long as 
these features are met,  NGO and CSO are used interchangeably in the Philippine contexts: (i) 
“organized , i .e. institutionalized to some extent, ( ii) private , i.e. institutionally separate from the 
government, (iii) non-profit-distributing , i.e. not returning any profits generated to their owners or 
directors, (iv) self-governing,  i.e. equipped to control their own activi ties, and (v) voluntary , i.e.  
involving some meaningful degree of voluntary participation, either in the actual conduct of the 
agency’s activities or in the management”. See Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier,  
Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A cross -national analysis  (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press,  1997).  
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cit izens,  including stakeholders readily informed. Obviously,  in this changing 
context, mayors have to weigh  the pressures from voters, lobby groups, funding 
agencies,  external part ies, and activists  before making an important decision or 
action. It  is  in this context that  policy decisiveness  must be examined so that 
leaders can seize the opportunities to effect  significant change in the l ives of 
people.   
The abil ity to manage socio -poli tical  dynamics is one of the key aspects 
of policy decisiveness.  Mayor Edward S.  Hagedorn of Puerto Princesa City,  
Palawan, Philippines i l lustrated this when he implemented the “Clean Air 
Program”.28 Mindful of the environmental  and climate change issues,  Hagedorn  
realized that  his city needs to reduce pollution emissions from “tricycles” 
(three-wheeler taxis).  He set a target  of 50% emissions reduction, and he was 
successful  because he understands the local  poli tical  dynamics.  There were 
many actors considered in making the decision –  t ricycle drivers, tricycle 
operators, commuters,  private sector, media,  academic insti tutions,  civil  society 
organizations, and external funding agencies.  The core of the program was the 
introduction of “50/50 Scheme”. It  means that  t he 4,000 tricycles that  operate 
daily will  be reduced to 2,000 tricycles through a number -coding scheme. Under 
this scheme, all  tricycles with st ickers “1” can operate only on Monday,  
Wednesday, Friday, and Sunday. Tricycles with stickers “2” can operate o nly on 
Tuesday, Thursday,  Saturday, and Sunday. The decision to carry out this 
scheme had to be carefully made because tricycle drivers are influential  group, 
representing at least  a solid 12,000 votes including their families.  The 
circumstance also matters because at that  time, the May 10, 2010 election was 
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 USAID ASIA, “Puerto Princesa’s Clean Air Act Program: A Best Practices Case Study 
Philippines”, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF102.pdf  (Accessed December 23, 2011).  
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approaching and the city officials aligned with Hagedorn feared that,  when not 
handled properly,  an environmentally-beneficial  program could have a serious 
polit ical backlash. Hagedorn analyzed the loca l  context,  and proposed that a 
two-week experiment can be carried out to determine the impact of the proposed 
program. The tricycle drivers and operators agreed with the guarantee that  the 
scheme will  be discontinued if proven to yield negative results.  After two weeks, 
the overall response of the general  public was posit ive.  The results:  t raffic 
congestion was minimized, tricycles drivers were able to maintain their average 
weekly income despite operating for four days only,  and some claimed that 
health conditions was improved because of less air pollution .  
This case shows that  Hagedorn is a policy decisive leader and has 
mastered the context as well  as  managed the socio-polit ical  dynamics  to attain 
unity of purpose. His poli tical  leadership skil l to commu nicate,  resolve dissents, 
and push through with the program shows some ingredients of achieving policy 
decisiveness .  The insights of this case is  that policy decisiveness –  guided by 
understanding, adapting, and mastering the context –  can be one of the essential 
competences that  a leader should acquire.   
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
Having stated the organizing concepts and the background of housing 
program delivery, this paper aims to suggest that the conventional approach of 
applying collaboration as a strategy to achieve effective program delivery is 
contentious. Although collaboration as strategy for program delivery is prescribed 
in the Philippine Constitution and several policy frameworks , there is no clear 
evidence to show that it is a determinative factor for effectiveness. On the contrary, 
there has been an observable disconnect between what the national policy 
frameworks prescribed and how the actual delivery are carried out, as will be shown 
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later in the case studies.  Furthermore, this paper aims to suggest that policymakers 
and researchers in the Philippines seem to be more inclined towards collaboration as 
explanation for the successes and failures of program delivery when policy 
decisiveness, as alternative explanation, might also shed light in the program 
delivery discourse. In this regard, there is a need to revisit, and investigate how 
policy decisiveness affects program delivery. Greater understanding o f this issue 
can offer insights to improve housing program delivery.  
 
1.2.1 Research Question 
This research answers the question: How does policy decisiveness affects 
program delivery? In answering this question, it should be noted that policy 
decisiveness is viewed as an important defining feature of leadership. Although the 
notion that leadership influences program delivery is already known, this is often 
forgotten in the formulation of policy frameworks . Additionally, in the Philippine 
context, there is a gap in leadership literature, particularly on how leadership affects 
program delivery. Most studies generally describe the qualities of leaders in relation 
to the outcomes, but it failed to show how those qualities are translated into 
outcomes. In other words, while the inputs (i.e. leadership qualities) and the outputs 
(i.e. program delivery or outcomes) are illustrated , the process of how the inputs are 
transformed into outputs is not known. It is expected that by understanding policy 
decisiveness, the question of how leadership affect program delivery can be 
examined. In particular, it can analyze how leaders discuss, agree, define, and 
interpret the policy frameworks for effective delivery of housing programs.  
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1.2.2 Objectives  
The main objective of this research is to understand how policy decisiveness 
affects housing program delivery. Specifically, this paper aims to answer three 
questions that are associated with policy decisiveness .      
Firstly, how does the leader (i.e. mayor) form his choices, decision, policies, 
and actions?  
Secondly, how the does the leader manage the socio -political dynamics 
surrounding program delivery?  
Finally, how does the decision of the leader impact the beneficiar ies? 
 
1.3 Scope, Limitations, and Contributions 
The scope of this research is quite narrow, exploring mainly the process  of 
how policy decisiveness affects program delivery. Using four case studies, this 
paper discusses: (i) how policy decisiveness is exercised, (ii) why policy 
decisiveness has to be reviewed vis -à-vis collaboration; and (iii) how policy 
decisiveness can be promoted to improve program delivery.   
Having a narrow scope, this research has several limitations. First, it is not a 
study about leadership per se but more limited to policy decisiveness as an 
important feature of leadership. While this study describes the initiat ives, 
at tributes, and decisions of leaders in program delivery,  these descriptions are 
not enough to characterize the leadership of individuals ,  who are covered in this 
research. Additionally,  the leadership descriptions ,  as observed through the 
exercise of policy decisiveness,  are more exploratory rather than definit ive.  At 
some point,  this paper will  mention that  policy decisiveness can be achieved 
through leadership.  In this case,  “leadership” is  used as verb and not as a field 
of study, which is broader.  Second, this research is neither an assessment of 
housing program nor  an assessment of the status of squatters in the Philippines. 
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It  should be made perfectly clear that  housing/squatters issue is used only as a  
case point  for analyzing policy decisiveness.  While some statistics are shown, 
these data are used only to suppor t arguments on how policy decisiveness 
affects program delivery. In case the reader needs more detailed information 
about housing and squatting, this paper could not be the best  material .  Third, 
this research is not a comprehensive study of policy decisiveness but an exploratory 
one. Some political scholars may look for monthly or yearly data on squatters to 
show trends or specific numbers of beneficiaries who received either housing or 
homelots before and after elections  and may find that this paper is lacking. While 
this research collected some of this information, it is not detailed enough due to 
limited availability of data. Some, if  not most,  cit ies in the Phil ippines do not 
maintain proper records nor establish a data management system.  Fourth,  the 
characterist ics of cases covered in this research are not the same, and i t  poses 
some issues of comparing them. All four cases  vary in terms of local  context,  
polit ical  dynamics,  and t imeline in which housing program delivery is analyzed. 
Finally,  the arguments stated in this research are not intended for general  
theorizing but for exploring greater  insights on policy decisiveness and 
collaboration. Since the cases are limited to the Phil ippines , and in the context 
of housing program only, t his implies that  the conclusions  and findings have 
lesser potential for generalization. These l imitations are noted, and should be 
addressed in future research of similar interest .   
Despite the l imitations of this study, the following value cannot be 
disregarded. Firs t ly,  the study challenges the conventional wisdom about 
collaboration by arguing that  policy decisiveness also matters.  Secondly, the 
study contributes to the general  knowledge of poli t ical  science by providing 
case studies about the emerging concept of “p olicy decisiveness”.  Finally,  the 
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study sheds some light to the puzzle concerning “how” leadership influences 
effective program delivery.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation  
Given the sheer volume of l i terature devoted to the issues of structure  and 
agency for poli tical  analysis,  some scholars might think that the reflections on 
collaboration (as structure) and policy decisiveness (as agency)  are relatively 
unnecessary. The reali ty,  however,  is somewhat different.  Many poli tical 
scientists ,  policymakers,  and researchers  have dissenting voices about structure 
and agency as framework for analysis .
29
 In  the Phil ippine context,  collaboration 
has been widely prescribed as strategy for program delivery.  Somehow, it  is 
taken as a conventional wisdom.  This prescription has to be reviewed because 
there is  no clear evidence that collaboration is a determinative factor for 
effective program delivery. This paper suggests that  collaboration must be 
reviewed along with policy decisiveness .    
Chapter 2 reviews related literature by briefly introducing the theoretical 
concepts used as framework in this research. It revisits the structure and agency 
debate in political analysis to provide readers a theoretical frame for understanding 
the case studies. The discussions on collaboration and policy decisiveness are 
elaborated in this chapter to guide the analysis.  
Chapter 3 stipulates the research methods and explains why the cases-driven 
analysis is chosen as the best approach to achieve the objectives of the research. It 
also introduces the hypothesis, the research framework, and the methods of how the 
cases were selected.  
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Chapter 4 describes the “successful” case of Marikina City through non-
collaboration. The main reason for success is attributed to the policy decisiveness of 
the mayor, and not the non-collaboration strategy. This chapter is organized into 
three sections to show how policy decisiveness of the mayor affected the housing 
program delivery. The first section describes the profile of Marikina City to show 
the context in which leadership is exercised. The second section describes the 
process of program delivery as well as the policies, decisions, and actions  of the 
mayor. The final section analyzes  the achievements and impacts of housing program 
delivery.   
Chapter 5 describes the “successful” case of Naga City through collaboration.  
While it is shown that collaboration has been crucial factor for effective program 
delivery, it is not the determining factor. The mayor is presented as policy decisive, 
and this is attributed as the main reason why he can facilitate a successful program. 
This chapter describes the policy decisions and actions of the mayor, the process of 
program delivery, and the impacts of the housing program.   
Chapter 6 presents two “less successful” cases of Mandaluyong City and Cebu 
City. The former adopts non-collaboration strategy while the latter adopts 
collaboration strategy. Both cases are described as less successful because the 
mayors are policy indecisive. This chapter provides evidence to the argument: If the 
leader does not exercise policy decisiveness, program delivery will be less 
successful .  
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and recommendations. The key conclusion 
is: If the leader exercises policy decisiveness, program delivery will become more 
successful.  
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter briefly presents the theoretical concepts that are used in this 
research. It revisits the “structure-agency” debate in political analysis to provide 
readers with a theoretical framework for understanding the case studies that are 
presented in the succeeding chapters . Specific discussions on collaboration (as 
structure) and policy decisiveness (as agency) are elaborated in this chapter to guide 
the analysis.  
 
2.1 Structure and Agency 
There has been a complex debate on structure-agency as a framework for 
polit ical  analysis (Hay 2002).  As adopted in this paper,  structure stresses the 
role of institutions while agency stresses the role of leader ship in program 
delivery.  In program delivery, collaboration is seen as an example of structure 
while policy decisiveness is  seen as an example of agency. ‘Structure’ can be 
viewed in many dimensions such as material circumstances, external geopolitical 
contexts, informal institutions – loosely understood as culture, and formal 
institutions such as laws, rules, and regulations.  ‘Agency’, on the other hand, can be 
thought of as the capacity of individuals or sometimes groups to shape their 
environment (Leftwich 2010). While the concepts of structure and agency can 
hardly be separated in reality, it is important to separately understand each 
perspective for purposes of greater understanding and analysis.  
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2.1.1 Structural Perspective 
The structural perspective posits that  effective program delivery can be 
best  explained by a set  of characteristics within the institution. This perspective 
assumes that institution is more determinative factor for program delivery than 
individual.  Scholars,  who support  this perspective,  argue that  insti tutions  
persist  while individuals come and go.  On this ground, insti tutions are believed 
to create greater regulari ty of human behavior,  and therefore enhance its 
predict ive capacity to achieve outcomes.
30
 The arguments for structure (March 
and Olsen 1989, Peters 2000) can be briefly summarized into three key points.    
First ly,  structural  configurations (e.g.  economic, social ,  and poli t ical  
insti tutions) are argued to  generally influence the outcomes of programs. The 
reason is that  these insti tutions define the “rules of the game” for program 
implementation, hence, si tuating and l imiting the actions of individuals.  This 
view denies that  human actor is  the ult imate social reality,  but rather confined 
to the rules of insti tutions.  Therefore ,  program outcomes are better explained by 
structures.   
Secondly,  structures provide systematic arrangement of behavior,  as 
facil i tated by ru les,  regulations,  polices,  and laws. Having a system in place, 
individuals respond to certain arrangements.  In other words,  human actions are 
simply the responses to the structures of one kind or another, in which 
individuals  are si tuated.  
Thirdly,  structural  factors (e.g.  institutional capacity)  provide more 
tangible indicators of determining the outcomes. For instance, i t  is  easier to 
determine the outcomes by l inking its cause to structur es l ike organizations,  
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religion, polit ical  affi l iation, and class rather than looking at  individual 
behavior or at ti tude that  regularly changes.   
As this research builds the case for agential  perspective, cri t icisms on 
structural  perspective have to be outlined. In general ,  structuralists  
underestimated the autonomy and qualit ies of individual to shape outcomes . 
They tend to concentrate on the individual’ s posit ion in a hierarchy, and d id not 
deal  with the ambiguity of human experience as well  as his  unique capacity to 
lead (several  examples to il lustrate this point will  be presented in the next 
section). In fact ,  structuralists are wrong when they argued that  individuals 
behave in a systematic  manner in respond to institutional arrangements.  If  this 
argument is true, why do people abandoned communism? Why do people rallied 
against  dictatorship in many parts of Africa?  Up to now, s tructuralists cannot 
explain these changes.  Even some advocates of the structural  perspective 
recognized these limitations. Peters (2000), for example,  pointed tha t 
insti tutions do change their content and activities,  hence, poses difficulty to 
make strong organizing concept.  The bottom line of this l imitation is that 
advocates of structural  perspective run the risk of hyper -stabil ity of 
explanations and may be seen  as constraints on creativity of actions by 
individuals  (Callinicos 1989, Hay 1995) .   
 
2.1.2 Agential Perspective  
Some scholars share the view that effective program delivery can be 
explained by leadership  (as agency).
31
 This perspective argues that  leaders make 
or reform institutions .  Leaders also implement and make insti tutions  work. The 
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arguments for agency (Aston 2006, Avolio 2002, Giddens 1976, Peters 2000) 
can be brief ly summarized with these three key points.  
First ly,  leaders are possessors  of causal powers to intervene (or not) in 
socio-polit ical  events .
32
 The leadership of Nelson Mandela i l lustrates this point. 
Mandela (through his dedication, decisions,  and actions) was able to dismantle 
the institutionalized racism that  had for some time a legacy of apartheid in 
South Africa.  Through his abil ity to manage socio -polit ical  dynamics from 
different interest groups,  Mandela unite people towards common purpose of 
dismantling apartheid and for that   he was elected as the first black President in  
a multi -racial  nation.   
Secondly,  leaders ,  through their decisions and actions,  can shape 
outcomes of events.  This point is il lustrated by the decisions and deeds of great 
men (e.g.  Napoleon, Hitler,  Mussolini , Thatcher, Bush, and Obama) whom 
through freewill  and behavior had dramatically changed the course of history.  
These examples imply that  history or outcomes of events emanate from the 
freely chosen decisions  and self-determined deeds of ‘great men’ .   
Thirdly,  leaders are free to act  to make institutions work. This view 
argues that  there is  freedom for leaders to act  and the outcomes of those actions 
–  ei ther success or failure –  are explained by the decisions and actions they 
made. The case of President Bill  Clinton of the United States of America shows 
that  through his decisions and actions,  he was able to reform the government 
insti tutions to achieve an economic turnaround out of the crisis. In this case, 
the insti tutions did not constrain the creativity of the President to achieve his 
desired outcomes.
33
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Again, i t  should be clearly noted that  while leaders may have substantial 
charisma and other polit ical  resources,  they can be more successful  in achieving 
certain outcomes if they can channel those resources within known and effective 
insti tutions (Hay 2002).  In this regard, it  is  useful to discuss the complementary 
nature of  structure and agency.  
 
2.1.3 Structure-Agency Complementarity  
Presumably, there is  no current theorist ,  who would argue that ei ther 
agency or structure is an absolute explanation of outcomes. Although many 
scholars are influenced by this debate, i t  can be safely assumed that  most 
scholars today hold the view that  agency and structure are complementary. 
However,  in certain circumstances scholars may prefer one explanatory factor  
over the other for greater analysis.  For instance,  Focault  (1985) observes that 
structure is  no longer viewed as the complete answer to explain outcomes while 
March and Olsen (1989) attempt to rediscover insti tutions as the organizational 
basis of poli tics.  Regardless of preference, structure and agency can be viewed 
as complementary. Giddens (1976) through his  ‘structuration’ theory argues that  
“structure and agency are mutually dependent and internally related ” using the 
metaphor that  they are in fact  two sides of the same coin.   
In practical  sense  (following the complementary nature of structure and 
agency),  institution and leadership cannot  be seen as entirely separate factors.  
Loyal and Barnes (2001)  summarized it s  complementari ty by suggest ing that 
“ leadership stands for the freedom of the contingently acting subject  over and 
against  the constraints that  are thought to derive from enduring  institutions.  To 
the extent that  human beings have agency,  they may act  independently of and in 
opposit ion to structural  constraints,  and/or may (re)consti tute social  structures 
through their freely chosen actions.  To the extent that  they lack agency, hum an 
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beings are conceived of as automata, following the dictates of social  structures 
and exercising no choice in what they do ” .   
The “structure -agency”  framework, as  so far discussed in this paper ,  
provides the theoretical  basis for analyzing the outcomes . In fact ,  some scholars 
have already applied this  framework for polit ical  analysis.  For instance, Aston’s 
(2006) explanation of the Gulf War in Iraq examines whether the actors 
involved are free to make decisions independently of structures.  George Bush 
and Saddam Hussein  can be seen as making decisions and actions based on 
freewill :  Bush following his father’s unfinished business and Saddam Hussein ’s 
personal refusal  to allow weapons inspectors to assess whether he was 
producing weapons of mass destruction.   However,  structural factors might have 
also played an important role such that the rising oil prices may have fuelled 
the economic recession in the US while in Iraqi ,  the development of banned 
weapons was meant to protect  its  interest  due to regional ins tabili ty and conflict .  
The arguments for “structure” and for “agency” as well as the complementary 
nature of these concepts are presented in this section to provide information about 
the underlying thought processes. These concepts are the foundations for  discussing 
the more specific concepts of “collaboration” and “policy decisiveness”.  
 
2.2 Collaboration 
Collaboration, facilitated by insti tutional synergy (as structure) ,  has been 
“widely encouraged through legislation, financial incentives,  and support 
infrastructures”  (Huxham and Vangen 2005: 7).  Collaboration, as a strategy for 
program delivery, is now widely practiced by local governments around the world 
(CEFRIO 2000) and is gaining momentum by escalating the practice across the 
globe (Salamon 1999). In fact, in the Philippines, collaboration is considered as 
solution to social programs that lack resources and manpower support. While 
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program delivery is traditionally practiced as the sole function of the local 
government, these days, the NGOs are engaged in this function. In Europe, greater 
emphasis is now given on improving program delivery by collaborating with the 
nonprofit organizations and private sector (Rhodes 1997, Stoker 2004). 
Collaboration, as applied in this paper, happens when local govern ment “works 
together” with NGO to improve the delivery of housing services. This definition 
implies the “process through which parties, who see different aspects of a problem, 
can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go be yond 
their own limited vision of what is possible” (Gray 1989 : 5), the “process that 
enables independent individuals and organizations to combine their human and 
material resources so that they can accomplish the objectives they are unable to 
bring about alone” (Kanter 1994), the “very positive form of working in association 
with others for some form of mutual benefit” (Huxham 1996 : 7), and the general 
idea of “working together in building social capital, sustaining a democratic society, 
and transforming the civic culture of a community or region” (Chrislip 2002 : 5). In 
essence, collaboration implies that by “working alone” , effective program delivery 
cannot be achieved by any single person or institution.    
With specific emphasis on role of institutions, p rogram delivery patterns can 
generally fall  to either “non -collaboration” or “collaboration”. This dichotomy 
is of course an “ideal type” because in reali ty,  there is  no pattern that  is  purely 
non-collaborative or collaborative.  The non -collaboration pattern,  as described 
in this paper,  simply means non -collaboration with NGOs in housing program  
delivery. Theoretically,  i t  refers broadly to the actions that  are taking place 
within local government’s formal structure in carrying out the program. This 
pattern is  anchored on the tradit ional public administration  paradigm, wherein 
the local government is  seen as the sole insti tution responsible for public 
services delivery. By contrast ,  the collaboration pattern,  as described in this 
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paper,  simply refers to the local  government working together with relevant and 
affected stakeholders such as the NGOs. This pattern is anchored on the 
governance network  paradigm. Since both of these patterns  are anchored on 
different paradigms, i t  is important to begin with establishing the major 
assumptions between these paradigms a nd show how non-collaboration and 
collaboration patterns  are applied along these assumptions.  On one hand, the 
traditional public administration has been the dominant paradigm in carrying 
out programs and services.  The principles and practices of this para digm are 
well-established and documented. Thus, i t  will not be thoroughly explained in 
this paper.
34
 By contrast ,  the “governance network” is relatively an evolving 
paradigm that  is  presented as alternative to the tradit ional public administration. 
This paradigm postulates that  policymaking and program implementation based 
on tradit ional public administration are no longer congruent with actions taking 
place within the formal institutions of government but instead involve the 
participation of relevant and af fected stakeholders in the increasingly complex 
governance structure (Rhodes 2002, Stoker 2003).  Since this is  an evolving 
paradigm, much elaboration will  be presented. The characterist ics and 
shortcomings of each of these paradigms will  be also discussed.  
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2.2.1 Non-Collaboration Pattern  
It  is  argued that  for over two decades,  local  governments have practiced 
the non-collaboration pattern for program delivery  because i t  is  anchored on the 
traditional public administrat ion paradigm. During those decades, the 
traditional public administration paradigm provided the relatively easy answers 
to the difficult  question of how to deliver  public services.  To make this more 
comprehensible, it  is important to review the basic assumptions of this 
paradigm as well as the issues involved.  
According to Walsh and Stewart  (1992) ,  there are five fundamental 
assumptions that  defined how the tradit io nal public administration function s, 
namely: “self-sufficiency, direct  control ,  accountabili ty upward, uniformity,  
and civil  service system” .  Putt ing these assumptions all  together will  bring 
about the important role that  insti tutions play in public servic e delivery.  
Additionally,  based on these assumptions,  and from the works of other key 
advocates for structuralism, the characteristics of non-collaboration pattern 
could be presented in Table 2.1.   
 
Table 2.1 Characterist ics of Non-Collaboration Pattern 
Non-Collaboration Pattern Based on Traditional  
Public Administration Paradigm 
 
Focus on efficiency 
 
Delegation of authority:  roles are specifically defined  
 
Internal  control  to avoid fraud, abuse, and waste and  
 
Rules and procedures are strict ly applied 
 
Roles and responsibil i ties  are key focus  
 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)  are observed 
 
Sources:  Peters  2003 ,  Kickert et.al. 1997, and Walsh  and  S tewart  1992   
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On the basis of Table 2.1,  two general  observations can be made 
concerning the non-collaboration pattern of program delivery. First,  there is  an 
emphasis on formal structures , and local  government structure is seen as 
independent  from society.  The problem with this is  that  structures cannot detect 
the social  changes as well  as the social  dynamics brought about by those 
changes.  Secondly, management  of program delivery is rule-based. The rule-
based cri teria are adopted to ensure internal consistency in the institution.  In  
view of this , institutional performance is  judged on the basis of legal grounds 
rather than actual performance of tasks (Rist  1990). Under the non-
collaboration paradigm, the “public is  largely treated as loyal subjects rather 
than as active clients” .35 According to Peters (2002),  the possibili ty of engaging 
other stakeholders may be present but to “a l imited number of social  actors in 
the policy process at  both the formulation and the implementation stages.  This 
selectivity of access  for social  actors i s to some extent a reflection of the top 
down conception of governing and the associated assumption that  government 
was capable of making i ts own decisions about policy and administration ” .  
Based on i ts  assumptions,  the system of governing under the traditional public 
administration paradigm generally exhibits a non-collaboration of program 
delivery.  However,  recently,  many cri t ics of the traditional public 
administration paradigm have questioned the appropriateness of its  underlying 
processes of program implementation in the context of rapidly changing socio -
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polit ical  environment .
36
 Since the underlying processes have been heavily 
questioned, the perceived mandate that  guides  the public sector is  no longer 
considered as perfectly valid .  In this regard, the governance network  evolved as 
an alternative paradigm, and it  is  where the collaboration pattern of program 
delivery is anchored.  
 
2.2.2 Collaboration Pattern  
The interest  in collaboration for program delivery can be traced from its 
perceived potentials.  The study conducted by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (2001) found that  insti tutional collaboration 
between local government and private sector i mproves the delivery of public 
services for the following reasons.  “First ,  collaboration stimulates the use of 
government measures that  are in line with local priori t ies.  It  promotes the use 
of public programs that could help meet the goals assigned to them. Second, 
collaboration draws public programs closer to locally -identified priorit ies.  It  
gives civil  society and other partners the opportunity to influence the 
implementation of policies.  Finally,  collaboration combines and enhances the 
effect  of public programs and local initiat ives. It  encourages local  governments 
to seek synergies that  could maximize the local impact of various activit ies 
carried out in l ine with local  priori t ies. ”  Other studies conducted in advanced 
nations l ike the United Kingdom (Marcussen 2007, Stoker 2004, Rhodes 1997), 
United States (Salamon 1999),  Australia ( Aulich 2004), Canada (Knopff 2002), 
New Zealand (Craig 2004),  and Japan (Yamamoto 1999) showed similar 
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findings.  Based on those findings,  the characterist ics of collaboration pattern 
could be shown in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2 Characterist ics of Collaboration  Pattern 
Collaboration Pattern Based on  
Governance Network Paradigm 
 
Quali ty is  given key emphasis  
 
Delivery of value to public  
 
Empowerment:  encourages public to make judgments  
  
Flexibil i ty 
 
Focus on accountabil i ty 
 
Discretionary authority is  encouraged 
 
Sources:  Marcussen  2007 ,  S toker  2004,  and  Huxham and Vangen 2005  
 
The systematic focus on collaboration has been collectively known as the 
key element of “governance network”. 37  It  is  believed that  the increasing 
complexit ies of services delivery that  gave rise to governance network .
38
 With 
increasingly complex demands  of people,  local  government alone cannot deliver 
everything unless i t  collaborates with private sectors ,  including NGOs. “This 
relationship between the public and the private sector is known broadly as 
‘governance’” (Pierre and Peters 2000).  While there are many different 
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meanings of governance in the academic l i terature (Rhodes 1996),  the most 
fundamental  notion is that  government is  no longer viewed as sole actor 
compared to  previous t ime. Instead, the government  is  general ly considered as 
part  of the many interacting stakeholders, including public and private sectors.   
The concept of governance network implies  that policymaking takes 
through negotiations with various affected actors “who are interacting on the 
basis of interdependency, trust ,  and jointly developed rules,  norms , and 
discourses”  (Marcussen 2007).  It  is  assumed that  the emergence of  governance 
networks was triggered by the persistent cri ti cism to the traditional public 
administration paradigm in terms of hierarchy and inflexib ili ty.
39
 While the 
“‘governance network  paradigm’  is  also cri ticized as unstable,  diffuse,  and 
opaque, nevertheless i t  clearly deserves scholarly attention because i t  adds 
considerably to the current transformation of the form and functioning of local  
government” (Sorensen 2009). Moreover,  “ it  creates new spaces of governance 
by breaking down the tradit ional dichotomies of state and society,  public and 
private,  and local  and global”  (Torfing 2006).  As such, the boundary between 
state and society becomes blur because of co-governance by multi -stakeholders.  
In other words,  the concept of  governance network  “brings together public and 
private actors in the processes of joint  decision making, and they cut across the 
distinctions between global,  national ,  and local  level governance in the creation 
of tangled, multi-level networks”  (Bache and Flinders 2004).   
Drawing from these concepts, Marcussen (2007: 25) defines governance 
network as “a  relatively stable art iculation of mutually dependent,  but 
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operationally autonomous actors, who interact  through conflict-ridden 
negotiations that  take place within a relatively insti tutionalized framework of 
rules,  norms, shared knowledge and social  imaginaries;  facili tate self -regulated 
policy making in the shadow of hierarchy; and contribute to the production of 
public value in a broad sense of problem definitions,  visions,  ideas, plans and 
concrete regulations”. As an emerging paradigm, the conceptualization of  
governance network  is not yet  well  established . In particular,  governance 
network has some implications in the contexts of insti tutions  as they might be 
self-grown or init iated and designed from above (Rhodes 2000).  They might be 
inter-organization or intra-organizational  (Sorensen 2009).  They might be open 
or closed (Termeer 1997).  They might be loosely coupled or t ightly knit 
(Kickert  1997).  They might be short -l ived or permanent (Huxham 2004).  They 
might be society-wide or sector-specific (Salamon 2003).  In addit ion , 
governance network  may also carry different labels .  As such, they are often 
referred to as  co-governance, public-private partnerships,  ci t izen panels,  
strategic alliances,  advisory boards,  or policy committees (Marcussen 2007). 
These are some of the issues that  need to be addressed in “ governance network” 
paradigm.  
Furthermore, it  is crucial  that  on top of the multi-stakeholder 
collaboration, a definitive governance arrangement needs to be agreed upon to 
contribute to achieving public purposes.
40
 This point is important because 
reports from actual experiences show tha t  collaboration encountered many gaps 
in theory and practice .   Huxham and Vangen (2005: 59-81) have best  il lustrated 
these gaps with the following observations:  (i)  in theory, collaboration 
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converges common aims but in practice the members often cannot agr ee on them, 
(i i)  in theory, collaboration is about sharing of power but in practice people 
behave as if  i t  is  all  in the purse string, (i i i)  in theory, trust  is  necessary for 
successful  collaboration but in practice members are suspicious of each other, 
(iv) in theory, i t  is the organization (e.g.  local  government) that  collaborates 
but in practice i t is  people who interact  and often burnt out because of 
collaboration fatigue, (v) in theory, collaboration is highly manageable but in 
practice everything keeps changing, (vi) in theory, collaborative leadership can 
facil i tate process but in practice, leadership is not always in the hands of 
members,  and (vii) in theory, leadership is  good but in practice,  leadership 
activit ies are continually met with dilemmas and difficult ies. To bridge the gaps 
between theory and practice of collaboration, insti tutional synergy is essential .  
 
2.2.3 Synergy  
Literature suggests that  synergy is what makes collaboration work . 
Synergy, in i ts  broadest  definition, “refers to the combined or ’co-operative’  
effects –  li terally,  the effects produced by things that  ‘operate together ’  (parts, 
elements,  individuals,  or organizations) , associated with the slogan ‘ the whole 
is  greater than the sum of i ts  parts ’” (Corning 1998).  There are various 
i l lustrations of synergy.
41
 One of these is the ‘state -society synergy’,  which is 
based on the argument that  “civic engagement strengthens state insti tutions,  and 
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effective state insti tutions create an environment in which civic engagement is 
more likely to thrive”  (Putnam 1993: 42). This argument is now widely 
supported by evidence drawn from research findings on government -civil 
society collaboration across the world (Salamon 2003).  The common thread in 
many state-society collaborations is that “ the engaged cit izens are a source of 
discipline and information for public agencies,  as well  as on -the-ground 
assistance in the implementation of public projects ”  (Evans 1997).  Evidence 
shows that  closer connections between government and society (e.g.  in 
policymaking and implementation) can result in more participation, 
improvement of democratic practices, and transparency and accountabil i ty 
(Nugent 1993, Ostrom 1996, Tendler 1997, World Bank 1993).   
Based on various experiences on state -society collaborations, Evans 
(1997) has developed the concept of synergy to describe a positive engagement 
that helps promote developmental goals.  He argues that synergy can be ac hieved 
by complementari ty  and embeddedness. The former is based on complementary 
actions between government and citizens while the lat ter is  based on ties 
(embeddedness) that cross the public -private divide.  It  should be emphasized 
that  these two elements of synergy are mutually supportive.  The aim of 
separating the two is not to privilege one over the other but to get  better 
analytical  understanding of the complexit ies of synergist ic relations.  In other 
words,  both complementari ty and embeddedness are requ ired to produce 
synergy.
42
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The conceptualizations of complementarity and embeddedness are useful 
in understanding how synergy works in practice. In the context of housing 
program delivery, the key argument of structuralists is  that  institutional synergy 
makes collaboration work. The main idea surrounding this argument is  that 
public sector and private sector  must work together in delivering the services so 
that  talents,  resources,  and ideas are effectively combined to achieve the 
desired results .  But the question is:  What arrangements or conditions are 
necessary to make institutional synergy work? This question leads to the 
concept of policy decisiveness that  may shed light on the issue.  
 
2.3 Policy Decisiveness 
Policy decisiveness, facilitated by leadership (as agency), has been 
considered as crucial factor for effective program delivery as shown in a number of 
case studies.
43
 The key argument is that policy decisiveness offers greater chances 
for effective program delivery because it  prevents long debates and gridlocks during 
the decision-making process. In general terms, policy decisiveness is viewed as “the 
ability to change or stick to prevailing policy”. 44  It also entails the ability of the 
leader to effectively manage the socio-political dynamics that emerge from the 
interactions of various interest groups. This concept is best understood through the 
“veto player” theory that illustrates the dynamics of pol icymaking process. Veto 
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players are individual or collective actors whose approval is crucial, as their control 
of an office or branch of government empowers them to reject any policy proposal 
(Tsebelis 2002). For example, in a presidential government setup like the 
Philippines, the principal veto players in the policymaking process are the President, 
the Senate, and the House of Representatives. A unanimous decision of all three 
veto players is necessary to pass a policy, and hence, dissent of one of them is 
enough to halt the process and prevent the enactment of a policy.   
 
2.3.1 Policy Decisiveness as Unity of Purpose  
The notion of policy decisiveness implies the ability of the leader to unify 
veto players towards a common purpose. In this regard, t he power (number) and the 
purpose (ideology) of veto players are crucial factors in policy decisiveness. In 
terms of power, when there is only one veto player such as in an absolute monarchy, 
his resolve alone is enough to produce or change policy. However, when there are 
multiple veto players such as in a typical presidential government, the consent of 
each veto player is imperative to produce or change a policy. This implies that it is 
harder to pass a policy when there are multiple veto players but it is  easier when 
there is only one veto player.  In terms of purpose, if all the veto players espouse a 
similar ideology, then, passing a policy – that is consistent with the ideology – is 
faster and less complicated. However, if the veto players have different ideologies, 
then, passing a policy takes longer time and more complicated. On these bases, 
policy decisiveness can be achieved in a context where there is only one veto player 
or when veto players adhere to similar ideology.   
In brief, as discussed by Cox and McCubbins (2001), when there is greater 
number of effective veto players, the policymaking process tends to be  indecisive, 
but more stable. In this case, changing a policy is difficult but once accomplished, 
the veto players tend to adhere to the main tenance of the policy. By contrast, when 
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the number of effective veto players is small, the policymaking process tends to be 
more decisive, but less stable. In this case, changing a policy is relatively easy but 
tends to be unstable, as it is susceptible to change from time to time.  
The number of veto players can influence the  policy output. If the number of 
veto players is less or only one, the policy output tends to serve the interest of the 
public, i.e. “public regardedness”. However, if the number of veto players is large, 
the policy output tends to serve the interest of the private sector, i.e. “private 
regardedness”. The policy output that favors public regardedness resembles public 
goods, improves efficiency of allocations, and promotes the general welfare. By 
contrast, the policy output that favors private regardedness funnels private benefits 
such as projects, subsidies, or loopholes to individuals, groups, or regions.
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Moreover, depending on the context of government, the policymaking process may 
involve many actors who can directly or indirectly affect the policy enactment.  
The veto players are actors whose agreement is indispensable to the 
enactment of policies. Veto players are typically specified in the constitution and in 
the legal frameworks. In the Philippine local government set up for instance, the 
principal actors in local policymaking process are the mayor and the legislative 
council. If the authority to make policy is invested in single veto player either 
executive (i.e. mayor) or legislative (i.e. city council), then the likelihood that a 
single purpose may be able to seize control of policymaking and pervert it to its 
                                                          
45 This outcome is the consequence of the bargaining gam e played by policy actors, where 
each veto player can demand and receive “side payments” in exchange for their agreement to the 
proposed policy. See G.W. Cox and M.D. McCubbins, “Political Structure and Economic Policy: 
The Institutional Determinants of Po licy Outcomes”, in Structure and Policy in Presidential 
Democracies  edited by S. Haggard and M. McCubbins (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,  
1999).  
48 
 
own purpose is increased.
46
 This context provides greater condition for policy 
decisiveness.  
 
2.3.2 Policy Indecisiveness as Gridlock  
Policy indecisiveness happens if the leader fails to unify veto players towards 
a common purpose, thus, resulting in gridlock. I f the authority to make policy is 
invested in multiple veto players, then the likelihood of competing factions to 
consent in policy is increased, and there is high probability for the government to be 
incapable of pursuing public good – it is this kind of context that provides greater 
condition for policy indecisiveness.   
In the process of enacting policy for program delivery, it is essential to 
prevent gridlock so that public good can be pursued. In case of gridlock or policy 
indecisiveness, program delivery can be delayed. If this happens, some of the veto 
players may attempt to pursue their goals unilaterally. According to Linz (1994), 
this unilateral action often circumvents and undermines  the normal constitutional 
processes. It can be safely assumed that unilateral actions can  be likely observed in 
city governments, where the mayor dominates the policymaking process due to 
“patronage politics”. It is therefore essential to investigate the dynamic  interaction 
of veto players in local policymaking process.   
Another consideration in understanding policy indecisiveness is the dynami c 
role of non-veto players. While the consent or dissent of non-veto players is not 
considered directly crucial to the policymaking process , they have the capacity to 
put pressure on the veto players. As highlighted by Tsebelis (1995), the non-veto 
players are considered exogenous to the process and their influence is always 
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channeled through the veto players. Moreover, non-veto players could be either 
internal or external actors. The internal actors operate within, and are subjected to 
the authority of the local government (e.g. local business groups, labor unions, and 
the media), while the external actors operate from the outside, and are independent 
of the authority of the local government (e.g. multinational corporations, 
international organizations, and foreign governments).  Depending on the clout, 
influence, and ideologies of these internal or external actors, their inputs can appear 
in the executive-legislative interface directly or indirectly.   
In the Philippine context, the NGOs and peoples organizations (POs) have 
evolved as one of the more active non-veto players in the local policymaking 
process. Despite their being external entities, NGOs/POs have emerged as 
influential and dominant actors, as they increasingly shape the policy process and 
outcome.
47
 Under the LGC, local governments are encouraged to create local special 
bodies that represent the specific interest of the community to the legislative council. 
To ensure this, sustained pressure is applied to the  veto players as well as on the 
policymaking process. In effect, noncompliance is made politically costly by not 
having support during local elections. As a result of this practice, NGOs/POs 
acquire enormous leverage to set legislative agenda and shape pol icy outcome.  
 
2.3.3 Analytical Advantage of Applying Policy Decisiveness  
Using the notion of policy decisiveness to explain program delivery can offer 
several advantages in critical political analysis. Firstly, the use of policy 
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decisiveness can help eliminate some competing factors such as economic situation 
of local government, location, and socio-political conditions. The key idea is that a 
decisive leader understands all those issues, and performs definitive action to 
overcome the challenges, specifically by unifying all actors towards achieving the 
shared vision. Secondly, the use of policy decisiveness offers option to review the 
role of single individual (specifically the leader) in existing institutions. The review 
process can offer new insights and new case studies to greater understand one of the 
political analysis tool, which is the “structure -agency” framework. Finally, the use 
of policy decisiveness can add value to the prevailing question of how leadership 
affects program delivery. Policy decisiveness can answer this question by showing 
the process and actions of leader that resulted to certain outcomes.  
 
2.3.4 Leadership  
In general, policy decisiveness crucially depends on leadership . The decisions 
and actions of a leader will indicate whether policy decisiveness (or indecisiveness)  
is exercised. In the context of program delivery, l eadership is  essential  in both 
administrative and decision-making concerns.   
On administrative concerns,  leadership is  required to complement 
organizational systems and to enhance subordinate motivation, effectiveness, 
and satisfaction (Bass 1990).  One example of this is  the “ city card system” 
init iated by Mayor Sigfrido R. Tinga of Taguig City,  Phil ippines.  Mayor Tinga 
has effectively delivered the services closer to the people through this 
innovation. Under this system, business establishment and private companies 
operating in the city are levied, and then channeled to serve the poor.  This 
init iative has facili tated greater access to  social  services and improved 
transparency in city transactions (Galing Pook 2009).   
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On policy and decision -making concerns,  leadership is  necessary to 
ensure the coordinated functioning of local  government as it  interacts with a 
dynamic external environment (Bass 1990).  The work of Mayor Alvarez of 
Munoz City,  Phil ippines can be taken as example. Mayor Alvarez has influenced 
the city council  to pass an ordinance allowing partnerships between city 
government  and research centers so that  their collaborative efforts will  benefit 
the local  community.  As a result,  the government’s partnership with National 
Carabao Center  (located within in the city) facil i tated the sett ing up of village 
cooperatives that trained local farmers to raise carabao (water buffalo) and sell 
milk products to supplement income.
48
  
The two cases briefly show that  policy decisiveness,  as exercised by the 
mayor,  can affect  program delivery. In particular, it  can direct  and guide local 
government and human resources toward s strategic objectives and ensure that 
i ts  functions are aligned with the external environment  as well  as to the vision 
of the local  government .   
 
Leaders and Leadership 
Leaders are human actors who make a difference. They do something by 
gett ing people to do a lot more about their community or achieve the vision for 
local  development.  According to Powell (2008),  “leadership is  the art  of gett ing 
people to do more than the science of management says is  possible.  If  the 
science of management says that  the capacity of  this local  government is  at  100 
percent,  good leaders take i t to 110 percent”.  With huge powers vested on local 
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government leaders, leadership is considered as crucial factor in shaping th e 
outcomes of development programs. Leadership can be the engine that powers 
local  government to achieve the goals of development programs. Without 
leadership, program delivery cannot operate effectively and ult imately public 
services will suffer.  Leadership,  wherein the leader enjoys the trust of the 
people and also trust s the power of the people ,  helps facil i tate policy 
decisiveness .
49
 
The term leadership, as used in this research, refers to “the nature of the 
influencing process and its resultant outcomes  that occurs between a leader and 
followers and how this influencing process is  explained by the leader’s 
disposit ional characterist ics and behaviors,  follower perceptions,  at tributions of 
the leader,  and the context in which the influencing process occurs ” (Antonakis, 
Cianciolo,  and Sternberg 2004: 5).  This conceptualization of leadership 
captures the essence of leadership for two reasons.  First,  i t  is  consistent with 
the definit ions used in several  leadership paradigms.
50
 Second, such 
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conceptualization appears in various inquiries about the science of leadership.
51
 
Using this definition, leadership is  vital  for successful implementation of 
programs, and in recognition of this, operational guidance for current and 
prospective leaders can be formulated.
52
  
The abil i ty to lead others is  associated with the concept of power and 
influence. Thus, these two concepts are among the common themes in the study 
of leadership,  part icularly in poli t ical  science.
53
 Power and influence can be the 
key factors to effectively manage the socio-polit ical  dynamics surrounding 
program delivery. For instance, the exercise of power to influence the process 
and outcome of program is one of the areas that  can be dealt  with leadership. 
Power  refers to the means that  leaders have to potenti ally influence others.  It  is 
viewed as the abili ty to cause others to perform actions that  they might not 
otherwise perform. Although influence  is  also viewed as the abil i ty to change 
the behavior of others,  it  tends to be subtler compared with power.  The 
important distinction is that “power embodies the abil ity to change behavior of 
others with regulari ty and ease while influence is less reliable and often 
employs face-to-face interactions”  (Vecchio 2007: 69).   
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While power and influence are taken into acco unt particularly in the 
contexts of policy and program delivery, many poli t ical  scientists are sti ll  
t rying to figure out the best  answer to the question s:  What are the leadership 
attributes  that explain successful  program? How are leadership attributes 
translated into tangible results? So far,  answers to these questions are not direct , 
as most li terature simply pinpoints to the fundamental  concepts of leadership 
and management .
54
 In other words,  leadership is  often always mixed with 
management concept.  According to Bennis and Nanus (2007: 20),  there is  a 
profound difference between management and leadership. “To manage  means to 
bring about,  to accomplish, to have charge of or resp onsibil ity for,  or to 
conduct,  but leading  is  influencing, guiding in direction, course,  action, 
opinion”. In view of this, understanding leadership requires differentiating it 
with the concept of management  (Kotter 2007: 24; Puccio,  Murdock, and Mance 
2007: 6).   
 
Policy Decisiveness as Facilitated by Leadership  
In the context of decision-making, the abili ty of the leader  to unite key 
players towards a common purpose promotes policy decisiveness. In their 
collection of case studies on leadership,  Bennis and Nanus (2007) found that  
specific quali ties such as the abil ity to create shared meaning, having 
distinctive voice,  integrity,  and adaptive capacity  in achieving results  
differentiate decisive and indecisive leaders .  In decision-making process ,  it  can 
be argued that  decisiveness  is an essential  leadership quali ty.  As adopted in this 
paper,  decisiveness is  generally a perception that  the leader is  never conceding 
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in various areas of policy, continuously doing what is  right by acting with 
authority,  and is committed to accountabili ty of outcomes.
55
 If  one wishes to be 
viewed as a decisive leader,  “ it  is  not enough to be perceived to have done the 
right decision, but to have done the right decision against  the odds of public 
opinion”  (Turner 2001).  Moreover,  to be viewed as decisive leader,  these three 
leadership attributes  –  consistency, legal i ty,  and accountabil i ty –  have to be 
observed.
56
 By then, a decisive leader can be described as (i) one who makes 
effective and timely decisions, even when information is limited or solution 
produces unpleasant consequences, (ii) one who is proactive and result-oriented, and 
(iii) one who perceives the impact and implications of the decisions.
57
 
Based on a massive l i terature on leadership, personal attributes can help 
indicate whether the leader  is  inclined to be decisive or indecisive  (Hogan and 
Kaiser 2005).  According to Boin (2005),  a key to understanding decisive 
leadership is  the analysis of how the attributes are demonstrated in different 
contexts.  The idea of decisive leadership is  associated with the leader’s 
competence in understanding the contexts and transcends i t .  This competence is 
essentially mastering the contexts that  guide the leader in making definitive 
decisions.     
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2.4 Summary  
This chapter revisited the structure-agency debate, which is used as the 
analytical framework for this research. It  compared and contrasted the key 
theoretical  arguments for structure and agency in terms of program delivery. 
The discussions particularly highlighted collaboration facil itated by 
insti tutional synergy (as structure) and policy decisiveness facil itated by 
leadership (as agency).  In analyzing the concepts,  previous studies pertaining to 
collaboration and policy decisiveness were reviewed from the global 
experiences and the Phil ippines.  This chapter emphasized that  collaboration and 
policy decisiveness can be separated for purposes of analysis .  However,  in 
reali ty,  such separation does not exist .   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the methodology, and explains why the cases-driven 
analysis is adopted to best achieve the objectives of this research. This chapter also 
introduces the research design, the hypothesis, the research framework, and the 
rationale for selecting the four case studies used for comparison.  
 
3.1 Research Design  
This research adopts a comparative research design. It  compares four 
cases of  housing program delivery, where policy decisiveness is  either present 
or absent .  There are two main reasons for applying a comparative design. The 
first reason is to find out , among the four cases, how policy decisiveness affects 
program delivery. The second reason is to explore,  using the four cases,  
whether program delivery can be effective without policy decisiveness.   
 
3.1.1 Hypothesis 
On the basis of the literature, as reviewed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, this 
research formulates the following hypothesis:  
 
If the leader exercises policy decisiveness, program delivery will 
become more effective.  
 
 By comparing the four case studies, two tests can be carried out to validate 
the hypothesis.  
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Test 1: Is policy decisiveness a determinative factor for effective program 
delivery?  
 
The main objective of this test is twofold. One is to establish a clear 
relationship between policy decisiveness and program delivery. And once this is 
established, the general notion (conventional wisdom) that collaboration determines 
effective program delivery can be rejected. The only way to reject the notion that 
collaboration is a determinative factor for effective program delivery is to show 
cases where collaboration did not work. In performing this test, two cases of 
“successful” program delivery will be compared, using collaboration as controlled 
variable (i.e. one case is utilizes collaboration while the other case does not). The 
test is positive if policy decisiveness is exercised in both successful cases.  The test 
is negative if policy decisiveness is not exercised in one or both successful cases.  
 
Test 2: If the leader does not exercise policy decisiveness, can program 
delivery be effective?  
 
The main objective of this test is to ascertain the critical importance of policy 
decisiveness in affecting program delivery. In other words, program delivery will be 
less effective (or less successful) if the leader does not exercise policy decisiveness. 
In performing this test, two cases of “less successful” program delivery will be 
compared, and again using collaboration as controlled variable (i.e. one case utilize s 
collaboration while the other case does not). The test is positive if policy 
decisiveness is not exercised in both less successful cases.  The test is negative if 
policy decisiveness is exercised in one or both less successful cases.  
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 This research is expecting positive results in both Test 1 and Test 2 so that 
the researcher can strongly argue that policy decisiveness crucially affect program 
delivery.  
 
3.1.2 Research Framework  
The research framework of this paper is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The 
framework assumes that policy decisiveness ( independent variable ) affects 
program delivery (dependent variable ),  and ultimately impacts the 
beneficiaries .   
 
Figure 3.1 Research Framework 
 
In order to understand how policy decisiveness affects  program delivery,  
some indicators were identified, observed, and compared using the case studies. 
In particular,  indicators for policy decisiveness,  program delivery, and impacts 
on beneficiaries were identified. By using these indicators,  the process of how 
policy decisiveness affects program delivery can be  further  described.  
 
Independent Variable  
To infer whether policy decisiveness is exercised, the key indicator is  the 
abil ity of the leader to unify veto players’ different agendas towards a common 
purpose. Otherwise,  the leader is  perceived as policy indecisive if  he is  unable 
to handle the dynamics of veto players resulting into gridlock. In this regard, 
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the following specific indicators need to be analyzed: (i)  how does the leader 
formulate his policies,  decisions, and actions;  (ii)  how does the leader manage 
the socio-poli t ical  dynamics  of veto players ,  and (i i i)  how do the decisions and 
actions of the leader impact the program beneficiaries.   
Dependent Variable  
To infer whether the program delivery is “successful” the key indicator is the 
decreasing number of squatters as a result of implementing the housing program. 
Otherwise, program delivery is considered as “less successful” if the number of 
squatters continues to increase despite implementing the housing program. In this 
regard, the following specific indicators for program delivery need to be analyzed: 
(i) does it prevent entry of new squatters; (ii) does it render “substantive” benefits 
to recipients; and (iii) does it empower the beneficiaries.  In the process of program 
delivery, the dynamics between the leader, the delivery personnel, the veto -players, 
and non-veto players will also be observed.  
 
Controlled Variable 
In comparing the cases, collaboration will be used as controlled variable. This 
means that every time two cases are compared one should be applying collaboration 
and other is not. This is to show that collaboration or non -collaboration does not 
determine the success of program delivery. Collaboration  indicates that city 
government “works together” with CSOs/NGOs in program delivery. By contrast, 
non-collaboration indicates that the city government delivers the program purely on 
its own.  
Guided by this research framework, the process of how of program is 
delivered as well as how policy decisiveness affects delivery can be 
systematically described.  
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3.2 Selection of  Cases  
This study selected four cases because each is unique in terms of  both 
leadership pattern and program delivery pattern  (Figure 3.2) .   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Unique Features of Cases  
 
Each of the four cases has different characterist ics  with respect to the 
variables (i.e.  policy decisiveness,  program delivery, and collaboration) being 
investigated.  
First ly,  there are two cases of policy decisiveness (i .e.  Marikina and 
Naga) but each of these cases has different pattern of program delivery. One 
adopts non-collaboration while the other adopts collaboration.  
Secondly, there are two cases of policy indecisiveness (i.e.  Mandalu yong 
and Cebu).  Again, each of these cases has different pattern of program delivery, 
wherein one adopts non-collaboration while the other adopts collaboration.  
Thirdly,  the two cases are “successful” while the other two cases are “less 
successful”.  Having successful and less successful  cases will  allow the 
researcher to identify which factors are associated with success as well  as 
identify which factors are associated with failure.   
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With these unique characterist ics of each case,  the co mparison can be 
easily carried out in understanding: (i)  which factor is determinative for 
effective program delivery, and (i i)  how policy decisiveness affects program 
delivery. It  should be noted that  each of these cases operates in different 
contexts,  in different t imelines,  and with different dynamics.  Therefore,  the 
value of comparing them is more on understanding the process of program 
delivery rather than understanding the achievements based on statist ics of 
housing units or number of beneficiaries served.  
 
3.2.1 Unit of Analysis  
The unit  of analysis of this study is  policy decisiveness as facil i tated by 
leadership. It  analyzes the choices,  decisions, and actions  of the leader  in terms 
of whether it  facil i tates unity of purpose or gridlock .    
 
3.2.2 Choice of Issue 
Housing issue is chosen  as a case point  for analysis  because i t is one of 
the most cri tical  problems facing most  ci t ies.  Heightened urbanization leads to 
greater housing demands, which essentially call  for leadership in addressing the 
problem. First ly,  the re is  an increasing backlog in the housing programs in most 
ci t ies. Understanding this issue is essential before the local  government 
capacity will  be overtaken by urbanization. Secondly, a huge percentage of  
urban voters are informal sett lers.  This is  a delicate context that  calls  for 
crucial  leadership role in managing the socio-poli tical dynamics.   Finally,  there 
is  limited study on the role of leadership,  specifically on policy decisiveness,  in 
housing program delivery.   
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3.3 Data Collection  
Primary and secondary data are collected for this research. Key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions were conducted. Informants and 
participants were asked about the leadership attributes ,  policy decisions and 
actions of their mayors  to assess whether they exercise policy decisiveness or 
policy indecisiveness .  Additionally,  questions on the interaction of the mayor 
with the program delivery mechanisms were asked.  This is to assess how the 
mayor handles the socio-poli tical  dynamics.  Moreover,  related documentation 
and archival records were also gathered. Memoranda, minutes of meetings, 
agendas,  and announcements were compiled. Writ ten reports,  including 
administrative documents (e.g.  proposals,  progress reports,  local  shelter plan , 
and other internal records),  formal studies,  newspaper clippings,  and art icles 
appearing in the mass media or community newsletters were also collected. 
Organizational structures,  maps and charts,  l ists  of names, and other relevant 
i tems such as previous  records about the housing program activit ies,  including 
those available online were gathered for reference.  
 
3.4 Summary  
This chapter has presented the hypothesis of this research, which was 
formulated based on the analysis of related literature. It also discussed the research 
framework and the rationale for adopting a cases-driven analysis. The research 
framework highlighted “policy decisiveness” as the key variable affecting program 
delivery. Additionally, this chapter presented the bases for choosing housing 
program as the case point for analysis as well as how the case studies were selected. 
The chapter also explained the methodology for testing the hypothesis and how the 
data were collected.  
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CHAPTER 4 
MARIKINA CITY 
 
This chapter describes a successful case of housing program delivery in 
Marikina City under the leadership of Bayani Fernando. It details the process of 
program delivery and offers explanation why the program has been successful 
despite non-collaboration. In developing this case, background information about 
the city, the housing program, and the mayor – specifically his decisions and actions 
– were collected and analyzed.  
 
4.1 Profile of Marikina City  
Apart  from the characterization of having a squatter-free environment, 
the City of Marikina is  known for i ts  local  reforms through strict 
implementation of ordinances as well  as successful implementation of 
innovative projects.
58
 The tangible results of these reforms include better traffic, 
higher income, decline of crime rate,  and cleaner surroundings.
59
 This 
description is a total  opposite to the conditions of Marikina during the 1980s, 
which at  that  t ime was relatively unknown place .  As reported, i t  had the 
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 Rosa Babel F. Calilung, “Exploring Local Governance Initiatives in the Promotion of 
Sustainable and Livable Cities: The Case of Marikina, Philippines”, http://www.codatu.org/wp-
content/uploads/Exploring-local-governance-initiatives-in-the-promotion-of-sustainable-and-livable-cities-Rosa-Babel-
CALILUNG.pdf (Accessed October 5, 2013).   
59
 Valentino G. Baac and Rosette C. Librea, “The Marikina City Resettlement Program: A 
Model for Community and Government Partnership for Development”,  
https://ia600501.us.archive.org/19/items/TheMarikinaCityResettlementProgramAModelForCommunityAndGovernment/Mi
crosoftWord-MarikinaResettlementProgramACaseStudy.pdf (Accessed November 15, 2013).   
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occasional dist inction of being the breeding ground for crime (e.g.  drug pushing, 
abductions,  and homicides)  –  a town with poor peace and order,  a haven of 
squatter colonies,  and a place with sleepy businesses .
60
 In part icular,  one-third 
of Marikina’s population was urban poor squatters ;  the level of crime, including 
rape and murder ,  was high; and the Marikina River was considered as the 
largest  garbage receptacle.
61
 In general ,  infrastructures were in poor condition 
and the government had very l i t t le capacity to get  things done .   
It  was in 1996 that  Marikina earned the status as first  class city .
62
 With 
innovative projects in place,  Marikina became one of the richest local 
governments in the Philippines based on gross net  income and assets.
63
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 International Labour Organization, “Local Economic Development and Youth 
Employment in the Philippines: The Case of Marikina City”, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-manila/documents/publication/wcms_149584.pdf (Accessed October 5, 2013).  
61 Carlyne Yu and Edsel Sajor, “Urban River Rehabilitation: A Case Study in Marikina 
City, Philippines”, http://www.wepa-db.net/pdf/0810forum/paper35.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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 The LGC classifies the cities as follow: the 1st class  city has an average income of 
Php300 million or more. The 2nd class  city has Php240 million or more but less than Php300 
million. The 3rd class  city has Php180 million or more but less than Php24 0 million. The  4th class 
city has Php120 million or more but less than Php180 million. The 5th class city has Php60 
million or more but less than Php120 million, and the  6th class  city has an average income below 
Php60 million.  
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 Bureau of the Local Government Finance-Department of the Finance, LGU Fiscal and 
Financial Profile: Statement of Income and Expenditures Volume II  (Manila: BLGF Publications, 
2007). 
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Additionally,  the innovations in Marikina City lead to great  transformation that 
earned the city with  many awards both local  and international.
64
 
 
4.1.1 Location  
Marikina City is  one of the cit ies in Metro Manila. It s  location is 
21 kilometers at  the eastern part  of Manila –  the capital  city of the Phil ippines  
(Figure 4.1) .  The land area is  approximately 21.5 km
2
,  which is about 3.42% of 
Metro Manila’s total land area .   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Location of Marikina City 
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 For ins tance ,  i t  r ece ived the  “ Cleanest  and Greenest  Ci ty”  award  from the  Gawad  
Gal ing Pook Foundat ion and Hal l  o f  Fame in  tha t  ca tegory , see Galing Pook, “Award Criteria”, 
http://www.galingpook.org/main/gp-awards/award-criteria (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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There are dist inct  features at various parts of Marikina. The northern 
part  is  essentially residential  with some public and private schools.  The 
southern part  is  where the business district  is located, so i t  covers commercial , 
industrial,  and business activit ies.  The western part is where the very rich 
residents occupy.
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4.1.2 Quick Statistics  
There are 16 barangays  that  comprise Marikina.
66
 Polit ically,  each of 
these barangays is  headed by a captain,  who is officially elected into office. 
Table 4.1 presents some quick statistics to further provide an overview  of the 
city.    
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 Charito C. Tordec illa, “The Gatekeepers of Marikina: A Case of In -City Relocation and 
Management of Squatter -Free Community”, http://www.asg.ateneo.edu/file/Best_Practices_3.pdf (Accessed 
May 21, 2009).  
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 The ‘barangay’ is the smallest political unit in the Philippine local government system. 
Barangays are headed by the barangay captains, who are elected along with their barangay 
councilors. See Asian Development Bank, Country Governance Assessment: Philipp ines  
(Mandaluyong: ADB Publications, 2005).  
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Table 4.1 Quick Statistics of Marikina City  
Land Area 21.50 km
2
 
Population (as of 2007 )  490,612
67
 
Density  22,819/km
2
 
Total  Income (as of  2004)  PhP 1.12  Bill ion  
IRA Share (as of  2004 ) PhP 318.24  Mill ion  
Local Source (as of  2004) PhP 804.771  Mill ion 
Income Classification  1
s t
 Class 
City Classification  Highly Urbanized City 
Number of Barangays  16 
   Source:  Ci ty  Planning and Development Off ice  2009  
 
 Marikina City is  a component of the Metro Manila Development 
Authority (MMDA) that  covers 16 cit ies and 1 municipality.
68
 As a first class 
city,  Marikina generates  a high proportion of i ts  income from local sources.  As 
of 2004, 71% of the city’s income was generated from local sources.  The other 
29% was a share from National Government’s Internal Revenue Allotment 
(IRA).  
 
4.1.3 Serving Mayors   
 Table 4.2 shows the l ist  of mayors who served Marikina since 1988. This 
table indicates that  when Bayani Fernando won the elections in 1992, he was 
able to perpetuate himself in power for the next two succeeding elections and 
even transferred the polit ical  leadership to his wife  in 2001. He was appointed 
                                                          
67 As of 2010, the estimated total population of Marikina was 424,150. National Statistics 
Office, “The 2010 Census of Population and Housing”, http://www.census.gov.ph/content/2010-census-
population-and-housing-reveals-philippine-population-9234-million (Accessed November 14, 2013).  
68 See profile of Marikina City in comparison with other cities and municipality in Metro 
Manila, “Metro Manila Development Authority”, http://www.mmda.gov.ph (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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chairman of MMDA (2002-2009) who coordinated all  mayors of Metro Manila 
to facil itate development.  In his capacity as chairman of MMDA and husband of 
the mayor,  Bayani Fernando continued to exert  influence in the governance of 
Marikina City.   
 
Table 4.2 Serving Mayors in Marikina since 1988 Elections  
City/Term 1988- 
1992 
1992- 
1995 
1995- 
1998 
1998- 
2001 
2001 – 
2004 
2004 - 
2007 
2007 – 
2010 
Marikina Rodolfo 
Valentino 
Sr.  
Bayani 
Fernando 
Bayani 
Fernando 
Bayani 
Fernando 
Maria 
Lourdes 
Fernando 
Maria 
Lourdes 
Fernando 
Maria 
Lourdes 
Fernando 
 
In the 2010 national elections,  Bayani Fernando ran for Vice President 
of the Philippines, so he quit his post  as MMDA chairman. In that  election, he 
lost his bid over former Makati City mayor,  Jejomar Binay. It  should be noted 
that  i t  was not Bayani Fernando’s first  taste of los ing in an election. In fact ,  in 
1988, Bayani Fernando first at tempted the mayoralty posit ion in Marikina but 
lost to Benjie Rivera.
69
 Moreover,  i t  should also be noted that the 1988 
elections was the first  local  election under the 1987 Philippine Consti tution. In  
that  regard, the term of office in that first election was about four years to  
accommodate adjustments. Prior to the 1987 Consti tution,  the local elections 
were halted for about two decades under the dictatorial  regime of President 
Marcos. 
 
4.2 Bayani F. Fernando: The Mayor 
Bayani  F. Fernando, popularly known as “BF”, is  perceived as the leader 
who brought Marikina City to i ts  current stature .  He has been a three-term city 
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 Dann Fabros , “Expanding the ‘Marikina Way’ Throughout the Country”, The Philippine 
Free Press 11 (2008): 20-30. 
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mayor,  who changed the status of former municipality into one of the best -
managed cit ies.  BF is a professional  Mechanical  Engineer  and the founder of 
the BF Group of Companies that  deal with constructions and real  estate. With 
his group of companies,  he has built  huge infrastructures including malls, office 
buildings,  industrial  and residential  complexes,  and amusement centers .
70
 
Although there are very few writ ten documents about the personal background 
of BF, his exceptional administrative skil ls  and leadership quali ties have been 
widely noticed and publicized.
71
 In many instances, his leadership attributes 
have been recognized by other local  government leaders  –  specifically his  
policy decisions that  are characterized with firmness and based on 
uncompromising principles.  
 
4.2.1 Strong Resolve  
BF’s policy decisions are usually controversial  but showing strong 
resolve and determination to achieve desired goals. For instance,  in his desire 
to make Marikina as another model for cleanliness and orderliness ,  BF decided 
to clear the sidewalks and demolish  the shanties of il legal squatters.
72
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 Bayani F. Fernando, “The Sojourn of my Life”, http://kingsrebel.blogspot.jp/2010/01/profile-
bayani-fernando.html (Accessed November 12, 2013).  
71 Small Enterprises Research and Development Foundation, “UP ISSI Gave Me 
Foundations of Management”, http://www.serdef.org/archives/1063 (Accessed November 12, 2013).  
72  Olongapo City and Puerto Princesa City (both exemplary cities for cleanliness and 
orderliness in the Philippines) are BF’s benchmarks for cleanliness. BF p i lo ted “c leanl iness  and 
order l iness”  in  barangay Sta .  E lena .  In  tha t  barangay,  BF c leaned  the  Mar ikina  River  and  go t  
r id  o f  squat ters  occupying the  r iverbanks .  He improved  the  loca t ion by put t ing key ameni t ies  
and  infras t ruc tures .  Having Sta ,  E lena  as  p i lo t  al lows people  to  see  the  po tent ia l  o f  Mar ikina 
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Clearing the Sidewalks  
Clearing the sidewalks was among the first  noticeable policy decisions 
that  earned BF the reputation of exercising “polit ical  will”. 73  The sidewalks 
were once considered eyesore with residents using i t  as part  of their private 
property.  To address this,  BF insti tuted a reform program called ,  “Disiplina sa 
Bangketa” (Disciple at  the Sidewalks) .  One of the objectives is  to remove all  
forms of obstruction at  the sidewalks , including i l legal vendors.  The rationale 
for clearing the sidewalks was to prepare the city for development.   This was 
supported by a local  ordinance that  declared “all  materials that  do not belong in 
sidewalks are common garbage and must be disposed”. 74  The ordinance 
provided the legal basis for action  and opportunity for ci ty government to show 
that  they are governed by the rule of law.
75
 There were challenges in 
implementing the ordinance, especially among il legal vendors who sued BF for 
human rights violations. Despite this,  BF continued the program because he 
continually won all  court  cases filed against him, signifying that  he has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
i f  a l l  barangays  wi l l  have  s imi lar  development  approach .  Tomas C. Aguilar Jr.,  interview by 
the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
73 For  BF,  the  moniker  “Mr.  Po l i t ica l  Will”  i s  “s imply do ing what  i s  r igh t  wi thout  fear  
o f  los ing vo tes”.  This concept was popularized by BF himself. See BF’s website,  
http://bayanifernando.com.ph/forum (Accessed July 4, 2010).  
74  Marikina City Ordinance No. 59, Series of 1993 otherwise known as “Disiplina sa 
Bangketa” (Discipline in the Sidewalks).  
75
 Clearing the sidewalks of vendors was controversial in a sense that those affected 
likened BF to a “dictator” or a “tiger”, who is without pity to poor people. However, that was on ly 
the hard start or “birth pains” of better things to come. Arvin R. Santos, interview by the author, 
Marikina City, March 2009.  
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doing the right actions.  After some time, with posit ive results coming in,  the 
constituents of Marikina started to faithfully abide by the r ules and showed full  
support  to the city government.    
There are of course opposing views in clearing the sidewalks,  especially 
the use of force by law enforcers . Some vendors argue that the use of force is  
unacceptable as a way of instil l ing discipline.  In response to this, BF posited 
that laws must be enforced to pave way for development  efforts.
76
 Recognizing 
the complaints of some squatters,  BF put some mechanisms to prevent the 
abused of law enforcers.  One of the mechanisms is a  monitoring system wherein 
an ethics committee hears all  formal complaints that  are submitted to the City 
Council .
77
  
 
Demolishing the Shanties 
BF’s  decision to demolish squatters’ shanties was also controversial .  
The rationale for demolit ion is to ensure safety of squatters –  aside from the 
fact  the shanties are i llegal  structures.
78
 First of al l ,  the il legal structures 
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 Valentino G. Baac and Rosette C. Librea, “The Marikina City Resettlement Program: A 
Model for Community and Government Partnership for Development”,  
https://ia600501.us.archive.org/19/items/TheMarikinaCityResettlementProgramAModelForCommunityAndGovernment/Mi
crosoftWord-MarikinaResettlementProgramACaseStudy.pdf (Accessed November 15, 2013).   
77 Arvin R. Santos, interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
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 Rosa Babel F. Calilung ,  “Exploring Local Governance Initiatives in the Promotion of 
Sustainable and Livable Cities: The Case of Marikina, Philippines”, http://www.codatu.org/wp-
content/uploads/Exploring-local-governance-initiatives-in-the-promotion-of-sustainable-and-livable-cities-Rosa-Babel-
CALILUNG.pdf  (Accessed October 5, 2013).  
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erected by squatters on riverbanks hampered development efforts and 
maintenance of cri tical  facil it ies set  up by the local  government  such as 
drainage. Secondly,  the conditions of squatters  at  the riverbanks were 
detrimental  to health because of  constant  congestion and poor sanitation .  
Thirdly,  the squatters faced continuous threats of floodwaters.  While demolit ion 
can be justified by all  these counts,  BF sti ll  emphasized that  affected families 
have to be relocated from danger zones within the city.
79
  
Based on Section 28 of UDHA, demolit ion is legal if  the following 
conditions are present:  “(i)  when the person or enti t ies occupy danger areas ;  (i i) 
when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be 
implemented; and (ii i)  when there is  a court  order for eviction or demolition. ”  
In enforcing this law, BF was determined to perform outright demolit ions. In  
instances,  where squatters are “caught in the act” erecting i l legal shanties ,  BF 
demolished them outright .
80
 Of course i t cannot be assumed that  demolitions 
would go on smoothly.  In fact ,  there were many problems encountered during 
the demolit ion process,  including confrontation between the city’s demolit ion 
team and the squatters.  In addit ion, there were several  court  cases, including 
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 Charito C. Tordecilla , “The Gatekeepers of Marikina: A Case of In -City Relocation and 
Management of Squatter -Free Community”, http://www.asg.ateneo.edu/file/Best_Practices_3.pdf (Accessed 
May 21, 2009).  
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 Randy David, “Bayani Fernando and the Urban Poor”, 
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20070901-85966/Bayani_Fernando_and_the_urban_poor_ 
(Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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those fi led by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
81
 Most often, the 
complaints concerning demolit ion were formalized through efforts of 
professional squatters who resisted demolitions.  These groups took some photos 
and reported the acts demolit ion to CHR that facil itated the fi l ing of cases to 
the court .
82
 In response to these challenges,  the city government  has been 
organizing community associations and providing them appropriate information. 
Each association has its  president whose tasks include monitoring of members 
and representing the association at  the city government .  Members of the 
association are also expected to police their ranks.  On the part  of  the city 
government,  the task of organizing the communities was challenging  because 
the community organizers are expected to facili tate continuous interaction 
between the government and the people .  However,  only few staffers have the 
capacity to do so.  Part  of the job of the community organizers is to remind the 
beneficiaries of the prohibited actions under the law without gett ing a death 
threat  in return.
83
  
Although BF was successful  in removing the squatters and resettl ing 
them, the greatest  challenge was how to manage people’s reaction. The 
Community Inspectors (CIs) reported seeing two types of sentiments from the 
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 However, while the CHR agreed that the demolitions were legal, it was suggested that it  
must be done in “humane” and “just” manner. Carlota V. Contreras, interview by the author, 
Marikina City, March 2009.  
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 Valentino G. Baac and Rosette C. Librea, “The Marikina City Resettlement Program: A 
Model for Community and Governmen t Partnership for Development”,  
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83 Carlota V. Contreras, interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
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squatters during demolit ion: anger and grief.  However,  the se sentiments began 
to wane during the final  term of BF, when beneficiaries saw the reformations  all 
over the city.  It  goes without saying that  “with strict  implementation of the law, 
most squatters are now enjoying an improved quality of l ife in their own  new 
homes.” 84  Could this be considered a successful  delivery of housing program? 
Most of the former squatters reported that  their l ives are better compared to 
being squatters.  In  fact ,  some previous squatters are now working at  the 
Marikina City Hall .
85
  
 
4.2.2 Non-Collaboration Perspective of Program Delivery  
BF’s perspective on program delivery is generally non -collaborative.  In  
other words,  he did not collaborate with NGOs in implementing the programs . 
Instead, he revitalized the local  bureaucracy by introducing cri t ical  reforms to 
make program delivery more effective.
86
  
                                                          
84 Earthquakes and Megacities Ini tiative-Pacific Disaster Center, “Marikina City Squatter -
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Systems Restructuring  
BF initiated civil service reform in revitalizing local bureaucracy. First  
of al l,  BF terminated inefficient employees,  especially those who got the job 
through nepotism and those with pending court  cases.   By doing these,  BF sent 
a clear message that  graft  and corruption would not be tolerated under his 
administration. Secondly, BF eliminated the op portunity for employees to 
violate rules.  For instance, in the payment system at  the city hall ,  BF changed 
the system from “lining up” with the cit izens to having an “express lane” for 
employees.  In the old system, employees and cit izens queue in the same line to 
pay their  bil ls . However in the new system, the city hall  employees have a 
separate lane. This express lane system has two benefits . One is express service. 
The other is  elimination bribery in the payment process.    
 
Instil ling Discipline  
Although insti l ling discipline appears to be an abstract  concept,  BF 
operationalized it  by promoting transparency, creating a disciplinary board, and 
adopting a system of enforcing the use of explanatory sl ip,  and mission 
orders .
87
 To encourage employees’ support ,  BF provides incentives to those who 
follow orders.  The notion of discipline is generally equated to being “law 
abiding citizen”.  
At the city hall ,  BF has taken transparency into the physical  level .  He 
used glass walls  instead of opaque walls so that employees from different 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
87  The descriptions of each of these elements (i.e.  transparency and disciplin ary board) 
were drawn from interviews as well as from mimeos available at  the Marikina City Public 
Information Office, 2008.  
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offices can see one other .  This is  to show that  ci ty hall  employees have nothing  
to hide to i ts  people , and BF finds this essential  to build trust .
88
 BF also put up 
a disciplinary system through a committee  composed of city administrator,  ci ty 
councilor (who head the blue ribbon committee),  ci ty lawyer,  and head of 
personnel division. The main function of the committee is  to hear formal 
proceedings if  ever there are complaints against  an employee . However,  not all 
complaints that  are  sent to the committee will  be heard immediately,  especially 
if  the complaints  are trivial ,  such as being late at  work once .  The explanation 
sl ip is  another mechanism to insti l l  discipline . The idea is  for any employee to 
explain whenever a complaint is formally writ ten against him/her.  This system 
is advantageous because i t  al lows for communication between superior and 
subordinate.  Furthermore,  a ‘mission order’ for each employee is instituted in 
Marikina City.  This order contains l ist  of work that  an empl oyee is mandated to 
do. The work order is  useful in many respects.  First ly,  when an employee goes 
out at  the office or is  on official business,  he/she will  need to show the 
approved mission order to the personnel department. All  employees understood 
how the mission order system works.  Secondly, the mission order facili tates 
efficiency because each employee is assigned different jobs but is  designed for 
the overall  success of the city because all  mission orders are logically aligned 
to the vision of the city.  Finally,  the mission orders are used as reference in 
assessing productivity of employees.   
                                                          
88  Rosa Babel F. Calilung, “Exploring Local Governance Initiatives in the Promotion of 
Sustainable and Livable Cities: The Case of Marikina, Philippines”, http://www.codatu.org/wp-
content/uploads/Exploring-local-governance-initiatives-in-the-promotion-of-sustainable-and-livable-cities-Rosa-Babel-
CALILUNG.pdf  (Accessed October 5, 2013).  
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Insti l ling discipline is  challenging because people have their own 
interests.  But having laws and regulation s to guide employees’ behavior, 
insti ll ing discipline can be done. The overall  init iat ive of instil ling discipline 
integrates a ‘system of reward ’  promoted in a form of incentives.  Productive 
employees who faithfully complied with the mission orders are gi ven incentives 
through training, higher bonuses,  and trips outside the city.
89
  
 
Streamlining Services Delivery  
To streamline program delivery, BF init iated the warehouse, the 
clustering, the assessment planning, and the minimization of paper works .  The 
warehouse  showcases how properties of the city should be organized and 
accounted. Everything in the warehouse is logically arranged to facil itate  easy 
distribution and access.   In fact ,  “ the warehouse serves as a notable tourist  spot 
for those studying Marikina’s governance and initiat ives ,  as i t  symbolizes 
transparency.” 90  The warehouse is Marikina’s image for efficient services 
delivery and accountabil ity.   
There are many similar initiat ives that  BF introduced to streamline 
service delivery. These include cluster planning and minimization of paper 
works.  The former refers to a system of unified planning process ,  where 
different offices with similar concerns can plan together and come up with 
specific actions to fulfi ll  the vision of the city.  The latter refers to a system 
                                                          
89  See Dann Fabros, “Expanding the ‘Marikina Way’ Throughout the Country”, The 
Philippine Free Press 11 (2008): 20-30.  
90  Sofronio Dulay, “Good Governance and Innovation at the LGU Level: The Cases of 
Marikina City and San Juan City”, https://sites.google.com/site/totidulay/goodgovernance (Accessed August 
15, 2012).  
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promoting a paperless work by using modern technologies such as the 
util ization of fi le sharing software as well  as the uti l ization of electronic 
signatures.
91
  
 
4.2.3 Other Initiatives  
One observation about BF is that  he did not adopt any ideological 
framework in introducing new init iatives .  Instead, he benchmarked with other 
local  governments and showed concrete results,  which people can actually see,  
feel ,  and benefit  from it ,  as demonstrated in his earlier initiat ives .
92
  
 
Delivering Results  
 It  is  crucial  for BF that  every project  must deliver results.  The Save 
Marikina River project  seemed impossible in the early 1990s.
93
 However,  from 
being a dumping area for households and industrial  wastes,  the riverbanks 
became a recreational area surrounded with amenities and sports facil i ties.
94
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 Rosa Babel F. Calilung, “Exploring Local Governance Initiatives in the Promotion of 
Sustainable and Livable Cities: The Case of Marikina, Philippines”, http://www.codatu.org/wp-
content/uploads/Exploring-local-governance-initiatives-in-the-promotion-of-sustainable-and-livable-cities-Rosa-Babel-
CALILUNG.pdf  (Accessed October 5, 2013).  
92
 BF prefers to “benchmark” rather than adopt certain ideologies . Benchmarking for BF 
means achieving concrete results, including surpassing the benchmarks. M elvin A. Cruz, City 
Administrator, interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
93  The Pasig River passes through many cities in Metro Manila. http://www.pasigcity.gov.ph/ 
(Accessed August 5, 2011).  
94
 Carlyne Yu and Edsel Sajor, “Urban River Rehabilitation: A Case Study in Marikina 
City, Philippines”, http://www.wepa-db.net/pdf/0810forum/paper35.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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How did BF deliver these results? First ,  he reorganized the engineering 
department and requested other engineers from his Group of Companies to 
design the infrastructures .  Second, he removed all informal sett lers along the 
riverbanks. Third,  he directed the City Engineering Department to dredge up 
waste,  si lt ,  and gravel from the river. Fourth,  he constructed outfalls  and 
diversion channels.  Finally,  he instructed the engineers to construct dikes.
95
  
The modernization of Marikina’s  public market is another initiat ive that 
delivered good results .  From being disorganized and  untidy, the public market 
has become more systematic and efficient.  In doing this,  BF promoted the use of 
official  and appropriate weighing scales to ensure th at  consumers are not 
deceived. More police agents are assigned in public market to ensure safe ty and 
compliance of ci ty ordinances .
96
 Complementing these initiat ives,  a waste 
management system was also established. BF created the Waste Management 
Office (WMO) to institutionalize waste management operations.  This office is 
provided appropriate funds and equipment for efficient garbage collection such 
as mini-compactor and ten-wheeler trucks .  The init iative resulted in high 
garbage collection efficiency rate of 98% , the highest  in Metro Manila.
97
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 Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative -Pacific Disaster Center,  “Marikina City Flood 
Mitigation Countermeasure Program: Sound Practice No. 5”, http://emi.pdc.org/soundpractices/Metro-
Manila/SP5-MM-Flood-Mitigation-Marikina.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
96  Sofronio Dulay, “Good Governance and Innovation at the LGU Level: The Cases of 
Marikina City and San Juan City”, https://sites.google.com/site/totidulay/goodgovernance (Accessed August 
15, 2012). 
97
 Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative, “Manual of Sound Practices”, http://www.emi-
megacities.org/upload/3cd_2007_MOSP_TR0702.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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Impacts of  Init iatives  
 By casual standards, the initiat ives have significant impacts. First of al l,  
the Marikina River became a tourist  at traction , generating more visitors aside 
from the regular visi ts  made by local  residents.  Secondly, new infrastructures 
were constructed, and i t  facili tated efficiency in market operations as well  as 
waste management.  Finally,  laws and regulations of the city were  effectively 
enforced with citizens faithfully abiding them .
98
  
Of course some people are skeptical .
99
 The skeptics are judging BF’s 
init iatives as pure gimmickry, unsustainable,  and poli tically motivated to ensure 
a win in elections. However,  one thing was clear.  By implementing those 
init iatives ,  the BF administration had shaped the city’s landscape and laid down 
a strong foundation for future development efforts.  In  fact ,  i t  changed 
Marikina’s income classification from a 3rd class municipali ty to a 1st  cl ass 
city in 1996.
100
 
                                                          
98 When BF campaigned for mayor in 1992, he paraded heavy equipment (i.e. pay loaders,  
dump trucks, and graders) so that people can see that he has the tools and equipment to transform 
Marikina. There was a drama during that campaign. Tomas C. Aguilar Jr., interview by the author, 
Marikina City, March 2009.  
99 When BF campaigned for re -election in 1998 his political opponents  were attacking his 
projects as mere façade for politicking. Isa Lorenzo, “Marikina’s (Not so perfect) Makeover.” 
http://pcij.org/i-report/2007/marikina.html (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
100
 When BF came to power in 1992, the annual income of the Marikina was only about 
Php54 million. In just nine (9) months, BF had increased the income to about Php74 million. 
During his last term of office, the Marikina City was earning an annual income of about Php50 0 
million. See Dann Fabros, “Expanding the ‘Marikina Way’ Throughout the Country”, The 
Philippine Free Press 11 (2008): 20-30.  
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4.3 The “Squatter-Free” Program 
This section will  describe the city’s housing program delivery,  which is 
considered “successful”.  Essentially,  t he “Squatter-Free” program has been 
implemented without collaboration with NGOs. The reasons for non-
collaboration can be traced back to BF’s various policy decisions.  In fact ,  BF 
strongly opposed the creation of Local Housing Board (LHB) , which is legally 
mandated under the LGC.
101
 His idea is  that  the city government has enough 
capacity to  plan and implement the program by i tself. By using the city’s own 
insti tutional capacity,  the hassles of long debate and gridlock in both 
policymaking and implementation can be avoided. As early 1988, BF already 
expressed his vision of “Squatter -Free Marikina” during his first campaign for 
mayoralty race.  He did not win in that election, so his  vision was set aside for a 
while. However,  when BF won the elections in 1992, he immediately laid his 
vision into action . BF noticed that  in  1993, about 23,000 squatter families 
(about one third of Marikina’s population that year)  were recorded. 102  These 
squatters were found along the river banks and creeks  as well  as in private 
properties and lands.  
As an init ial  approach, BF ordered the conduct of a census  to determine 
the extent of squatting problem in Marikina .  All  those identified as squatters 
                                                          
101
 The Local Housing Board is the specified local special body provided under the Local 
Government Code as the policy making body  for local housing development. This policy making 
body shall comprise representatives from POs, NGOs, and private sector. This idea is opposed by 
BF. See Sunstar Manila, “Creation of Local Housing Board Opposed”, 
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/man/2008/10/06/news/creation.of.local.housing.board.opposed.html (Accessed 
August 5, 2011).  
102 Marikina Settlements Office, 2009.  
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where then registered. After knowing the number of the squatters,  BF stated the 
following policies:  all  squatters who have stayed in the city for 20 years shall  
become automatic beneficiaries,  and no new squatters will  be covered  as 
beneficiaries .
103
 Under the program, BF decided to remove squatter -families 
from their present locations not only to pave way for urban development 
programs but also for thei r safety.  For example in barangay Parang, one of the 
large government lands was occupied by squatters  so the city government  
redeemed a portion of the roadway. With the removal of the squatters ,  the City 
Government was able to start at tracting investors to  set up industries .  In that 
respect,  BF was quoted saying that  “the city could not afford to be largely a 
residential ci ty,  there must be local development”. 104 He said this in response to 
the cri ticisms that  BF has no sympathy for displaced squatters.   
 
4.3.1 Decisions  
 BF’s choices ,  decisions,  and actions are significant in understanding the 
process of program delivery. Crucial to the implementation of the “squatters -
free” program is the insti tution that  manages i ts  implementation . In this case, 
BF created the Marikina Sett lements Office (MSO) to handle all issues related 
to squatters, demolition, and resettlements. The mission of MSO is “ to provide 
                                                          
103 Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative -Pacific Disaster Center, “Marikina City Squatter -
Free Program: Sound Practice No. 7”, http://emi.pdc.org/soundpractices/Metro-Manila/SP7-MM-Marikina-
Squatter-Free.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
104
 Valentino G. Baac and Rosette C. Librea, “The Marikina City Resettlement Program: A 
Model for Community and Government Partnership for Development”,  
https://ia600501.us.archive.org/19/items/TheMarikinaCityResettlementProgramAModelForCommunityAndGovernment/Mi
crosoftWord-MarikinaResettlementProgramACaseStudy.pdf (Accessed November 15, 2013).  
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decent shelter to the underprivileged and homeless cit izens in urban sett lement 
areas whose lives  are generally marked by economic insecurit ies and whose 
occupancy on the land is uncertain. ” 105  MSO acts as the central  agency in 
developing, regulating, and maintaining the “squatter -free” vision of the city. 106 
The MSO is an internal structure within the ci ty government,  and is very much 
different from the LHB which comprises stakeholders,  including NGOs, POs, 
and private sector.  The key indicator for success is  that  each squatter family is  
given a piece of land to build their house. Hence, in this respect,  MSO 
implements two key policies of the program, which are:  
 
  containment of squatter dwelle rs within the city locali ty  
  provision of 24m2  lot  to each squatter structural  owner  
 
                                                          
105 MSO was es tab l i shed  on February 5 ,  1993  through Execut ive  Order  Number  0003 -
93 .  
106
 So far there are three legal documents within the city government in which MSO is 
anchored. First is Executive Order No. 0003 -93 “Creating the Marikina Settlements Office and 
Defining Thereof Its Duties, Functions, and Responsibilities” which was issued b y Mayor Bayani 
Fernando on February 3, 1993. Second is Ordinance No. 201 Series of 1996 “Ordinance Creating 
the Office of the Municipal Settlements Office and Defining the Functions Thereof”, which was 
adopted by the City Council on November 28 1996. In th is Ordinance, the functions and services 
of the MSO are expanded to include some services. The third is Ordinance No. 237 “Ordinance 
Creating the Staffing Pattern of the Marikina Settlements Office Under the Office of the Mayor of 
Marikina Prescribing Func tions and Responsibilities and Appropriating Funds for Salaries and 
Benefits Therefor” which was adopted by the City Council and approved by Mayor Fernando in 
December 1, 2000.  
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The first  policy means “In -City Resett lement”  (i .e.  squatters will  not be 
resett led outside the city of Marikina,  as mostly practiced by other cit ies in 
Metro Manila).
107
 The second policy means “uniformity” in the size of lot  to be 
allocated to all  qualified beneficiaries.   
 
In-City Resettlements  
The rationale for in -city resett lement is  that  squatters should not be 
transferred outside the city so that  they are not away from their livelihoods and 
schools for their children. When the city government  l iberated approximately 
5km
2
 of lands (previously occupied by squatters)  for infrastructure development, 
squatters had to be relocated  within the city.  In the process of resett lement , 
squatter beneficiaries were given two options.  One, the beneficiaries can stay in 
the land they used to occupy, if  this land is st il l  not yet  covered for 
construction of development projects. The other option is to transfer  to other 
area within the city,  as designated by the government (Table 4.3).   
 
Table 4.3 Major Settlement Sites  
Area Land Area 
(ha) 
No. of  
Families 
Population No. of  
CAs 
1 Tumana  44 7,102 35,510 54 
2 Malanday 44 5,834 29,170 22 
3 Nangka  4.3 1,768 8,840 15 
4 Doña Petra 14 1,863 9,315 9 
5 San Miguel Reali ty  1.99 568 2,840 3 
6 Sto. Niño 1.08 325 1,625 2 
7 Camacho  2.8 514 2,570 2 
Total 112.6 17,974 89,870 107 
 Source:  Marik ina  Se t t lements  Of f ice  2008  
 
                                                          
107 Charito C. Tordecilla, “The Gatekeepers of Marikina: A Case of In -City Relocation and 
Management of Squatter -Free Community”, http://www.asg.ateneo.edu/file/Best_Practices_3.pdf (Accessed 
May 21, 2009).  
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In facil i tat ing the resett lement,  MSO arranges si te visits  and provides bus 
service.  While squatters have options to choose from the various sites,  the final 
decision of which site to take (i.e.  after matching the number of families with 
available slots in the si te) is sti ll  with  the MSO. One important point  is  that 
before the squatters could transfer to the designated si te, they must h ave a 
relocation order  from MSO. The procedure of assigning the house location 
within a resett lement site is  on “first -come first -served basis”.  Therefore,  the 
ones who moved out first  from illegal area will  get  the best location . According 
to the city government,  this is  an incentive for squatters who cooperate with the 
program right away.
108
 
In acquiring private lands for resett lement si tes,  the city government 
undertakes the following process.  First , MSO identifies the lands through the 
Assessor’s Office. Second, MSO makes actual  inspections of the sites. Third, 
MSO identifies the land, which is oftentimes already occupied with squatters. 
Fourth,  city government representatives (e.g.  MSO operations manager,  CMP 
officers,  or the mayor) initiate talks with  the landowners.  This is where 
negotiations and agreements take place.  In most cases,  i t  is  BF who convinces 
landowners to sell  their lands.  His strategy is to show to the landowners that  it  
is  very costly to remove squatter communities if  this is  done by pri vate 
landowners themselves.  BF told the owners that  i t  would be more profitable to 
sell  their property to the beneficiaries according to the assessed value of the 
property.  The results of the negotiation are oftentimes posit ive  that  most private 
landowners sold their lots for resettlement si tes.  In paying the landowners, 
                                                          
108
 Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative -Pacific Disaster Center, “Marikina City Squatter -
Free Program: Sound Practice No. 7”, http://emi.pdc.org/soundpractices/Metro-Manila/SP7-MM-Marikina-
Squatter-Free.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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MSO applies the CMP because this offers incentives,  including: (i)  exemption 
from paying Real Property Taxes;  (i i)  court  l it igation is avoided between the 
landowner and the  squatter families because the lat ter are given the first 
priority to purchase the property;  (i i i)  security of land tenure for informal 
sett lers;  and (iv) lesser requirements compared with other financial  loan scheme 
available to squatters.
109
  
 
Uniformity of  Lot Allocation  
Based on the city government  assessment,  the uniform lot  size of 24m
2
 is 
enough for single family.  BF justified this by saying that  “what matters is  not 
the size of land but the standards of living and sanitation in the area. ”110 There 
two functions of the uniform lot  size policy: one is to ensure that  all  squatters 
can be appropriated lot from limited amount of land, and the other is  to 
discourage relatives of squatters to l ive in the city with them. This strategy 
worked because as of March 2009, there have been no new squatters recorded in 
the city.
111
 In enforcing this policy, t here were strict criteria for disposing lands. 
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 Valentino G. Baac and Rosette C. Librea, “The Marikina City Resettlement Program: A 
Model for Community and Government Partnership for Development”,  
https://ia600501.us.archive.org/19/items/TheMarikinaCityResettlementProgramAModelForCommunityAndGovernment/Mi
crosoftWord-MarikinaResettlementProgramACaseStudy.pdf (Accessed November 15, 2013).  
110 Charito C. Tordecilla, “The Gatekeepers of Marikina: A Case of In -City Relocation and 
Management of Squatter -Free Community”, http://www.asg.ateneo.edu/file/Best_Practices_3.pdf (Accessed 
May 21, 2009).  
111 Cities Alliance, “Marikina City Development Strategy”, 
http://citiesalliance.org/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CAFiles/Projects/City_of_Marikina.pdf (Accessed November 14, 
2012).  
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First  of al l,  the beneficiaries must be members of community association (as 
also required by CMP). As of August 2008, about 247 associations (Table 4.4) 
were organized by MSO. During BF’s administration, community associations 
were envisioned to be self -reliant,  and normally,  i t  takes about 6 months to 
organize a single association.
112
  
 
Table 4.4 Community Associations and Number of Households  
No. Status of  Land Security  Number of  
Associations 
Number of  
Households 
1 With Security of Land Tenure  102 9,879 
2 With Secured Lot Allocation  127 18,448 
3 To be Relocated (st ill  in danger areas)  8 998 
4 Unorganized colonies in private lands  10 529 
Total 247 29,854 
Source:  Marik ina Set t lements  Of f ice  2008  
 
Secondly, based on Section 5 of UDHA, beneficiaries must be a Filipino 
cit izen, who is underprivileged.
113
 The beneficiary “must not own any real 
property whether in the urban or rural areas and must not be a professional 
squatter or a member of squatt ing syndicates ” .  Thirdly,  in terms of avail ing for 
relocat ion, renters  who rent between PhP150-400 a month will  be considered 
eligible while sharers  ( i .e.  married children of structure owners,  aunts, uncles, 
cousins,  nephews/nieces,  and children sharing or living in the house of the 
qualified beneficiary) are not  enti tled to avail  for relocation.
114
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 Lilia Ramos, interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
113  Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, “Urban Development and Housing Act of 
1992”, http://hlurb.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/laws-issuances/mandates/ra_7279.pdf (Accessed August 15, 2012).  
114 Valentino G. Baac and Rosette C. Librea, “The Marikina City Resettlement Program: A 
Model for Community and Government Partnership for Development”,  
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4.3.2 Delivery Mechanism  
 Marikina City solely implements the “squatters-free”  program through the 
MSO. Considering the bulk of functions and services,  MSO has to maintain over 
75 employees who are distributed in different divisions.  MSO operates under 
the Office of the Mayor and headed by an MSO Chief.  It  has a total  of five 
divisions as shown in Figure 4.2.  The Administrative Division  controls and 
maintains records, budget and supplies,  property custody, clearan ces facil i tat ion, 
personnel matters, and information, education, and communication matters. The 
Housing and Homesite Regulation Division  has two sections.  One is the 
inspectorate section, which monitors and prevents the erection of i llegal 
structure, inspects and investigates new occupants, and facili tates coordination 
with various offices and departments within the city government to effectively 
implement MSO programs. In particular,  MSO coordinates and works with the 
City Police,  City Planning and Develop ment Office, Assessor’s Office, 
Engineering Department,  City Health Office,  and Department of Social  Welfare 
and Development. The other section is the homesite regulation, which conducts 
the clearing of sidewalks and disposing of solid wastes .    
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    Source:  Marik ina  Se tt lements  Off ice  2009 
Figure 4.2 MSO Functional Structure  
 
The Land Census Survey Division does census and mapping, subdivision 
plan preparation and evaluation, occupancy checking, boundary identification 
and marking, property research and verification, socioeconomic profiling, and 
lot  acquisit ion, and resett lement site identification. The  Estate Management 
Division  does community organizing, project  acquisit ion a nd disposition, and 
accounts monitoring and maintenance. Finally,  the  Basic Services and Facil it ies 
Development Division  performs water and electricity connections, community 
and housing design, aesthetic projects,  community facil i t ies (e.g.  multi -purpose 
building and police outposts),  open -space development (e.g.  parks and 
playgrounds),  and community bil lboards and markers.   
Source: MSO 2009 
Source: Mar ik ina  Set t lements Off i ce  
2009  
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 Essentially,  MSO does not need NGO assistance in fulfi ll ing i ts  functions 
because almost al l  functions are already covered by the di visions.
115
 In fact, 
community organizing, which is the strength of many NGOs is also taken cared 
by MSO through the Estate Management Division. The MSO function al 
structure is  designed in such a way that  i t  can efficiently and effectively 
implement the “Squatter-Free” program, which generally includes the following 
steps:  “(i)  land inventory, (i i)  identification of squatter colonies,  (i ii)  census 
survey and structural  mapping, (iv) socialized housing registration, (v) 
classification of colonies for appropriate type of resett lement,  (vi) 
dialogue/meeting, (vii)  agreement for relocation, (viii)  declaration of settlement 
si te, (ix) negotiation and Memorandum of Agreement signing with landowners, 
(x) actual  demolit ion and relocation, (xi) land developmen t in the sett lement 
si tes,  and (xii) conversion of emergency relocation site to permanent settlement 
si te.”116 
 
Process of  Resolving Conflict  
 There is  a strong dynamics between MSO and squatters,  especially when 
demolit ion is involved and affected communities resist.  How MSO, upon BF 
directions,  resolves this issues  offers some lessons.  For example in barangay 
Agus,  MSO encountered difficult ies in persuading the community to move ou t 
in order to facili tate road construction . While the MSO asked the communities 
in Agus to transfer long t ime ago, the squatter families remained in the area.  
Added reason to their resistance was the support  coming from lobbyists, 
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116  Marikina Settlements Office, “Steps for Implementing the Squatte r-Free Program” 
(Mimeo, 2007).  
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opposit ion polit icians,  NGOs, and professional squatters who have interests 
with those squatters.
117
 BF studied these dynamics and strategized to pursue the 
needed development effort .  In this part icular case ,  BF was quoted as saying, “I 
cannot cry with the poor because if my eyes ar e blinded by tears,  I cannot carry 
them out of poverty”. 118 So, BF ordered the demolit ion of shanties .  With BF’s 
determination, the Agus residents later found themselves transferring to 
resett lement si tes provided by the city government.  Of course BF’s decision to 
proceed with the demolit ion was a surprise to many  people because i t was few 
months away to the next elections,  and it  might af fect  his chances for reelection. 
Although BF was reelected, he found that  he did not receive much votes  from 
squatters in Agus. The case of  Agus was a learning experience for the city that  
i t  further improved the MSO’s abil ity to  resolve squatter-related conflicts. In  
particular,  i t  came up with new policies to help manage the housing program, 
including: “(i)  slum dwellers shall  be given preference to stay in their present 
residences,  if  possible;  (i i)  if  any transfer shall  be done, the new place should 
be better than their present community;  (i i i) the residents should be willin g to 
pay for the land;  (iv) payment should be made in installment and preferably on 
long-term basis;  and (v) the city government shall  take full  responsibil i ty of the 
total sett lement  function for Marikina.”   
 
 
                                                          
117 There are reports that those squatters in Agus were being politicized. People, who were 
against BF or those who belong to other political parties were behind the resistance of squatter 
communities. Tomas C. Aguilar Jr. , in terview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
118
 Bayani Fernando, “Bayanisms: Quotable Quotes”, http://bayanifernando.com.ph/bayanisms 
(Accessed July 4, 2010).  
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Dealing with Squatters  
 In dealing with squatters,  MSO takes several  actions.  First ly,  MSO 
controls the entry of  new squatters into the city territory .  In doing this,  MSO 
enforces existing law that  no structures could be built  without a permit  from the 
City Hall .  MSO seeks assistance from barangay officials to monitor the building 
of i llegal structures.  If  i l legal structure is  built ,  MSO demolishes outr ight 
without any notice.  The Demolit ion Unit (DU) of MSO is responsible for all  the 
demolit ion jobs.  In dealing with squatters who will l ikely resist  demolition, 
representatives from MSO are reaching out to community to explain that 
demolit ion has to be done to promote development and better quality of l ife . 
Additionally,  the common reasons for demolition are:  “(i)  the squatters are 
occupying a dangerous area,  (i i)  they are erecting i l legal structures,  and (ii i) 
they are staying in i l legal locations. ”119 It  is  for these reasons that  they have to 
be removed and resett led to other areas within the city.   
Secondly, MSO init iates dialogue with squatters .  During each dialogue, 
MSO studies whether an “on -site development” or “off -site development” 
project  is appropriate .  MSO observes that  the common problems in squatter 
areas are “ownership of land, drainage system, access roads and alleys,  potable 
water,  l ight,  and a decent house.” 120  The process of having a dialogue starts 
                                                          
119 Valentino G. Baac and Rosette C. Librea, “The Marikina City Resettlement Program: A 
Model for Community and Government Partnership for Development”,  
https://ia600501.us.archive.org/19/items/TheMarikinaCityResettlementProgramAModelForCommunityAndGovernment/Mi
crosoftWord-MarikinaResettlementProgramACaseStudy.pdf (Accessed November 15, 2013).  
120
 Sofronio Dulay, “Good Governance and Innovation at the LGU Level: The Cases of 
Marikina City and San Juan City”, https://sites.google.com/site/totidulay/goodgovernance (Accessed August 
15, 2012). 
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with MSO identifying someone they know in the community.  Through that  
person, a meeting will  be arranged. During the dialogue, those who are not 
convinced of the program will be visi ted by MSO officers. Once the community 
agrees,  BF will  meet them and explain the details  of the program. On the basis 
of the agreement,  MSO will issue a seven -day notice (and 30 days moratorium) 
before transferring the squatter beneficiaries to the resett lement si tes.
121
 
Squatters are given the choice to decide where they want to be resett led.  In case 
the squatters do not l ike the relocation area,  they can have the option to go back 
to their provinces.  If  they decide to go back to their provinces,  MSO provides 
support  to cover their transportation cost .
122
 For those who agreed to be 
relocated, the transfer is  done in a s ystematic way. A temporary shelter is  
provided, unti l their houses are fully reconstructed.  
Thirdly,  MSO assigns responsibil ities to squatter communities .  
Beneficiaries have obligations and responsibil it ies.  Aside from paying for the 
land and construction of their houses, they have to show discipline and obey 
city ordinances.  There are over 50 responsibili ties that  the city government 
assigned to squatter communities. For  instance, squatter communities  are 
expected to preserve road pavements and alleys.
123
 The squatter communities 
                                                          
121
 Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative -Pacific Disaster Center, “Marikina City Squatter -
Free Program: Sound Practice No. 7”, http://emi.pdc.org/soundpractices/Metro-Manila/SP7-MM-Marikina-
Squatter-Free.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
122 Arvin R. Santos, interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
123  The assignment of these responsibilities are based on city ordinances (i.e. Ordinance 
No. 59, Ordinance No. 57, Ordinance No. 67, Ordinance  No. 74, Ordinance No. 108, Ordinance 
No. 116, Ordinance No. 86, and Ordinance No. 163) that are enforced in the city.  
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are also expected to manage their associations and support the maintenance of 
the housing program.
124
   
Finally,  MSO informs squatter -communities of  i ts  services .  It  offers 
various services such as the Local Government Shelter Project ,  wherein the city 
government reclassifies i ts park lots property into permanent residential areas 
to allow underprivileged families the opportunity to secure legitimate 
ownership of their homes and lots. The rationale for this service is that 
“ownership of even a small piece of land gives dignity and self -respect.  It  
provides a strong motivation for people to build a better community to be in 
harmony with each other and w ith nature”. 125  The land and census surveys  
facil i tated by MSO are uti l ized for boundary disputes sett lements,  subdivision 
planning and design, structural mapping, land researches,  and inter -agency 
coordination. The functions relating to dismantling and prevention of  the 
construction of  il legal structures include survey and containment of informal 
sett lers,  identifying new illegal occupants,  clearing of encroachment,  and 
demolit ion of newly-buil t  i l legal structures and obstructions.  The city 
government provides caretaker services to effectively secure the lots of 
property owners.   
 
4.4 Policy Decisiveness of BF  
 The housing program delivery in Marikina is generally considered “successful” 
because it effectively reduced the number squatters as shown in Table 4.5.  
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 Lilia Ramos, interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
125 Carlota V. Contreras, interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
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Table 4.5 Estimated Number of Squatters in Marikina 1993~2007  
Year 1993 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Total 19,974  14,501  11,016 6,490 1,271 
 Source: Marik ina Se t t lements  Of f ice  2009  
 
 When the program started in 1993, the city identified about 19,974 squatter 
families. As the year progresses, the number of squatters has been consistently 
reduced. Hence, in 2007, the number of squatter families had been down to 1,271. In 
addition to reducing the number of squatters, the services provided to beneficiaries 
were also remarkable as summarized in Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6 Achievements of the Squatter -Free Program as of 2008 
Families who were relocated  17,974 
Sites for resett lements   7 
Community associations  that  were organized   247 
Families that have secure  land tenure  14,310 
Families to be relocated  1,448 
Families with electrici ty meter s  26,964 
Families water meters   24,245 
Squatter families who remain in private lands  1,271 
Total  land area of sett lement si tes  63,130m
2
 
Area for Emergency Relocation Centers  9,307m
2
  
CMP Payments  (amount of payment per month)  PhP250-400 
Population of highly dense communities (no. of families)  26,964  
 Source:  Marik ina  Se t t lements  Of f ice  2008  
 
These achievements indicate that the program did not only resolve the 
problem of squatt ing but also security of tenure and safety.  These achievements 
can be attributed to BF’s exercise of policy decisiveness.   
Firstly, BF decided to stop squatter growth. He did it by rallying behind the 
city council and community to prevent entry of new squatters. With such decision, 
BF has shown a clear understanding of the root cause of squatting problem that 
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allowed him to initiate a definitive solution. He understood that the lack of land to 
build a house and the influx of squatters into the city had contributed greatly to the 
squatting problem. With this understanding, BF decided that solutions have to be 
directed to providing homelots to qualified squatter beneficiaries  and preventing 
new squatters from coming into the city. It is within this context that the policies of 
squatters-free program are centered.  
Secondly, BF has unified the conflicting interests of stakeholders towards a 
common goal by using his authority as mayor. He applies legal mandates and 
provisions of law to justify his decisions and actions. For instance, in convincing 
people to support his policies he referred to what the law dictates (e.g. the UDHA 
and LGC) and implement them. In addition, he convinced people by showing results 
from pilot projects. He shows determination that results can be achieved because the 
city has strong institutional capacity.   
Finally, BF applied his past experience in business management  to deliver the 
housing program. BF has long managed his corporation and business, where he 
learned the value of benchmarking, showing results, and rallying people behind a 
common vision. He understood that in order to deliver results, people need guidance. 
So, he introduced the “Guide to Lead” that he formulated and practiced  to help 
manage the city affairs. 
126
 The employees of MSO applied these guidelines “by 
                                                          
126
 BF’s Guide to Lead  –  “(1) Know your objective and resources, (2) Draw a plan to the 
last bolt and the last man, (3) Sell your plan, (4) Deploy as much and proper tools for the job, let 
the tool do the job, (5) Make sure everyman has his orders, (6) Give comfort to every man, (7 ) 
Make sure everyone is doing his share, (8) When things go wrong and you're pressed for time, 
don't do it alone - Let the organization help you to keep task in line. The organization is bigger 
than you may think, (9) Change plan or abort mission if the jo b cannot be done, but get prior 
clearance from whoever gave you the order, (10) When in doubt report, (11) When the job is done 
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heart”,  at tributing to smooth and successful  implementation  of the squatters-
free program.
127
  
 
Program’s Impact and Challenges   
Viewed from the perspectives of the urban poor,  the impacts of the 
“Squatter-Free” program are remarkable.  It  provided beneficiaries with lots , 
which they can call  their own. The beneficiaries,  who have been relocated, are 
now enjoying the luxury of l iving in safe environment with reliable uti li t ies and 
basic infrastructure facil i ties .  The beneficiaries have also gained greater access 
to other essential services like garbage collec tion and other related social  
services.  Broad lessons can be summarized from implementing the program. 
First , the problem of housing for the poor is  not the house but the land. What 
the slums need is land  that  they can afford to pay. Second, ownership of s mall 
piece of land gives dignity and self -respect.  It  provides motivation to build a 
better community.  Third,  the in-city sett lement policy eliminates the issue of 
displacement and ensures social  acceptabili ty.  Fourth,  al leviati ng squatt ing 
problem improves the community’s competit iveness.  Finally,  a s shown in this 
case,  squatter-free community is  not an impossible task.  
Although the impacts of the program are remarkable, various challenges 
remain. Some charges from the CHR, on account that Marikina  City violated 
human rights during demolit ions,  are st il l  reported. MSO was also charged for 
not holding dialogues or meetings with affected squatter communities prior to 
demolit ion, a charge which the MSO denied. There are also some legal charges 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
–  report, and (12) If you succeed. Let everyone know. If you fail, let me be the first to know ”.  See 
http://www.mmda.gov.ph/guidetoleadbf.jpg (Accessed July 19, 2009).  
127
 Melvin A. Cruz, City, interview by the author, Marikina City, March 2009.  
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fi led against  MSO regarding claims on ti t les.  Moreover,  there is  a difficulty in 
tracing professional squatters and refusal  of some squatters to be relocated. 
Another challenge is where to resett le the remaining 1,500 squatter families. 
Likewise,  some private landowners do not agree with the terms of the city 
governments. Among others,  the presence of conflict ing groups or associations 
delayed some dialogues with the squatter communit ies.  These challenges need 
to be addressed.  
 
4.5 Summary  
 This chapter showed how policy decisiveness, as exercised by BF, facilitated 
an effective program delivery. The program has effectively reduced the number of 
squatters 19,974 in 1993 to 1,271 in 2007. How did policy decisiveness contribute 
to achieve this? Firstly, BF decided to stop squatter growth. He did it by rallying 
behind the city council and community to prevent entry of new squatters. Secondly, 
BF has unified the conflicting interests of stakeholders towards a common goal by 
using his authority as mayor. He utilizes legal mandates and provisions of law to 
justify his decisions and actions. Finally, BF applied his past experience in business 
management to deliver the housing program. He used tools such as benchmarking 
and achieving results.  
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CHAPTER 5 
NAGA CITY 
 
This chapter presents the successful case of housing program delivery in 
Naga City. Since this case is generally considered as “model” for doing 
collaboration in the Philippines, the process of how collaboration is facilitated will 
be thoroughly discussed. To understand why this case is considered successful, the 
decisions and actions made by Jesse M. Robredo along with the challenges faced by 
the city government will be scrutinized and analyzed.   
 
5.1 Profile of Naga City   
With i ts strong reputation as exemplary local  government in the 
Phil ippines,  Naga City has been recognized as the center for local  governance  
to upscale lessons to other LGUs .
128
 How Naga attained its current state is a 
product of various development efforts and programs to overcome th e 
challenges,  including social  and economic problems. In the late 1980s,  the 
economic challenges were tremendous that  downgraded Naga City from first-
class to third class city,  as indicated by the Department of Finance.
129
 Robredo 
(2006: 9) reported that  the “ three-storey public market, considered in 1969 as 
                                                          
128
 In June 2009, the Naga City Governance Institute (NCGI) was established to scal e up 
its success to other cities. The establishment of the NCGI was supported by the World Bank. See 
World Bank, “Naga City: a shining light of good governance in the Philippines”, 
http://go.worldbank.org/NNAP2HX8F0 (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
129
 Bureau of Local Government Finance –  Department of Finance, LGU Fiscal and 
Financial Profile: Statement of Income and Expenditures Volume II  (Manila: BLGF Publications, 
2007). 
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Southeast  Asia’s biggest ,  was in shambles and soon hit by a fire that ate up one 
third of available space. The central  business district  was overcrowded, shying 
away potential  investors.  Traffic volume, swollen by countless buses and 
jeepneys (public util i ty vehicles) at  the terminal inside the business district, 
was unmanageable” .  In other words, there was li t tle employment opportunity 
and the economic was no t growing. The business sector expressed no confidence 
and people demonstrated low trust  with the government .  Additionally,  while 
there were a number of  business establishments ,  the collection of business tax 
was poor. As a result ,  social services were poorly delivered and s ubstandard.
130
 
The social  problems were also alarming such that  b asic services  were 
deteriorating, such as education and health services. Crime was increasing and 
i l legal gambling proliferated because poli t ical  leadership seemed to tolerate the 
practice.  Most importantly,  the number of informal sett lements went up –  
doubling to more than 20% from only 10% in just  about 10 years (Robredo 
2006).  Viewed in this light,  the demand for an aggressive,  creative,  and 
effective leadership at  ci ty government  became more pronounced .   
As far as the population is concerned, r ecords from the city government 
showed that  as of 1990, about 9% of the entire population came from other 
localit ies in a span of five years.  This percentage accounts  for 1.5% annual 
inflow of population .
131
 According Kawanaka (2002),  there are about twenty 
rich families in Naga City who are big property owners.  They are urban 
capitalists,  who engaged in various kinds of business. The property owners are 
classified into two categories: agricultural landowners  and commercial 
                                                          
130
 Princeton University, “Innovations for Successful Societies”, 
http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/oralhistories/view.xml?id=327 (Accessed November 18, 2013) .  
131 Naga City Planning and Development Office, 2009.  
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landowners.  The most prominent are the commercial  land owners.  Their 
properties are the most lucrative, especially those located around the center of 
the city and they collect rents from business estab lishments. Some property 
owners even manage universities on the land they own. The urban capitalists for 
the most part engage in large -scale wholesale and retail  trade. They also run 
hotels,  restaurants, and movie theaters.  Below them are the medium and sm all-
scale businessmen who are mostly of Chinese descent.  The city's  white -collar 
ranks are made up of medical doctors,  dentists, lawyers,  engineers as well as 
teachers,  government employees,  and private sector employees .  At the lower 
end of the economic ranks are the marginal businessmen and manual workers. 
They make up the market and street  vendors,  small -scale eatery owners,  sari -
sari  store owners,  watch and shoe repairers,  drivers,  construction laborers,  and 
other kind of laborers.   
Since the beginning of 1990s, the challenges have been gradually 
addressed, resulting into much improved social  conditions.  Eventually in 2000s, 
Naga City became a repository of good practices and trailblazing init iatives  for 
local  developments . It  has received more than 190 national and international 
recognitions from several  award -giving bodies ,  including the 1998 Dubai 
International Award for best  practice in governance worldwide.
132
 The sections 
that  follow describe how these achievements and recognitions were attained.  
 
  
                                                          
132
 Naga City, “Awards and Recognition” http://www.naga.gov.ph/cityhall/awards.html (Accessed 
August 5, 2011).  
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5.1.1 Location  
Naga City is  located in the Bicol region - one of the administrative 
regions of the Phil ippines  at  the southeastern  part  of Luzon.
133
 From the Manila, 
Naga is about 377 kilometers southeast . While the city has relatively small land 
area compared to all other cit ies in Bicol ,  i t  is  the most densely-populated city 
of the region (Figure 5.1) .   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Location of Naga City  
 
Within the Philippines, Naga City is  small in terms of size and population. 
However,  within the Bicol Region, it  is the second biggest  ci ty after Legazpi 
                                                          
133
 The ‘Bicol Region’ is one of the Philippines’ 17 administrative regions. It is made up 
of six provinces (including the province of Camarines Sur), seven cities, and one hundred seven 
municipalities. See National Statistics Coordinating Board, “List of Regions as of June 2008”, 
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/listreg.asp (Accessed July 5, 2010).  
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(National Statist ics Office 2008).  Naga City is  generally known as the “Heart  of 
Bicol” being the center for religious,  economic,  and cultural activit ies .   
 
5.1.2 Quick Statistics 
Naga City is  spread over an area of 7,748 hectares .  Of which 75.1% is 
agricultural  land and 24.9% is residential  and commercial  land. It  was founded 
in 1573 during the Spanish colonization period. Naga was legally incorporated 
as a city in December 15, 1948. The city has a total  land area of 84.48 km
2
.  As 
of 2007, i ts  population stood at  150,516 .
134
 The average population density of 
the city is  1,900/km
2
 (Table 5.1).    
 
Table 5.1 Quick Statistics of Naga City  
Land Area 84.48 km
2
 
Population (as of 2007 )  160,516  
Density  1,900/ km
2  
 
Total  Income (as of  2004)  PhP 346.96  Mill ion  
IRA Share (as of  2004 ) PhP 177.89  Mill ion  
Local Source (as of  2004) PhP 168.70  Mill ion 
Income Classification  1
s t
 Class  
City Classification  Independent Component City 
Number of Barangays  27 
       Source:  Ci ty  Planning and Development Off ice  2009  
 
Although Naga is classified as 1
s t
 Class City in terms of income 
classification, i t  is  st il l  dependent on IRA. As of 2004, the city’s dependency 
                                                          
134 National Statistics Office, “The 2010 Census of Population and Housing”, 
http://www.census.gov.ph/content/2010-census-population-and-housing-reveals-philippine-population-9234-million 
(Accessed November 14, 2013) As of 2010, the estimated total population of Naga City was 
174,931.  
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rate to IRA is 51%.
135
 Poli tically,  Naga is divided into  27 barangays.  All  these 
barangays are classified by NSO as ‘urban areas’.   
 
5.1.3 Serving Mayors 
For over two decades since 1988, Jesse M. Robredo served as mayor of 
Naga City (Table 5.2).  Robredo ’s leadership  is  widely respected and attributed 
as the main reason why most residents of Naga City want him to  stay in power.   
 
Table 5.2 Serving Mayors in Naga City since 1988 Elections  
City/Term 1988- 
1992 
1992- 
1995 
1995- 
1998 
1998- 
2001 
2001 – 
2004 
2004 – 
2007 
2007 – 
2010 
Naga  
 
Jesse M. 
Robredo 
Jesse M. 
Robredo 
Jesse M. 
Robredo 
Sulpicio 
Roco, 
Jr.* 
Jesse M. 
Robredo 
Jesse M. 
Robredo 
Jesse M. 
Robredo 
 
* Mayor Sulpico Roco, Jr. only served a single term and considered as “steward” of the city  
 
 For a single term, where Robredo was not in office  because of further training 
in the United States, Sulpicio Roco, Jr. served as mayor. Sulpicio Roco is a close 
friend and ally of Robredo. He is the brother of a national political figure, Raul 
Roco, whom Robredo respected so much.
136
 With academic training in sociology 
and anthropology in the Ateneo de Manila University, Sulpicio Roco spent most of 
his career in social research at the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC)  as 
anthropologist.
137
 However, in 1996, he quit his post to prepare for his candidacy as 
mayor of Naga City upon prodding of Robredo. Hence, in 1998 elections, with 
                                                          
135 Bureau of Local Government Finance, “LGU Income Class”, http://www.blgf.gov.ph/index.php 
(Accessed November 8, 2012).  
136  Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, “Former Senators – Raul Roco”, 
http://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/former_senators/raul_roco.htm (Accessed November 18, 2013).  
137  Institute of Philippine Culture, “Profile”, http://www.ipc-ateneo.org/node/1 (Accessed 
November 11, 2013).  
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Robredo’s endorsement , Sulpicio Roco won and served as mayor until 2001. As 
mayor, Sulpicio Roco had essentially just taken care of the programs and projects 
initiated by Robredo. In fact, he made no changes nor introduced new programs.
138
 
After his brief stint as mayor, Sulpicio Roco during the 2001 elections ran for a seat 
in congress. He won and served as congressman in the second district of Camarines 
Sur. His records showed that he filed a total of 19 National Bills and 14 Local 
Bills.
139
 After serving in congress, Sulpicio Roco  has been living a private life.  
After the synchronized national and local elections of May 2010, where 
Benigno Aquino III was elected President, Robredo was appointed Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) – the national government 
agency that coordinates the police and local government officials. On August 18, 
2012, Robredo while on official duty boarded a government plane that crashed in 
Masbate Island, causing his death.
140
  
 
5.2 Jesse M. Robredo: The Mayor 
Jesse M. Robredo, an expert in  local governance, was widely recognized 
in the Philippines and abroad . He earned a master’s  degree in public 
administration at  Harvard University as well as  master’s  degree in business 
administration at  the University of  the Philippines .  In both degrees ,  he finished 
                                                          
138  Naga City, “Experience – Projects”, http://naga.gov.ph/go/experience-naga/ (Accessed August 
12, 2012).  
139  Information Site on Politics and Government,  “Sulpicio Roco, Jr. – Legislative 
Performance”, http://i-site.ph/Databases/Congress/12thHouse/performance/roco-performance.html (Accessed 
November 11, 2013).  
140 ABS-CBN News, “PNoy on Robredo’s Death”, http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/nation/08/08/13/pnoy-robredos-death-i-had-survivors-guilt (Accessed November 18, 2013).  
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top of his class.  His undergraduate degree was obtained at  De La Salle 
University (DLSU) in Manila in the fields of industrial management engineering 
and mechanical  engineering. His first  job was in the private sector ,  part icularly 
at  the San Miguel Corporation (SMC)  which he took in 1980 .
141
 Then in 1986, 
Robredo served as Program Director of the Bicol River Basin Development 
Program (BRBDP) –  an insti tution created by the national government to plan 
and implement an  integrated area development  for the Bicol  region.
142
 In 1988, 
he was elected mayor  at  age 29 –  the youngest  mayor at  that  time .143 Despite his 
young age, Robredo exhibited the abil ity to restore confidence in both the city 
government and its  people by energizing the bureaucracy and engaging 
community in governance.  From there, the rest  was history because Robredo 
kept excell ing in various areas,  specifically those related in governance. In fact ,  
he received various recognitions and awards for his leadership  skills .  These 
include: in 1995, he was  elected president of the League of Cities of the 
Phil ippines (LCP); in 1996, he was an awardee of the Ten  Outstanding Young 
Persons of the Philippines  (TOYP); and in 2000, he was the Ramon Magsaysay 
Awardee for Government Service  –  the Nobel Prize equivalent in Asia .144  
                                                          
141
 San Miguel Corporation ,  “The Company”, http://www.sanmiguel.com.ph/ (Accessed August 5, 
2011).  
142
 Takeshi Kawanaka, Power in a Philippine City  (Chiba: Institute of Developing 
Economies, 2002).   
143  City Mayors, “Jesse Robredo”, http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/naga-city-mayor-
robredo.html (Accessed August 15, 2012).   
144  De La Salle University, “A Great Lasallian Leader and Public Servant”, 
http://www.lsu.edu.ph/files/robredo.pdf (Accessed November 18, 2013).  
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When Robredo first  assumed his post  as mayor,  he was not accustomed of 
the conventional poli t ics so he was not held back by them.  In fact ,  Robredo had 
with him a long l ist  of reform initiat ives –  a passion to pursue what he thinks is 
right for promoting good governance. His list  of reforms included: “the  
establishment of a merit -based system for hiring and promotion, skil ls 
improvement  and discipline  of employees;  program to tackle local  government’s 
budget deficit  by mobilizing tax collectors to press business  establishments  to 
pay taxes promptly and honestly.
145
 Although tax collection was generally 
considered unpopular move, Robredo planned to reinforce i t  with 
computerization program integrating a  geographic information system (GIS) to 
make i t  more accurate and systematic .   By introducing those reforms, Robredo 
within his first  year  of office,  had increased the city employees ’  salaries by 
10% and cost -of-l iving allowance by 200%, and in over 10-year period, the city 
registered a 1,020% increase in total income and a 573% rise in locally 
generated revenues  (Robredo 2006) .  In view of this, the Department of Finance 
(DOF) restored Naga City’s first  class inc ome status.146  
 
5.2.1 Semblance of True Grit  
Robredo’s gri t and uncompromising drive for excellence ha d its roots in 
family,  school,  and early work. Robredo learned to overcome adversity from the 
examples of his father,  who lost  eyesight at  the age of 39, when Robredo was 
just 4 years old. Despite such condition, his father continued to support  the 
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family through fishing with Robredo serving as his eyes (Ong 2007).  In school, 
Robredo received a Jesuit  education at  Ateneo de Naga high school,  where he 
adopted the ideals of becoming  “men and women for others”  –  the slogan of the 
Jesuits . Additionally,  his training at De La Salle University honed his 
management skil ls  which were later reinforced during  his t ime at  the private 
sector (i .e.  SMC). It  was at  work where Robredo imbibed the maxims of a well -
managed enterprise: “profit  with honor”. 147  He applied this maxim at his work 
in SMC, covering various areas of the Philippines.  Robredo was quoted saying, 
“San Miguel gave  me the experience to deal with all types of people;  managers,  
laborers,  labor leaders,  and people with not much of an education”. 148  Despite 
being a high ranking executive at  SMC, Robredo gave prime value to education 
by pursuing a master’s degree in business administration at the University of 
the Phil ippines . Obviously,  his dedication to education was unwavering because 
he attended classes and session despite his busy schedules.  As indicator of his 
dedication, he invested t ime to study and write academic papers on top of his 
management work, and sti ll  finished top of his class.
149
 
The year 1983 was a turning point of Phil ippine history because  Benigno 
Aquino Jr. ,  President Ferdinand Marcos’s charismatic archrival , was 
assassinated at  the airport  from his exile . It  was also a turning point of 
Robredo’s quest for promoting effective leadership and governance with the 
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 De La Salle University, “A Great Lasallian Leader and Publi c Servant”, 
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notion that  there should be an alternative to polit ical  repression and 
dictatorship.  Robredo’s gri t  emerged at  this po int  by balancing what he believes 
as right and the conditions surrounding his job. In fact ,  he was in a delicate 
si tuation because for him, the right action to do was to support  the wife of 
Benigno Aquino (i .e.  Cory Aquino) but at  the same his boss Eduardo Cojuanco 
Jr.,  who owned SMC demand loyalty to the company and to  Marcos.  The reason 
for this is  that  Cojuanco was a crony of Marcos .  At the end, Robredo supported 
the activit ies that  seek justice for Aquino and worked for Cory’s bid for 
presidency.  
At a closer look, Robredo’s growing polit ical activity had a familial 
dimension. Robredo was a relative of  Luis Villafuerte  who was the Provincial  
Governor of Camarines Sur  at  that time. It  was Villafuerte who groomed 
Robredo to run for mayor of Naga City,  which is situated in the province. It  was 
also Villafuerte who offered Robredo the post of director at  BRBDP so that  
Robredo can touch-base with local  people and show more visibil ity in the 
communities. The job will also pro vide essential l inkages with key poli t ical 
actors in the area.  Robredo took the post,  and while at  BRBDP, he studied  the 
socioeconomic problems of Naga City and tried formulat ing development plans 
that will address local  challenges .  In fact ,  he also mobilized some BRBDP 
staffers to form his confidential  group for poli t ical activities .
150
   
However,  i t  was also at  BRBDP where Robredo learned what poli tics is 
about when the Vice President of the Phil ippines at  that  t ime asked him to 
accept a certain personality to be his deputy.  Seeing no vacancy, Robredo 
explained the si tuation to the Vice President and thought everything will  be fine. 
                                                          
150
 Takeshi Kawanaka, Power in a Philippine City  (Chiba: Institute of Developing 
Economies, 2002).  
111 
 
What happened next was that the Vice President ordered the removal of 
Robredo from the post  to be replaced by the Vice Presiden t’s protégé. Realizing 
the impact of polit ics,  what Robredo did was unconventional.  He sued the Vice 
President to prove that  “this is a different time, and that  the dictator in the 
person of Marcos was already in exile”. 151  As a result ,  the court  nullified the 
Vice President’s  action and Robredo stayed on his post .   When i t comes to good 
governance, Robredo ’s values were uncompromising. In fact ,  he later cut ties 
with his uncle (Villafuerte) for trying to interfere in his plans  for the Naga.  
Kawanaka (2002) provides in-depth details and analysis regarding the 
cause of the rift  between Robredo and Villafuerte . “Before the breakdown of the 
relationship,  the Robredo family and the Villafuerte family were very close 
since they have blood relations.  Villaf uerte’s middle name is Robredo. 
Robredo’s grandfather on his father’s side and Villafuerte’s mother are brother 
and sister al though with different mothers.  When Villafuerte ran for electoral 
posts in 1978 and 1984, he sometimes stayed at  Robredo’s residenc e in Naga 
City and Robredo along with his father joined Villafuerte’s election campaigns. 
For his part ,  Robredo used to stay at  Villafuerte’s house in Makati  when he was 
a college student in Manila.  Villafuerte supported Robredo in the 1988 elections,  
who narrowly won with 14,086 votes (36% of the total) over his closest rival.
152
 
Villafuerte also won in the gubernatorial  race.  However,  other than Robredo’s 
victory, Villafuerte’s party was able to garner only the seats of vice mayor and 
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two city councilors in  Naga” .  Robredo’s charisma to encourage opposition to 
support  his plans was strong, so most of the opposition councilors defected to 
join his party.  Based on earl ier description, what caused the rift  between 
Villafuerte and Robredo was more on ideology and management style.  
Villafuerte intervened  in the city affairs and wanted to dictate the actions of 
Robredo. However, Robredo had progressive ideas and he did not want 
Villafuerte to dictate  him –  knowing that  the city was his responsibil i ty.  To 
make the story short ,  Robredo defected from Villafuerte’s party,  propell ing him 
to organize his own poli tical  base in Naga City.  It  was then the start  of 
Robredo’s active cause of empowering the people and vowed to yield power to 
them.
153
 Robredo init iated programs wherein the voice of local people can be 
heard. Urban poor were  organized and adequately represented in the local 
government affairs. With those ideals,  the council and the peoples’  
organizations supported him. As a result , Robredo’s  party captured all  sea ts for 
the city council  at  the following elections.   
 
5.2.2 Collaboration Perspectives in Program Delivery  
 Robredo emphasized insti tutional collaboration in program delivery. The 
basis of choosing this approach is anchored on his principle of  “yielding power 
to the people”. 154  According to Robredo (2003) the foundation of Naga City’s 
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good governance is based on three elements: “progressive development 
perspective, functional partnerships,  and people participation ” .  The first 
perspective (progressive development) mainstreams the role of al l  sectors into 
local  development.  It  is  greatly associated with the concept of “growth with 
equity” to promote economic development .  The second perspective (functional 
partnership) is anchored on the idea of working t ogether,  essentially by 
promoting collaboration and all iances.  Finally,  the third perspective (people 
participation) is  based on the philosophy that  growth and prosperity must be 
enlightened by the perceptions of the poor,  “whose upliftment is  one of the end 
goals of good governance” .  The key assumption is that  the city government 
should engage the people in planning process not only to receive feedback but 
also to make them active partners in development to achieve a better city.    
The three elements mentioned above are embodied in Robredo’s vision for 
Naga City,  which is “an maogmang lugar” (a happy place) . 155  In this vision, 
functional partnership is  pursued as the city’s policy for continued engagement 
of ci t izens in local  government affairs.  Through partnership,  the city 
government multiplies i ts  capacity and overcomes resource constraints.  The 
city’s partnership mechanisms include collaboration not only with community 
groups,  but also government agencies  and non-governmental  organizations. 
Some of the key partnership  programs are presented in this case study to gain 
insights of Robredo ’s perspectives on program delivery.   
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People Empowerment  
While people empowerment seems to be an abstract  concept,  Robredo  
operationalized it  through a program called “People Empowerment Program”  
(PEP), which is an initiat ive to promote polit ical empowerment . In essence, 
empowerment is  promoted by continuously engaging the community in 
governance processes.
156
 Through PEP, NGOs and people’s organizations (POs) 
were encouraged to actively participate in local government affairs and to group 
together into a federation so that  they can work closely with the city 
government.  The group of federations was later known as the Naga City NGO-
PO Council  (NCPC).   
PEP was implemented through the enactment and enforcement of  
Empowerment Ordinance  in 1995 upon Robredo ’s initiat ive. With NCPC 
(discussed fully in later section) having opportunity to influence city 
government’s plans and budget,  the notion of empowerment is  associated with 
good governance, wherein the marginalized sectors of society can actively 
participate in the governing process.  According to Santos (1989),  the PEP 
program shows that  the “empowerment essentially involves organizing various 
sectors and creating avenues for their meaningful part icipation ” .  In other words,  
stakeholders are actively engaged in both policymaking and decision-making 
processes of the city government.  Through such process, i t  was expected that 
the program will  ensure sustainabili ty and acceptabil ity  of various local 
government init iatives .  The implementation of  PEP facil itated a system of 
multi-level consultation between the city government and the NCPC. As of 2012, 
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the NCPC comprised  83 NGOs/POs, 27 Barangay People’s Councils,  and 11 
basic sectors.
157
  
By virtue of the Empowerment Ordinance, ci ty funds have been annually 
allocated for the NCPC to promote empowerment activities.  Among the 
activit ies supported by the funds include: organization of Barangay People ’s 
Councils (BCPs) and conduct of part icipatory barangay planning and 
budgeting.
158
 As observed, one of the  mandates of the NCPC was to organize 
the community and provide the marginalized sectors a voice and meaningful 
part icipation. Since the NCPC was established, the number of NGOs and POs 
has increased from a total  of 40 in 1996to about 83 in 2001  (more than double) .   
159
 This increase in number implies wider participation and inclusiveness 
of communities in budgeting, policy- and decision-making processes at  the city 
government.  Poli tically,  Robredo was able to easily handle the socio-poli tical  
dynamics with the end goal of achieving people empowerment ,  an idea that  was 
favorable to most polit icians.  Socially,  there was a positive change in 
perception towards the city government  that  led to higher level of trust  and 
confidence. Therefore,  i t  was through the empowerment program that 
community has been systematically engaged and became active partners , instead 
of simply being beneficiaries.   
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i -Governance   
 The i -Governance  is  another init iat ive that  enabled collaboration 
approach to thrive in Naga City.  This program applies the latest  information 
technologies to improve governance. According to Rodriguez (2011), the i -
Governance  is “an innovation in technology that  stands for (i) inclusive 
governance ,  which seeks to embrace, rather than exclude, individuals,  peoples, 
and sectors in running the government,  (i i)  information openness ,  which 
demonstrates that  information is power, and truly empowering when placed in 
the hands of ci tizens,  (ii i)  interactive engagement ,  which priori tizes the need 
for continuing dialog and exchange of information between authorit ies and 
constituents,  and (iv) innovative management ,  which commits the city to a 
culture of excellence sustained by creativity and innovation ” .  This program has 
been widely attributed as one of the main factors that  contributed to the 
improvement of city finances,  local transactions,  and services delivery.  
Innovations under this program include: (i)  NetServe –  the use of website to 
provide cit izens’  access to cri tical  information on local  services;  (i i)  TextServe 
–  the use of mobile phones to allow cit izens to send feedback, requests or 
complaints;  and (ii i)  Naga Citizens Charter –  the use of printed guidebook 
about local  services.  
The NetServe  is  hosted at  the city’s website (www.naga.gov.ph).  The 
information provided in the website covers an extensive catalog of the services , 
specifying the procedures,  response time, and responsible personnel to contact . 
Details about the services are also described in the website.  This approach is 
considered innovative because i t  does not only provide information about 
standard services,  but it  has also removed the “whom you know” mentali ty in 
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government.
160
 In fact ,  the NetServe offers “a predictable service delivery 
schedule posted on the website .  For instance, requests for streetl ight 
maintenance or removing blockage at  drainage are acted upon within 24 hours . 
Residents are informed of updates through the webs ite.
161
 The TextServe allows 
cit izens to send queries and feedback , where messages are received in the city’s 
email  inbox and are responded within the day. In addit ion, the Naga City 
Citizens Charter  is  printed version of the services designed  for residents who 
lack access to the internet or mobile phones.  This printed guidebook shows the 
step-by-step procedure of avail ing services offered by the city government. 
According to Robredo, “the information in the Naga City Citizens Charter  is 
complemented by a l ist  of requirements that  a customer must comply to 
facil i tate service delivery” .162  
 
The Triparti te Approach  
 Another harbinger of collaboration perspective is  the adoption of 
triparti te approach. In Naga City,  “tripart ism” is viewed as a partnership among 
LGU, POs, and NGOs. The triparti te arrangement is  essentially based on 
“mutual trust  and respect” .  This kind of collaborative arrangement came about 
following a “ long history of advocacy and community organizing spearhead by 
local  NGOs (e.g.  Heart  of Peace or HOPE, and the People’s Council  for the 
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Promotion of Rights and Welfare  or PCPRW)” . 163  There are many organized 
groups in Naga City,  and along with i t  is  a growing tradition of cit izen ’s  
involvement in the local  government affairs.  However,  this tradit ion of peaceful 
co-existence did not come easily.  Instead, there has been a long history of  
forums and dialogues on local  and national issues  that  were conducted. In fact ,  
“ the urban poor, the people’s organizations, and the non-government 
organizations had actively lobbied their causes within and outside the city” .164  
In early 1986, where social  and polit ical  problems (including insurgency) 
were prominent,  the NGOs formed the urban poor groups into all iances to 
advance their cause. The advocacy then was for the passage of pro -urban poor 
ordinances. As an all iance, the group gained  poli tical  clout  and obtained 
support  from progressive-minded individuals l ike Robredo.  “What Robredo did 
was to install  a mechanism for maximizing people’s participation in local 
governance. This was achieved by laying multiple channels through which 
specific sectors,  groups ,  or the entire consti tuency could participate in 
identifying development priori ties and in stamping their mandate on policy 
issues.” 165  Undoubtedly,  Robredo played a key role in instituting tripartism in 
Naga. He was regarded as the father of empowerment because of h is openness to 
advocate for pro-poor laws and recognition of the role of NGOs and POs in the 
process.  In view of this,  the president of the NCPC mentioned that  “t he good 
relations between local officials and the technical personnel of the city 
government,  on one hand, and the federation and the u rban poor communities on 
the other hand, have created a conducive and harmonious environment for 
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effective and efficient partnership. The tangible results of tripart i te partnership 
include the creation of special  bodies at local  government (e.g.  housing bo ards), 
where all  three parties participate in decision -making.”166  
 
5.3 The Case of “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan” Program 
 The “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan” (Partners in Development) is  the Naga 
City’s housing program which aims to manage the effects of urbanization  and  
ensure quali ty of l ife  of cit izens, especially in urban areas. The delivery of this 
program is facil i tated through collaboration. Established in May 1989, this 
program looks into new approaches of acquiring lands for urban poor 
beneficiaries .  As of 1995, the number of squatter families was estimated at 
11,000.
167
 These squatter families consti tute the Naga City’s urban poor who 
were facing two main problems: “ the absence of security of land tenure and the 
lack of basic infrastructure and facilit ies in their communities.” 168  In this 
context ,  the program has been designed to achieve two major objectives (i) 
“ land acquisition, which provides a sense of permanence to the urban poor's 
occupancy of a property,  and (i i)  urban upgrading, which provides decency, 
ease,  and comfort to daily l ife in the blighted areas. ” 169  For the period 2001-
2010, the estimated housing need of Naga City was 8,181 (Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3 Housing Needs of Naga City 2001-2010 
Category Total 
Displaced Units  1,847 
Doubled Up Households  2,284 
Informal Settlers  4,050 
Total  8,181 
          Source:  Naga Ci ty  Comprehensive  Shel ter  Plan  2001 -2010 
 
The housing need of Naga City is  at tributed to population growth and in -
migration. As reported by the City Planning and Development Office (2008), 
the city’s annual population growth rate of 1.65% will  lead to a projected total 
population of 162,313 by 2010 . Additionally,  many people from other towns are 
coming into Naga City,  essentially for work . Among the Bicol region’s seven 
cit ies, Naga is the most progressive, where neighboring towns and cit ies 
exhibit ing sluggish progress.
170
 It  is  for this reason that  many hopeful 
jobseekers are coming to the city hoping for permanent residence, decent job, 
and better livelihood. It  is  also assumed that the socialized housing program of 
the city can be one of the reasons that  at tracted most of the in -migrants .
171
  
 
5.3.1 Decisions  
Robredo’s  decisions and actions are crucial in understanding why 
program delivery in Naga City is  considered “ successful”. Essentially,  
collaboration and people participation are Robredo’s key policies in delivering 
the housing program. Robredo encouraged NGOs and POs to participate in  
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various mechanisms of the government to provide input  in decision-making. 
Robredo promoted long-term sustainabili ty of programs by collaborating with 
stakeholders and promoting community ownership of local  undertakings.  Instead 
of confining the decision-making function with the local government , Robredo 
had formalized the collaboration mechanisms to enhance people’s participation, 
especially the marginalized groups.
172
 As described earlier,  virtually all  
programs in Naga City are done through LGU-NGO-PO collaboration. The 
reason for this is  that  collaboration has been viewed as an integral  part  of ‘good 
governance’ . 173  Robredo took advantage of the expanded powers and 
prerogatives under the LGC by “maximizi ng the participation of civil  society 
and individual ci tizens in local  governance and by harnessing the synergy from 
their part icipation to sustain i ts programs” (Asian Development Bank 2004).  Put 
simply, Robredo’s policy, decisions revolved around strengt hening 
collaboration, and his actions are focused primarily on empowering local 
ci t izens,  as will be illustrated later in this case.   
 
5.3.2 Delivery Mechanism  
 In delivering the program, the key arrangement is  collaboration between 
Urban Poor Affairs Office (UPAO) and Community Organizing of the 
Phil ippines Enterprise (COPE). The former is the agency assigned the task to 
handle urban poor concerns  while the latter is  the NGO that organizes the urban 
poor.  The Program’s Operations Framework (Figure 5.2) provides the rationale 
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why UPAO-COPE collaboration is essential  in housing program delivery. One 
relevant feature about this framework is the "partner-beneficiary" perspective, 
where the urban poor is  viewed as both partner and beneficiary.  This 
perspect ive encourages the urban poor to actively participate in resolving the 
housing problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2  “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan” Operations Framework  
 
The program operates in three dimensions –  physical ,  financial ,  and 
social .  The physical  dimension focuses on land acquisition and the provision of 
homelots to qualified beneficiaries.  The main focus is  on providing homelots so 
that  beneficiaries can graduate from being squatters by owning a piece of land.  
The financial  dimension focuses on management and financial  strategies –  
part icularly on the mechanisms of cost recovery and the collection of equity 
from beneficiaries. This helps sustain the program in terms of financial 
requirements.  The social  dimension focuses on p romoting partnerships and 
participation. Through this dimension, the urban poor,  as represented by COPE, 
Adapted from Prilles 2001 
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are empowered to participate in various levels of the program’s operations.  In 
particular, COPE is part  of the Naga City Urban Development and Housing 
Board (UDHB).
174
 This board sets the policies for the program.  
COPE, as an insti tutional partner,  plays a key role in social  preparation 
and community organizing. COPE identifies qualified beneficiaries  and 
contributes equity to the program. As of 2008, COPE has organized about 80 
POs. This number signifies a huge leap from only 9 POs when the “Kaantabay 
sa Kauswagan” program started in 1989. 175  COPE has been instrumental in 
forming these POs into the Naga Cit y Urban Poor Federation (NCUPF)  as shown 
in Figure 5.3.  Essentially,  the POs organized by COPE have eventually become 
part  of the NCUPF, which is a federation of POs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Relationship between COPE and NCUPF 
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To maximize scarce resources,  the delivery of housing program adopts 
the so-called “strategy of focus” .  This strategy “ l imits the program coverage 
only to the registered urban poor sector in Naga City,  placing homelot  provision 
as the core of assistance package for each household. The identification of 
beneficiary is  facil i tated by a single cri terion: presence of a land tenure 
problem. The logic for this single criterion is that,  where there is such a 
problem, the program responds and for where there is a tenurial  issue, there is  
also urban blight .”176 
 
Legal Basis for  Collaboration  
As discussed earl ier,  the passage of Empowerment Ordinance paved the 
way for greater collaboration . The city council passed this ordinance upon the 
influence of Robredo, who regarded “people empowerment”  as governance 
maxim.
177
 The Ordinance laid out a clear process of accreditation for NGOs and 
POs. As a result , al l  accredited NGOs and POs are grouped t ogether as an 
autonomous network, which is the NCPC, granted with special  powers under the 
Empowerment Ordinance.
178
 As shown in Figure 5.4,  COPE and NCUPF are part 
of the many NGOs and POs that  comprise the NCPC.  
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Figure 5.4 Situating COPE and NCUPF in the NCPC 
 
As specified in the ordinance, t he NCPC has the right to be represented 
in the different bodies within the city government (e.g.  Local Housing Board),  
including those which may be created in the future. NCPC  is granted the power 
to:   “(i)  Appoint NGO representatives to local  special  bodies of the city 
government; (i i) Vote and participate in the deliberation, conceptualization, 
implementation and evaluation of programs, projects,  and activit ies of the city 
government;  (ii i)  Propose legislation, part icipate,  and vote at  the committee 
level of the City Council ;  and (iv) Act as the people’s representative in the 
exercise of their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern 
and of access to official  records and documents.”  
As of April  2008, the NCPC was represented  in 32 standing committees of 
the city legislature,  placing i t in a posit ion to influence local  laws and 
policy.
179
 For instance, the NCPC sits in the Appropriations Committee for the 
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 The names of the standing committees are Rules and Privileges, B lue Ribbon, 
Appropriations, Infrastructure, Land Use, Social Development, Education, Health, Agriculture, 
Trade and Industry, Market Affairs, Public Safety, Youth Development, Manpower Development, 
Sports Development, Laws, Ordinances and Reorganization, B arangay (Village) Affairs, Tourism 
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allocation and approval of annual ci ty budget .  Considering all  these features, 
the NCPC is viewed as a mass -based, poli tical  organization, which ensures 
creative and dynamic popular part icipation in local  governance. The NGOs (e.g. 
COPE) and POs (e.g.  NCUPF) that  comprised NCPC have been formally 
organized to effectively art iculate their fel t  needs,  identify and priorit ize their 
problems, propose relevant and appropriate solutions to problems, define 
meaningful goals and specific targets, as well  as design,  implement,  and 
monitor projects that  would directly benefit  them. The number of NGOs and 
POs accredited to NCPC continued to increase that  as of December 2007, over 
40 NGOs and POs, belonging to 12 different sectors,  were recorded.
180
  
 
UPAO-COPE Collaboration 
Conceptually,  NCPC is an institutional counterpart of the city government . 
In handling the housing issue, COPE represents the NCPC and UPAO represents 
the city government. This collaboration  arrangement  is  legally instituted and i t  
is  an integral  part  of the city governance system. As insti tutional partner to 
UPAO, COPE performs various roles,  which include providing supplementary 
service of public goods, complementing in service provision, and advocating the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and Foreign Relations, Public Utilities,  Cooperatives, Culture and Heritage, Family, Games and 
Amusement, Consumers’ Protection, Women, Public Affairs and Information, Environment and 
Ecology, Children, Urban Poor, External Affairs, and NGO/PO Accreditation. John Bongat,  
interview by the author, Naga City, April 2008.
 
180
 The sectors are (i)  urban poor, (ii)  agricultural cooperative, (iii) nonagricultural  
cooperative, (iv) business, (v) labor, (vi) academe, (vii) senior citi zens, (viii) women, (ix) youth 
and children, (x) veterans, (xi) peasant, and (xii) transport. Zosimo O. Requejo, interview by the 
author, Naga City, April 2008.  
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process of policy formulation  and implementation to promote the welfare of the 
urban poor.  The collaboration structure for housing delivery is shown in Figure 
5.5.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Collaboration Structure of Naga City  
 
This collaboration arrangement indicates that  COPE is represented in all 
of local  government functions as far as the housing program is concerned. In  
budgeting, COPE sits  in the Appropriations Committee that  appropriates the 
annual budget of the city,  including those allocated for the housing program. In 
policymaking, COPE is represented in the local  housing board (i .e. Naga City 
Urban Development and Housing Board),  which is the policymaking body for  
the housing program. In implementation, COPE is involved  in identification of 
beneficiaries,  community organizing, and l ivelihoods activities.  The 
engagement of COPE in all local government functions (budgeting, 
policymaking, and implementation) demonstrates that collaboration has been 
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insti tutionalized. In addition, i t  signifies that  COPE plays an important role in 
decision-making process for housing program.  
 
Synergy 
The “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan” program has demonstrated that  
collaboration can be productive if  synergy between local government and NGO 
is facil itated. In achieving synergy, this case has shown that perspectives, 
resources,  and skills of members  should be combined. First of al l ,  synergy was 
created the way policies were made because perspectives of members from both 
UPAO and COPE were combined. The combination of perspectives was 
facil i tated through the conduct of regular committee meetings,  sessions of the 
local  housing board , and other consultative events.  Robredo , as convener of the 
program, conducted collaboration meetings as part  of  his “Weekly Management 
Meeting” ,  where members from local government offices (e.g.  members of city 
legislature, department heads,  chiefs of offices,  and key officers of independent 
working units) and NGOs are present.
181
 This meeting facil i tated the exchange 
of ideas and concerns.  It  enabled the mayor to draw feedback and understand 
the overall  status of the programs. The development of  the Naga City 
Comprehensive Shelter Plan  for 2001-2010 was facili tated through this process.  
Secondly, synergy was manifested in the implementation of program 
activit ies through the combination of resources and skil ls  between UPAO and 
COPE members.  On one hand, the skills  and resources required for the physical  
dimension (e.g.  homelots) and financial  dimension (e.g.  trust fund) of the 
                                                          
181
 Jesse Robredo, “Governance and Social Accountability Mechanisms in Naga City”, 
http://www.sasanet.org/documents/Resources/Governance_Social%20Accountability_Naga%20CIty_Philippines.pdf 
(Accessed August 12, 2012).  
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program were provided by UPAO. On the other hand, the development of skil ls 
required for social  dimension (e.g.  community participation) of the program was 
provided by COPE. In addit ion, COPE plays an importan t role in identifying,  
screening, and awarding the program to the partner -beneficiaries.   
Finally,  synergy was created through a positive response and cooperation 
of community to the program. An example of this is  the case of  Igualidad 
Interior,  one of the communities  assisted by the program, where families have 
l ived on the si te for almost 40 years but did not own the land. What happened 
here was that  COPE organized the community and then UPAO facil itated  the 
land acquisition through CMP.
182
 As the communities managed their 
associations,  the COPE and UPAO staffers assisted them in complying all  steps 
of the CMP applications  so that  they can receive cert ificates for the lands they 
are occupying. In this part icular case,  the city government  served as originator 
of CMP and the role of community association was focused on construction of 
their houses .  Additionally,  the COPE and UPAO collaboration jointly facil i tated 
the provision of related services such as  water supply, l ighting facil i ties,  and 
electrici ty.
183
 
 
5.4 Policy Decisiveness of Robredo   
The housing program delivery of Naga City is considered “successful” 
because it effectively reduced the number of squatter families. As indicated in Table 
5.4, the estimated number of 11,000 squatter families in 1995 has been significantly 
reduced to 3,972 in 2007.   
                                                          
182
 Naga City, “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan (Partners in Development)”, 
http://www.naga.gov.ph/cityhall/kaantabay.html (Accessed August 12, 2012).  
183 D.C. Nathan Sergio, interview by the author, Naga C ity, April 2008.  
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Table 5.4 Estimated Number of Squatters in Naga City 1995~2007  
Year  1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Total  11,000 6,591 5,295 4,081 3,972 
 Source: Urban Poor Affairs Office 2008  
 
The decisions and actions of Robredo were key factors to th is 
achievement.  Firstly,  Robredo ensured that  homelots are provided to qualified 
beneficiaries.  In 2001, the program facil itated the disposal of 33 hectares of 
private and government-owned lands to landless families  that addressed the land 
tenurial  concerns of about 50% of the urban poor in Naga City.  In 200 4, the 
program had covered a total  of 8,717 urban poor households,  representing 34% 
of the entire city population . Overall , in 2007, a total of 8,763 families had 
benefit ted from the program and about 3,972 families that  sti l l  need to be 
served as shown in Table 5.5.  Robredo understood the context in which the 
squatting problem occurred. In particular, He was aware of the challenges facing the 
squatting problem, including limited institutional resources of the city government 
to address the issue as well as the empowerment issue of citizenry, especially the 
urban poor. With his knowledge and understanding of the housing issue, Robredo 
was able to identify a definitive solution. Robredo emphasized the importance of 
providing homelots to qualified beneficiaries, and recognized that the city 
government needs support from other organizations to complement this effort.  
 
Table 5.5 Achievement of Housing Program as of 2007  
Estimated Number of 
Informal Settlers in 1995  
Informal Settlers to 
be Served  
(as of 2007) 
Achievement 
(as of 2007) 
 
11,000 families  
 
3,972 families  
 
8,763 families 
benefit ted 
   Source:  Ci ty  Planning and  Development Of f ice  2009  
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Secondly, Robredo managed the socio-poli tical  dynamics through 
empowerment mechanisms , which facil itated unity of purpose .  His decision for 
UPAO-COPE collaboration provided an avenue to learn how synergy can be 
created and shape the program agenda. Robredo effectively managed the 
conflicting interests through consultations and consensus -building. Robredo 
mastered the art of convincing people to rally beh ind a shared vision by empowering 
them to influence the budgeting, planning, and implementation of housing program. 
In particular, Robredo encouraged the formation of POs and NGOs and federating to 
have a stronger political clout.  Through collaboration, the “Kaantabay sa 
Kauswagan” program was named as one of the Top 40 Best  Practices  on 
Program Delivery  at  the Habitat II Conference in Turkey in 1996.
184
 The 
collaborative mechanism in urban housing, as highlighted in the program, was 
replicated in  some cit ies.  In the Phil ippines,  the Ford Foundation, the AIM, and 
the Local Government Academy (LGA) have also recognized the city for the 
program’s trailblazing innovations.  The program was also selected as one of the 
cases in the Asian Development Bank ’s “Urban Indicators for Managing 
Cities.”185 In December 5,  2007, it  received the Housing Rights Protector Award 
from Center for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) in Geneva, Switzerland 
for i ts  exceptional commitment to human rights,  especially the right  to adequate 
housing.   
Finally, Robredo applied his knowledge in management and business to 
deliver impactful results. Robredo’s decision to apply collaboration strategy in all 
                                                          
184
 The “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan” Program was consecutively conferred as “World 
Habitat Finalist” in 2001 and 2002 by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.  
185  Asian Development Bank, “Urban Indicators for Managing Cities: Cities Data Book”, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Cities_Data_Book/default.asp (Accessed August 5, 2011).    
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government programs reflects his commitment for transparency and accountability. 
It is with these qualities why Robredo obtained his political leadership position. 
While political position is traditionally obtained by belonging to a political clan or 
dynasty, Robredo had shown a different path. He came to power through his vision 
to empower the poor, and had worked hard for it to show results. Unlike  the 
traditional politicians, Robredo was not a wealthy man nor did he belong to a 
political clan. However, Robredo was admired and loved by local people because he 
empowered them – making them partners. His ideas were progressive. He restored 
confidence in people and businesses. His commitment to yield power in the hands of 
the people earned him the respect and dedication of urban poor. His various 
initiatives and programs gained popular support and were considered “exemplary 
practices” in local governance. The impact of effective program delivery on 
beneficiaries demonstrated the importance of policy decisiveness .   
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter described how the housing program of Naga was delivered. In 
particular, it showed that the program was “successful” because it effectively 
reduced the number of squatter families from 11,000 in 1995 to 3,972 in 2007. The 
success of the program is attributed to policy decisiveness as exercised by Robredo  
though his decisions and actions. Firstly, Robredo ensured that  homelots were 
provided to qualified beneficiaries.  Secondly, Robredo managed the socio -
polit ical dynamics through empowerment mechanisms, which  facili tated unity 
of purpose. Finally, Robredo applied his knowledge in management and business to 
deliver impactful results.  The impact of effective program delivery on 
beneficiaries demonstrated the importance of policy decisiveness . 
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CHAPTER 6 
MANDALUYONG AND CEBU 
 
This chapter presents two “less successful” cases of housing program 
delivery: Mandaluyong City and Cebu City. The former is a non-collaboration case 
while the latter is a collaboration case. To understand why these cases are 
considered less successful, the decisions and actions of respective city mayors will 
be discussed and analyzed. In addit ion, the socio-political conditions of each city 
will also be described to provide the contexts.  
 
6.1 Mandaluyong  
This section will show that the housing program delivery of Mandaluyong 
City is a non-collaboration case for a number of factors. Among these are the 
institutional capacity of the city and the decisions made by Neptali Gonzales II.   
 
6.1.1 City Profile   
Mandaluyong City promotes itself as the “Heartbeat of Progress” because it 
is located right at the center of Metro Manila  (Figure 6.1). The World Bank rated 
the city as ‘business-friendly city’ in terms of doing business and registering 
properties. Likewise, the AIM Policy Center conferred Mandaluyong as “Best in 
Quality of Life” based on city competitiveness study. 186  The high number of 
shopping and entertainment centers is notable in the city, and this is taken as 
indication of development and progress.  The city was founded in 1841 during the 
                                                          
186   Climate and Disaster Resilience Initiative, Metro Manila City Profile  (Kyoto: 
International Environment and Disaster Management Kyoto University, 2004).  
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Spanish colonization period and was legally incorporated as city on February 9, 
1994.
187
 The city has a total land area of 21.26 km
2
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Location of Mandaluyong City 
 
Quick Statistics  
As shown in Table 6.1, the city’s population stood at 278,474 with an 
average population density of 13,098/km
2
 as of 2007.
188
 Mandaluyong is classified 
as a 1
st
 Class City with 17% dependency rate on IRA. Politically, the city is 
                                                          
187  Mandaluyong City, “Socioeconomic Profile”, http://www.mandaluyong.gov.ph/index.aspx 
(Accessed November 14, 2013).  
188 As of 2010 Census, the estimated total number of population in Mandaluyong City was 
328,699 National Statistics Office, “The 2010 Census of Population and Housing”, 
http://www.census.gov.ph/content/2010-census-population-and-housing-reveals-philippine-population-9234-million 
(Accessed November 14, 2013).  
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subdivided into 27 barangays within two districts. The first district comprises 14 
barangays while the second district comprises 13 barangays.    
 
Table 6.1 Profile of Mandaluyong City 
Land Area 21.26 km
2
 
Population (as of 2007)  278,474  
Density  13,098/km
2
 
Total Income (as of 2004)  PhP 1.60 Billion  
IRA Share (as of 2004) PhP 275.38 Million  
Local Source (as of 2004) PhP 1.14 Billion  
Income Classification  1
st
 Class  
City Classification  Highly Urbanized City  
Number of Barangays  27  
         Source: Mandaluyong Information Office 2009  
 
Institutional Capacity 
One of the key features of the city is its capacity to generate and mobilize 
local resources. As indicated in Table 6.2, the city’s income has been continuously 
increasing. In 2002 for instance, Mandaluyong earned PhP1.2 Billion in income, one 
of its highest revenue marks. This is a big leap from a mere PhP836 Million income 
in 1998.  
 
Table 6.2 Income and Expenditures 1998-2003 
Year Income Expenditures Surplus (Deficits) 
1998 836,353,927.13 852,472,386.81 (16,118,455.68) 
1999 901,857,470.58 833,468,458.56 68,389,012.02 
2000 998,121,834.56 888,147,055.87 109,974,778.69 
2001 1,165,955,784.00 1,087,623,634.00 78,332,150.00 
2002 1,217,279,083.00 1,210,806,956.00 6,472,127.00 
2003 1,198,077,359.47 936,533,007.86 261,544,351.61 
 Source: Finance Committee Report 2004  
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When Mandaluyong became city in 1994, its  IRA increased and that helped 
propel more income from local revenues.
189
 It was legal move because the LGC has 
granted power to local governments to generate local income . With such power,  
Mandaluyong was able to steer its economic base.   Of the city’s total income, only 
about 20% comes from the IRA share. This implies that IRA is only a small part of 
the city’s economic liquidity. Undoubtedly, based on the Philippine city standards, 
the financial capacity of the city is strong.  
 
Serving Mayors (1988~2010) 
 Although the housing project initiated by Gonzales is the focus of this 
particular case study, the broader housing program initiated by the Abalos’ will also 
be introduced because Mandaluyong City is the political stronghold of the Abalos 
family. As shown Table 6.3, Gonzales only served a single term, and this can be 
considered as mere stewardship. This means that during the period, where the 
Abalos’ did not occupy the mayoral position, Gonzales understood that any member 
of the Abalos clan will take over as his term expires.  
 
Table 6.3 Serving Mayors in Mandaluyong since 1988 Elections  
City/Term 1988- 
1992 
1992- 
1995 
1995- 
1998 
1998- 
2001 
2001 – 
2004 
2004 - 
2007 
2007 – 
2010 
Mandaluyong 
 
Benjamin 
Abalos, 
Sr.  
Benjamin 
Abalos, 
Sr.  
Benjamin 
Abalos, 
Sr.  
Benjamin 
Abalos,  
Jr. 
Benjamin 
Abalos,  
Jr. 
Neptali  
Gonzales,  
II* 
Benjamin 
Abalos,  
 Jr. 
* Mayor Gonzales only served a single term (3 years) and considered as “steward” of the city  
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 Section 285 of the LGC of 1991 stated that “the share of local government units in the 
internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner: (a) Provinces - 23%, (b) 
Cities - 23%, (c) Municipalities - 34%, and (d) Barangays - 20%.” As of September 2010, there are 
79 provinces, 122 cities,  1,512 municipalities, and over 42,000 barangays. The sharing 
arrangement indicates higher share to individual city compared with individual municipality.  
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 Immediately after his stint as mayor, Gonzales was elected congressman 
representing the lone district of Mandaluyong City. Meanwhile, Benjamin Abalos , Jr. 
was again elected as city mayor. For purposes of this case study, some initiatives 
that were introduced by Gonzales will be briefly illustrated in the following sections 
to understand how his decisions and actions affected the housing program delivery.   
 
6.1.2 Neptali Gonzales II: The Mayor 
To understand the context why Gonzales is considered as “steward mayor”, it 
is important to briefly mention his friendship with the Abalos’. As the youngest and 
only son of former Senate President Neptali Gonzales , Sr., Gonzales is respected by 
the members of Abalos clan.
190
 Gonzales’s father was a close friend of Benjamin 
Abalos, Sr. (mayor from 1988-1998). Both Benjamin Abalos, Sr. and Neptali  
Gonzales, Sr. belonged to the same neighborhood and political party that further 
strengthened their friendship and alliance. Benjamin “Benhur” Abalos, Jr., son of 
Benjamin Abalos, Sr., is also a close friend and ally of Gonzales. Benhur has been 
serving as mayor of the city for several terms.
191
 Their friendship was clearly 
demonstrated when Benhur allowed Gonzales to run for mayor in 2004. At that time, 
Gonzales was constitutionally barred to seek a fourth consecutive term in the House 
of Representatives so Benhur gave way, and run for the Congress . It was in this 
                                                          
190
 Neptali Gonzales, Sr. was Senate President from January 1, 1992 to January 18, 1993; 
from August 29, 1995 to October 10, 1996; and from January 26 1998 to May 1998. See “Roll of 
Senate Presidents”, http://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/roll.asp (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
191  One term of office at local government is three years.  Under the LGC, a mayor who 
served three consecutive terms cannot run for the fourth term. In other words, a local political 
leader can only serve up to nine consecutive years in the same office. After that,  the politician 
may seek other office or skip one term to qualify for the same office again.  
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context that the leadership of Gonzales will be analyzed as far as his decisions and 
actions in housing program delivery are concerned.   
Gonzales’ biography is presented at his personal homepage 
(http://nmgonzales.com), and it will also be briefly summarized in this paper to 
know more about his background and leadership qualities. Regarding his education, 
he took his primary at the Mandaluyong Elementary School , his secondary at the 
Union High School of Manila of the Philippine Christian College, and 
undergraduate at the Far Eastern University (FEU) obtaining a degree in political 
science.
192
 One of his early awards was during his senior high school, where he won 
the prestigious Gerry Roxas Leadership Award.
193
 He studied law at the Ateneo de 
Manila University, graduating with honors and among the top 25 successful bar 
examinees. He practiced law prior to entering public office through a law firm that 
he jointly put up with few associates.  While doing private law practice, he also 
taught law at FEU’s Institute of Law on subjects relating to criminal law and 
constitutions. When Gonzales joined politics, he has been serving as congressman 
representing the lone district of Mandaluyong City. While in  Congress, he occupied 
various posts including Majority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001) and 
the 12th Congress (2001-2004). “In his first nine years as congressman, he authored 
33 bills and was co-author of 92 bills. During his first term, he held the distinction 
of being one of the neophyte members of the Congress to have the most number of 
bills adopted as laws. Among the measures he authored are the National Internal 
                                                          
192  Neptali Gonzales II, “Congressman Profile”, http://nmgonzales.com/profile.asp (Accessed 
August 5, 2011).  
193The Gerry Roxas Foundation, “Youth Leadership Award”, 
http://www.gerryroxasfoundation.org/prog_youth1.php (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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Revenue Code, the E-Procurement Law, and the establishment of the Mandaluyong 
Science High School.”194  
As mayor, Gonzales capitalizes on the high institutional capacity of the city. 
He understood that the city have too much resources, and has the ability to deliver 
desired program with better quality. Understanding this context, the contributions of 
Gonzales are generally directed towards strengthening the institutional capacity of 
Mandaluyong City to facilitate a more effective delivery of social services. Firstly, 
Gonzales tried to improve employees’ efficiency through computerization.  Through 
computerization, the work of employees became faster and more effective. For 
instance, the implementation of biometrics-based attendance monitoring system 
brought about ease and discipline to employees as well as savings for the city 
because employees are paid only for the actual time of work rendered.
195
 With 
proper documentation, tardiness and absences were deducted from the salary. Hence, 
with computerization, the city’s income for three years reached an all -time high of 
PhP1.78billion, the highest so far in the city’s history. Data obtained from the 
City’s Accounting Department revealed that from 2004 -2005, tax collection 
increased by 12.15% and subsequent increases were noted in succeeding years 
thereafter. This observation indicates that employees’ had enhanced the tax 
collection through computerization, coupled with the implementation of public 
works and projects.  
Secondly, Gonzales tried to upgrade institutional capacity for the delivery of 
social services. For instance in education, Gonzales increased the city’s annual 
                                                          
194  House of Representatives of the Republic of the Philippines, “House Bills and 
Resolutions”, http://www.congress.gov.ph/audience/ (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
195  Mandaluyong City, Mandaluyong City: The Millennium City  (Mandaluyong: 
Mandaluyong Information Office Publication, 2000).  
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budget for public school from PhP25 million to PhP35 million to buy better 
textbooks as well as facilitates the maximization of children’s learning potentials. 196 
Moreover, in public health, Gonzales decided that the procurement of Health 
Certificates by client should become a one-stop-shop. In view of these, health 
clinics and X-Ray laboratory were established at the city hall grounds. Gonzales had 
also expanded the capacities of city hospitals and health centers with enough 
equipment, medicines, and supplies.
197
  
Thirdly, Gonzales also invested in improving institutional capacity through 
advanced information technology and development legislation . Advanced 
information technology is advocated to facilitate judicious decisions and better 
services. Gonzales built up the “required technology to improve both internal 
management and delivery of frontline services.”198  For this purpose, Mandaluyong 
developed the City Management Information System (CMIS) . This is an updated 
information system that is applied primarily for revenue generation. The system is 
also used to aid administrative functions as well as socioeconomic profiling. The 
CMIS improves not only the database on revenues but it also facilitated a systematic 
administration of civil registry and corresponding rates for real property tax, fees, 
business permits, and license tax. Additionally, the system is linked to GIS with 
base map from the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority 
(NAMRIA) that facilitates identification of real property locations . Similar 
technologies and systems have been also appl ied for taxes, fees, and permits.
199
  
                                                          
196 Ernesto Victorino, interview by the author, Mandaluyong City, May 2008.  
197 Mandaluyong City Health Office , (Mimeo 2009).  
198 Mandaluyong City Public Information Office , (Mimeo 2007).   
199
 Nolan Reyes, interview by the author, Mandaluyong City, April 2008.  
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It should be noted that Gonzales also promoted development legislation to 
facilitate legal mandate and systematic allocation of resources for development 
programs. Essentially, all activities and transactions of the city  are based on records 
and laws.
200
 As a lawyer, Gonzales affirmed the policy of aligning the city’s 
development thrusts with corresponding legislation, which has been practiced by the 
Abalos’. For instance, some of the key legislation and policies relate to better 
administration, social service delivery, environment, economy, housing and land 
acquisition, tourism, infrastructure, flood control, education, and employment. 
Regarding administration, a Council Resolution ratifying the city government ’s 
computerization of the information system was passed. Regarding social services, a 
Council Resolution was passed authorizing the city mayor to negotiate and secure 
grants. Regarding environment, a “Resolution recommending approval and adoption 
of the Pasig River Rehabilitation Master Plan” was passed. Regarding housing and 
land acquisition, a “Council Resolution was passed authorizing the city mayor to 
sign pertinent documents relative to the ‘Land for the Landless’ and ‘Home for the 
Homeless’ programs .” 201   In general, the message is that many development 
legislations along various sectors were approved by the City Council during the 
term of Gonzales. The city’s special emphasis on development legislation provides 
clear focus on formal rules and regulations for administration.  
 
6.1.3 The City Housing Program  
Mandaluyong has a broader housing program called “Home for the Homeless”  
which was initiated by Benjamin Abalos, Sr. in 1990. To supplement this program, 
                                                          
200 Mandaluyong City Council, Compilation of City Legislation: 1992 -2008 .   
201
 For more list of other development legislation, see Mandaluyong City, “Profile of 
Social Services”, http://www.mandaluyong.gov.ph/profile/social_services.aspx (Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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Gonzales introduced the “Adopt-a-Home” project. While both of these initiatives 
will be presented here, the analysis will be focused on the adopt -a-home project.  
 
Home for the Homeless 
The starting point of the city housing program can be traced back in 1990, 
when the number of squatters in Mandaluyong reached 9,000 families. Benjamin 
Abalos Sr., the mayor of that time, initiated the  program so that eventually every 
family will own a land and a decent house. The main objective of the program is to 
make Mandaluyong squatter-free through mass housing. To achieve such objective, 
the city set forth two major strategies: “(i) buying land and allocating these to 
informal settlers, and (ii) constructing socialized housing projects for the urban 
poor”, which are similar to UDHA provisions . At the time of its establishment, three 
key agencies were involved to carry out the program, namely : the Office of the 
Mayor, the Estate Management and Development Office (EMDO), and the 
Engineering Department. The Office of the Mayor implemented the program through 
the EMDO, which processes the applications for housing units. The Engineering 
Department was responsible for facilitating and monitoring the construction process 
of the socialized housing. In 1992, two years after the implementation of the 
program, five (5) socialized housing projects were developed benefiting 844 
families (Mandaluyong Housing Development Board 2008). The coverage of the 
program continued expanding to cover more urban poor beneficiaries, and in 1994, 
the city became an originator of CMP. It  allocated about PhP21 million for CMP to 
facilitate land acquisition.
202
  
                                                          
202 This amount accounts to 4.7% of the city’s budget in 1994. It should be noted that the 
following year was an election year (1995) and the son of the mayor was groomed to succeed his 
political post in 1998.  
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In 1996, Benjamin Abalos Sr. renamed the EMDO to Mandaluyong Housing Board 
and Development (MHDB) to integrate the new mandates from the LGC and the 
UDHA. He then authorized a capital fund of PhP500 million for the housing 
program, including provision of shelter and land acquisition.
203
 With the allocation 
of such amount, the implementation of the program has made some significant 
progress, particularly in terms of land acquis ition and provision of socialized 
housing. Land acquisition is facilitated by MHDB in two ways. One is on-site 
development using funds of the city government and the other is through the CMP.  
The progress along these areas is shown in Table 6.4. Compared with on-site 
development mode, many of the lands were acquired by the city through the CMP.
204
  
 
Table 6.4 Land Acquisition as of December 2002 
Mode of Acquisition Total Land Area 
(in square meters) 
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
 
On-site Development  62,087 1,414 
Community Mortgage Program   67,340 1,601 
Total  129,427 3,015 
   Source: Mandaluyong Housing and Development Board 2005  
 
                                                          
203 Mandaluyong City Ordinance No. 159, S -1996 is known as “An Ordinance Creating the 
Mandaluyong Housing and Development Board, Defining its Power and Functions, Providing 
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes”, enacted May 2, 1996.  
204
 For instance, the Philippine National Railways’  property covering a land area of 
95,383.30m
2
 and the Barangka Ilaya along the Pasig River shoreline  where a total of 1,863 
families benefited. However, this arrangement had been modified at a time when the total balance 
of payment for the land becomes manageable enough for the  city to pay in full. This new 
arrangement has been a lot favorable to the paying public as their payments are now made to the 
city. Ernesto L. Santos, interview by the author, Mandaluyong City, May 2008.  
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Challenges at the initial stage of land acquisition and distribution were noted, 
including identification of beneficiaries as well as their “lack of initiative to abide 
by the procedures and rulings.”205 It was reported that the process was “complicated, 
as it extended the beneficiaries to include government employees, victims of 
calamities, and those affected by other government projects” (Mandaluyong Housing 
and Development Board 2008). With huge coverage, the city has to refer 
beneficiaries, who are qualified but could not be accommodated by the city, to avail 
the national housing program instead. With limited land within the city, others were 
offered resettlement packages outside the city. For example, “a total of 298 
households were transferred to Kasiglahan Village in Trece Martirez, Cavite (which 
is off-site) in the light of the Pasig River Rehabilitation Program that affected 
informal settlers. Those relocated to Cavite were provided adequate housing 
facilities and livelihood programs” (Table 6.5).  
 
Table 6.5 Eviction and Demolition Projects (2002-2003) 
Affected Area No. of Families Affected 
Buayang Bato 41 
Barangka Ilaya 106 
Hulo 15 
Vergara 89 
Namayan 4 
Mabini J. Rizal 43 
Total 298 
            Source: Mandaluyong Housing and Development Board 2005  
 
Socialized housing, as delivered by MHDB, has been innovat ive. With greater 
emphasis on providing housing units, the MHDB adopted a vertical development 
                                                          
205
 Ernesto Victorino, interview by the author, Manda luyong City, May 2008.  
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type of housing. “In December 2002, a total of 1,359 units have been awarded to 
qualified beneficiaries. Each housing unit has an average monthly amortization of 
PhP2,658.00 payable in either 10 or 25 years term. Additionally, 14 medium-rise 
buildings have been constructed in a land area of 8,733m
2
, benefiting 576 
families.”206 
 
Adopt-a-Home Project  
Gonzales , during his stint as mayor, pursued the “Adopt -a-Home” project to 
supplement the existing city housing program.  The unique feature of this project is 
that MHDB has engaged the Gawad Kalinga (GK) – an NGO devoted to addressing 
slums and fulfilling housing demands in areas left unsatisfied by the city 
government – in the construction of housing units. 207  The development of this 
project can be traced back during Gonzales’s bid for mayoralty in 2004 elections. 
He promised to prioritize urban housing issues if elected mayor. After winning the 
elections, some GK representatives who were cognizant to his promises visited his 
office with a proposal to build 300 housing units until the end of his term in 2007. 
Gonzales was enthusiastic about the proposal that he suggested to triple GK’s target 
by building 1,000 units. Gonzales was aware that in 2004, an estimated number of 
squatter families was about 22,000, and that most of them were rampant in 14 
                                                          
206 Mandaluyong Housing and Development Board, (Mimeo 2008).  
207
 Overall, the GK’s housing programs are a showcase that the problems of the poor can 
be solved. For more information about its operations and activities of GK, see Gawad Kalinga, 
“No More Slums, No More Violence, No More Poverty”, http://www.gk1world.com/ (Accessed August 
5, 2011).  
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barangays as indicated by the NSO Census of 2000.
208
Anticipating the social 
benefits of this project, Gonzales instructed the MHDB to coordinate all necessary 
arrangements with GK for them to work together. Since the project was designed 
purely as supplementary, the coverage was limited only to two barangays where 
many informal settlers were left unattended by the city government . In this context, 
the experience of GK was valuable to the city, particularly in two areas. Firstly, GK 
has been organizing the urban poor into associations in those two barangays since 
2000 with the help of volunteer groups (e.g. Singles for Christ and C ouples for 
Christ). These groups were exposed in building houses through the “sweat equity” 
approach. Secondly, GK has been facilitating various activities for the community 
associations (e.g. income-generating projects) that contributed to urban poor’s 
increasing level of awareness about their rights.  
In a nutshell, the project has the following features: (i) it is based on the 
concept of “Sweat Equity”, where beneficiaries and members of the community 
offer free-labor in the construction of socialized housing units – a concept that is 
patterned after the “Habitat Shelter Program” pioneered by former  U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter; (ii) MHDB and GK work together in seeking donations from the 
private sectors, usually in a form of construction materials, for ho using units; (iii) 
GK, together with MHDB, facilitates the identification and organization of 
beneficiaries; and (iv) MHDB, upon approval of the mayor, provides subsidy on 
other housing development expenditures such as electricity and water.  
 
                                                          
208
 These 14 barangays are: Addition Hills, Barangka Drive, Barangka Ibaba, Barangka 
Itaas, Burol,  Daang Bakal, M. J. Rizal, Malamig, Mauway, Old Zaniga, Plainview, Poblacion, 
Highway Hills,  and Hulo. Abraham B. Calamba, interview by the author, Mandaluyong City, April 
2008.  
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Provision of Housing Units  
Essentially, the project  was aimed at providing housing units to qualified 
beneficiaries who can help in the construction. The construction materials were 
sourced by the city government from the private sector and donations from other 
companies and individuals. The land, used for construction, was either owned by the 
government or private individuals who have special arrangement with the city 
government. In other words, beneficiaries do not own the land.  
With focus on providing housing, some issues were anticipated. Firstly, since 
the coverage was limited within two barangays only, squatters from other barangays 
felt that the mayor had preference in program delivery. It is not uncommon that 
every squatter wants a housing unit that he can call his own.
209
 Secondly, since 
beneficiaries do not own the land, cases of selling the house to other beneficiaries 
were observed.
210
 Basically, there is no housing security if beneficiaries do not own 
the land. Lastly, since beneficiaries were not engaged in planning the project, there 
is no deep sense of ownership to houses that were built . While it is true that they 
helped in the construction, the beneficiaries were not engaged in the whole process 
of planning and decision-making. In other words, they were not properly consulted.  
Instead, beneficiaries were viewed plainly as “ recipients” of the project. In this 
regard, this whole concept of housing provision should be revisited in consideration 
of land ownership to ensure tenure.  
 
Delivery Mechanism 
In the delivery of the project, GK’s engagement is limited purely to 
‘implementation’ as indicated in Figure 6.2. As noted earlier, Gonzales is more 
                                                          
209 Nolito Quilang, interview by the author, Mandaluyong City, May 2008.  
210 Abraham Calamba, interview by the author, Mandaluyong City, May 2008.  
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inclined to utilizing the institutional capacity of the city rather than depending on 
other organizations’ support. While GK rendered its expertise in building housing 
units through the “sweat equity” approach , it was neither represented in the local 
housing nor in the Appropriations Committee.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 MHDB-GK Partnership Structure 
 
Although limited, synergy in MHDB-GK partnership was created during 
project implementation. Throughout the 3-year (2004-2007) partnership life span, 
the skills of members from both organizations were effectively combined. For 
instance, MHDB took charge of the logistics and subsidy while GK took charge in 
organizing the urban poor as well as coordinating the construction of homes. 
According to the MHDB, the value of collaborating with GK is that it makes the 
implementation of the housing program more efficient. Through the “Adopt -A-Home” 
149 
 
project, the coverage of the ‘home for homeless’ program has been expanded “in 
terms of the number of barangays and the number of beneficiaries. ”211 First of all, 
GK has the expertise in applying the “Sweat Equity” approach in constructing 
homes, including the capacity to tap youth and adult groups to work together – a 
distinctive capacity that MHDB does not have. Second, GK is more capable of 
identifying genuine beneficiaries because of its experience of working in the area. 
This particular capacity is important for MHDB because there have been cases of 
‘professional squatting’ in the city. 212  Third, GK has expertise in providing other 
support activities to the communities through livelihood and income generating 
projects. This is another capacity that is lacking from the MHDB. Evidently, the 
MHDB-GK partnership has harnessed active community engagement into the city’s 
housing program. While these benefits were evident in the program, Gonzales fell 
short of recognizing a full collaboration approach for the city government.  
 
6.1.4 Policy Indecisiveness of Gonzales 
 As shown in Table 6.6, the number of squatters during the term of 
Gonzales continued to increase from 22,000 families in 2004 to 22,641 families at 
the end of his term in 2007 despite the assistance to some 710 families through his 
supplementary program.  While there are many factors to justify why the number of 
squatters increased, the fact is that squatting remains a big issue. He missed the 
opportunity of handling the socio-political dynamics, which he could have done by 
uniting stakeholders towards a common purpose. Of course, the achievement of the 
project cannot be discredited. For the record, the achievement was remarkable 
seeing real families having roofs above their heads.  
                                                          
211 Ernesto L. Santos, interview by the author, Mandaluyong City, May 2008.  
212
 Mike Ocampo, interview by the author, Mandaluyong City, April 2008.  
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Table 6.6 Contribution of Adopt -A-Home Project  
Estimated No. of 
Informal Settlers in 2004  
Estimated No. of Informal 
Settlers in 2007 
Achievement 
(as of 2007) 
 
22,000 families  
 
22,641 families  
 
710 families 
benefit ted 
    Source: Mandaluyong Housing and Development Board 2008  
 
 Yet, why is this project considered less successful? First of all, Gonzales did 
not prevent entry of new squatters in the city. In-migrants, who can be potential 
voters, coming from the provinces and neighboring cities, continue to enter and stay 
in the city. While the logical solution is to institute policies that will prevent and 
discourage new squatters’ entry, Gonzales did not do this action. Secondly, 
Gonzales did not see to it that the beneficiaries would graduate from being squatters. 
While the beneficiaries can occupy and own a housing unit, they are not guaranteed 
land tenure. In other words, although squatters own th eir houses, they do not own 
the land where the houses are built. This practice is not only prone to making 
beneficiaries sell their houses, but it also provides a false sense of housing security. 
Finally, Gonzales lacks definitive action for a comprehensive housing program. It 
appears that the decisions of Gonzales are not based on greater understanding of the 
situation, where land tenure is the root cause of squatting that should be rightfully 
addressed. On this basis, it can be inferred that Gonzales demonstrated policy 
indecisiveness in housing program delivery. His stand on housing issue was not 
clear, so with his policies. While Gonzales attempted to partner with NGO to 
supplement the city housing program, such “partnership” was transactional. As 
shown in this case, GK was not engaged in planning and budgeting functions. 
Instead, GK was only engaged in a short -period implementation through “sweat 
equity”. It cannot be stated that Gonzales introduced right policies for housing nor 
expressed strong commitment to accountability of outcomes. Why? Because 
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Gonzales was not able to systematically combine the perspectives and resources of 
collaboration members. With his adherence to highly formal and systematic 
processes, Gonzales viewed the partnership with GK as mere transaction that does 
not transcend beyond what is legally agreed upon. This is a contributing factor why 
GK was never represented in the MHDB nor represented in the Appropriations 
Committee. As a result, GK had no opportunity to influence the policy and budget 
allocation for local housing.  
 
6.2 Cebu City  
This section will describe why the housing program delivery of Cebu City, a 
collaboration case, is considered less successful . It will discuss certain factors, 
including institutional capacity of the city as well as the decisions and actions of 
Tomas Osmeña.  
 
6.2.1 City Profile   
Cebu was founded in 1565 during the Spanish colonization period , and was 
legally incorporated city on February 24, 1937. Cebu is known as the “first Spanish 
settlement in the country with colonial buildings still existing in the locality.”213 
Cebu City is situated in the central part of the Philippines (Figure 6.3) with a total 
land area of 291.20 km
2
. It is the main domestic shipping hub and the main 
international hub for flights into the country after Metro Manila. Due to its strategic 
location, Cebu City is an important point for commerce, trade, and industry in the 
                                                          
213
 These include Basilica Minore  del Santo Niño, Fort San Pedro, Casa Gorordo Museum, 
and Magellan’s Cross. See “Cebu City Tourism Commission”, http://www.cebucitytourism.com/ 
(Accessed August 5, 2011).  
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southern part of the Philippines. With these characteristics, Cebu is referred as  the 
“Queen City of the South”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Location of Cebu City 
 
Quick Statistics  
As of 2007, the total population of the city stood at 798,809
214
 with a 
population density of 2,743/ km
2
 (Table 6.7).  
 
 
  
                                                          
214  As of 2010, the estimated total population of Cebu City was 866, 171 National 
Statistics Office, “The 2010 Census of Population and Housing”, http://www.census.gov.ph/content/2010-
census-population-and-housing-reveals-philippine-population-9234-million (Accessed November 14, 2013).  
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Table 6.7 Profile of Cebu City 
Land Area 291.20 km
2
 
Population (as of 2007)  798,809  
Density  2,743/ km
2
 
Total Income (as of 2004)  PhP 1.65 Billion  
IRA Share (as of 2004) PhP 610.29 Million  
Local Source (as of 2004) PhP 1.04 Billion  
Income Classification  1
st
 Class 
City Classification  Highly Urbanized City 
Number of Barangays  80 
Source: City Planning Office 2008  
 
Cebu City is classified as 1
st
 Class City with 36% dependency rate on IRA. 
The City comprises 80 barangays – 49 are classified as urban and 31 as rural. The 
differences of classification, as adopted by the city government, are mainly  due to 
population density, little or no amenities, and agglomeration of economies. The 
entry of business process outsourcing firms, such as call centers, in early 2000 has 
greatly contributed to the growth of local economy. The “South Road Properties 
(SRP), a 300-hectare prime property development project on a reclaimed land 
located a few meters off the coast of Cebu’s central business district, is the largest 
multi-billion project in the history of Cebu City.”215 The SRP is a key project under 
the administration of Mayor Tomas Osmeña.  
 
Serving Mayors (1988~2010) 
Tomas Osmeña is a long-serving mayor of Cebu City (Table 6.8). Starting in 
1988, Osmeña continued serving for three consecutive terms until 1998. In 2001, 
Osmeña served another three consecutive terms until 2010. For a single term (1998 -
                                                          
215
 Cebu City Government, “The South Road Properties (SRP)”, 
http://www.cebucity.gov.ph/srp/srp.htm (Accessed June 15, 2009).  
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2001) that Osmeña was not serving as mayor, his friend and political ally Alvin 
Garcia occupied the position.
216
 
 
Table 6.8 Serving Mayors in Cebu City since 1988 Elections  
City/Term 1988- 
1992 
1992- 
1995 
1995- 
1998 
1998- 
2001 
2001 – 
2004 
2004 - 
2007 
2007 – 
2010 
Cebu  
 
Tomas 
Osmeña 
Tomas 
Osmeña 
Tomas 
Osmeña 
Alvin 
Garcia* 
Tomas 
Osmeña 
Tomas 
Osmeña 
Tomas 
Osmeña 
 
* Mayor Alvin Garcia only served a single term (3 years) and considered as “steward” of the city  
 
After his term as mayor in 2010, Osmeña run for the House of 
Representatives to represent the second district of Cebu City. He won and served for 
one term (three years). In May 2013 elections, Osmeña run again for mayor against 
a former ally Mike Rama. In that election, Osmeña lost to Rama, so he is now living 
a private life.  
 
6.2.2 Tomas Osmeña: The Mayor  
Tomas Osmeña belongs to strong political clan. He is the son of late Senator 
Sergio Osmeña Jr., the grandson of former Philippine President Sergio Osmeña Sr., 
and the younger brother of Senator Sergio Osmeña III.
217
 In other words, Tomas 
Osmeña is heir to one of the longest political families in the Philippines. The profile 
of Tomas Osmeña as described in the Cebu City website  (www.cebucity.gov.ph) can 
be summarized briefly in terms of his education and other background. He attended 
primary and secondary education at the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu City 
– a school managed by the Jesuits. He completed his degree  in Agro-Economics 
                                                          
216  For brief information about former Cebu City mayor, Alvin Garcia, see Zoom Info, 
“Alvin Garcia”, http://www.zoominfo.com/p/Alvin-Garcia/60428641 (Accessed November 10, 2013).    
217 John T. Sidel, “Philippine Politics in Town, District, and Province: Bossism in Cavite 
and Cebu”, The Journal of Asian Studies  56, no. 4 (1997): 947 -966.  
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from Xavier University in Cagayan De Oro City, Philippines. For graduate studies, 
he went to the University of California in Los Angeles to pursue a degree in Finance 
Management and International Trade. While in California, he worked as the Vice-
President of a Los Angeles-based company, SEROS, Inc. The other posts that he 
occupied, include: financial analyst for Foreign Credit Insurance Association, Vice-
President of the Apex Realty and Developers in California , and Vice-President of 
the “Club Filipino” in Los Angeles. 218  
In 1988, Osmeña was elected mayor in Cebu City. Belonging to a strong 
political clan, winning the election was no big deal. While serving as mayor, he was 
elected as Vice-President of the League of City Mayors of the Philippines  in 1990, 
and on the same year, he was awarded as one of the Ten Outstanding Young Men in 
the Philippines. Then in 1992, he was elected President of the LCP serving until 
1995.
219
 In 2002, Osmeña was given the “Most Outstanding Mayor Award for Local 
Government Leadership” from a consortium of government and educational 
institutions.
220
  
 
  
                                                          
218  Cebu City Government,  “Profile of Mayor Tomas Osmeña”, http://www.cebucity.gov.ph/ 
(Accessed June 28, 2009).  
219  League of Cities of the Philippines, “Knowledge Resources”,   
http://www.lcp.org.ph/KR_overview.php (Accessed November 14, 2013).  
220
 The consortium comprised: the “University of the Philippines, De La Salle University, 
National College of Public Administration and Governance, Center for Local and Regional 
Governance, Local Government Academy, and the Center for Leadership, Citizenship and 
Democracy”. Osmeña received the award on October 17, 2002 at the Philippine Senate .   
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Collaboration Inclination  
Osmeña is inclined towards collaboration in implementing his programs, 
encouraging greater engagement of non-government organizations, people’s 
organizations, and private sector. More specifically, Osmeña is inclined towards 
complementarity of functions between city government and other sectors. The idea 
is that the city government should not be performing the functions that other sectors 
are good at doing.  
The best example to illustrate the notion of complementarity of function, as 
advocated by Osmeña, is the Urban Basic Services Program (UBSP). Osmeña 
introduced this program to operationalize the provisions of the LGC.
221
 In particular, 
the LGC stipulates that “the local governments shall take responsibility for 
devolved services for health, agriculture, public works and social welfare which 
previously were obligations of national government”. In this regard, Osmeña 
decided to collaborate with NGOs in localizing the services. The main objective of 
the program was to “improve the situation of urban poor women and children in 
depressed barangays.” 222  Starting in 1992, the city government carried out the 
                                                          
221
 The Urban Basic Services Program covered 26 urban poor barangays . Francisco 
Fernandez, interview by the author, Cebu City, May 20 08. 
222
 The UBSP aims to “(i) reduce significantly the mortality and morbidity rates of 
children aged 0-5 years and of mothers in urban poor communities;  (ii)  increase family incomes by 
providing alternative sources of credit and technologies to support effo rts to improve health and 
the nutritional status of urban poor women and children; (iii)  organize urban poor communities 
and enhance their capacities to manage their own development programs; (iv) raise and increase 
awareness of urban poor women on basic i ssues and concerns that affect their daily lives and that 
of their children; (v) increase awareness of abandoned, street and working children of access to 
basic social services; (vi) upgrade and expand facilities for water, electricity, sanitation, drainag e 
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program in collaboration with NGOs so that both sectors can combine their 
respective expertise and capacities. The results of the program were observed in the 
areas of health, housing, and livelihood.
223
 All results were considered positive such 
that in health, coverage of immunization was expanded and common diseases were 
prevented. In housing, strategies for land acquisition were formulated and 
homeowner associations were organized so that they can apply for CMP with the 
city government as originator. In  livelihoods, technical assistance were provided to 
community, particularly in managing cooperatives as well as providing skills 
training for income-generating activities such as soap-making, food processing, and 
cloth weaving. The UBSP showcased that the city government can work together 
with NGOs to achieved desired results.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and other public utilities in urban poor communities; (vii) enhance child development through 
increased and sustained access among pre -school and school age children to quality educational 
facilities and a quality system;(viii) rationalize land tenure an d upgrade housing conditions among 
urban poor families through self -help; (ix) integrate all efforts and resources of both government 
and non-government organizations to make services available to most of the urban population, 
especially the disadvantaged;  and (x) empower people in terms of decision -making, accessing and 
managing resources.” See Cebu City, Urban Basic Services Program: Terminal Implementation 
Report 1998 .  
223
 Felisa U. Etemadi, “Urban governance and poverty alleviation: the Cebu City 
experience”, In Urban Governance and Poverty Alleviation: Trends and Prospects,  edited by 
Emma Porio (Manila: Global Urban Research Initiative in Southeast Asia, 1997).  
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Alliance Building  
Osmeña has established alliances with both the urban poor (as represented by 
POs and NGOs) and the private sector. For obvious reasons, these alliances are not 
only politically valuable but also useful in program and services delivery.  
Firstly, Osmeña initiated an alliance with the urban poor when first ran for 
mayor in 1988. He reached out to the urban PO coalitions to gain support. 
Specifically, Osmeña approached the Urban Poor People’s Council (UPPC) – a 
federation of urban poor organizations in 22 communities with a membership of 
180,000. As a federation with political clout , UPPC prepared a seven-point agenda 
known as the “People’s Alternative”, which included: “(i) people’s participation in 
decision-making, (ii) the creation of an office for socia l development, (iii) 
employment generation for the urban poor, (iv) local government control over the 
police, (v) the distribution of stalls among vendors in the city central market, (vi) 
sectoral representation of the urban poor in the city council, and ( vii) 
implementation of traffic regulations without discrimination. ”224  Osmeña promised 
to address the issues of urban poor and support the UPPC agendas , so when Osmeña 
he was elected mayor, he created the City Commission for the Urban Poor (CCUP) . 
It is reported that such office was the first of its kind the country, and that some 
NGO leaders were recruited to join.
225
According to Etemadi (2004), the 
collaborative arrangements within CCUP indicate a growing relationship between 
city government and NGOs/POs such that it resulted into a strategic paradigm shift: 
                                                          
224  Felisa U. Etemadi, Urban Governance, Partnership and Poverty in Cebu  (London: 
Department for International Development, 2000), 39 –40.  
225
 The primary task of the CCUP was to coordinate the speedy implementation of 
government policies and programs for the urban poor in the city. Danilo Gabiana, Head of DWUP, 
interview by the author, Cebu City, May 2008  
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the traditional NGO approach of “expose-oppose” was shifted to “expose–oppose–
propose”. This developed as “NGOs/POs realized that their hardline stance was not 
producing the desired results. Hence, confrontational politics gave way to the 
‘politics of engagement’, which is characterized by dialogue, negotiation, 
compromise and a win–win resolution of conflict”.  
Secondly, Osmeña also pursued alliance with the private sector.
226
 Since 
private sector plays a key role in local economy, Osmeña ensures that the local 
environment is conducive for business. The approach is to entice support from 
business sector so that they will not interfere in the affairs of city government. One 
example of alliance that Osmeña established is with the Eduardo Aboitiz 
Development Studies Center (EADSC). 
227
 In this alliance, EADSC provides a 
conference space for the city government and various groups to discuss the issues 
and share experiences to help pursue local development.   
 
6.2.3 The City Housing Program  
 Concerned with the issues of urban poor  and squatting, Osmeña in 1988, 
created the CCUP to serve as the city government agency that plans, formulates, and 
implements programs for the urban poor. 
228
 In view of the new mandates from 
UDHA, Osmeña in 1994 renamed CCUP to Division for the Welfare of Urban Poor 
                                                          
226
 Tomas Osmeña, “State of the City Address”, Cebu City, July 1, 2002.  
227
 Ramon Aboitiz Foundation Incorporated, “Eduardo Aboitiz Development Studies 
Center”, http://www.rafi.org.ph/intro.php (Accessed July 6, 2010).  
228  Cebu City Ordinance No. 1286 is known as “An Ordinance Creating the Cebu 
Commission for the Urban Poor Under the Office of the Mayor and Appropriating Funds Therefor 
and For Other Purposes” enacted May 2, 1988.  
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(DWUP).
229
 Another reason for renaming was to update and integrate the functions 
of the agency based on the mandates from the LGC. In the process of updating this 
office, DWUP became more concerned with addressing squatting issues to facilitate 
urban development.  
 
Strategy and Performance 
 The strategy of implementing the city housing program is simple , and that is 
to enlist qualified squatters as beneficiaries. Against this backdrop, DWUP 
essentially patterned its functions from the UDHA provisions, i.e. land acquisition 
and socialized housing.  
 Regarding performance in land acquisition, DWUP targeted a total of 206.31 
hectares of land to be acquired in 1996. This total land area was expected to benefit 
an estimated number of 15,828 beneficiaries.
230
 As of December 2005, the city 
government acquired around 648,504m
2
 of the identified land area to be distributed 
to around 8,999 beneficiaries (Table 6.9). This means that around 141.46 hectares of 
land still need to be acquired to cover the remaining number of beneficiaries. It is 
worth mentioning that due to Osmeña’s openness to partner with NGOs, a relevant 
approach to land acquisition – which is the CMP – thrived in Cebu. In fact, the 
                                                          
229 Cebu City Ordinance No. 1524 is known as “An Ordinance Creating the Division for the 
Welfare of the Urban Poor, Formerly the Commission for the Urban Under the Office of the City 
Mayor”, enacted June 27, 1994.  
230 This estimated number of beneficiaries was a p rojection made by the City Government 
in 1996. The identification of these land areas was done through the following City Ordinances: 
Ordinance No.1656 in 1992, Ordinance No. 1772 in 1996, and Ordinance No. 1866 in 2000.  
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“Pagtambayayong Foundation”  (an NGO based in Cebu) conceptualized the CMP, of 
which the national housing program patterned its mechanism for social housing.
231
  
 
Table 6.9 Land Areas That Still Need to Be Acquired  
Action Total Area 
(in hectares) 
Target Number of 
Beneficiaries 
 
Land Area Identified for Social 
Housing  
206.31 15,828 
 
Land Area Acquired and 
Distributed  
64.85 8,999 
 
Difference  141.46 6,829 
 
       Source: Division for the Welfare of the Urban Poor 2006  
 
 Regarding performance in socialized housing, DWUP initiated the 
‘Condominium’ and the ‘Sugbu Homes’. These housing projects are designed as 
low-cost housing for squatter families who can afford .
232
 In promoting these 
socialized housing projects, Osmeña allied with NGOs, which resulted in the 
establishment of the “Tawhanong Pagpuyo”, a tripartite body composed of 
government, NGO, and PO. The main function of the tripartite body is to facilitate 
coordination between national housing agencies and local housing agencies.   
 Generally, in terms of strategy, the housing program of Cebu puts greater 
emphasis on providing housing units rather than land distribution. This is something 
that needs to be observed because it appears that there are some limitations to this 
strategy. Additionally, the collaboration approach  is one of the core approaches for 
housing program delivery. While this appears to a remarkable strategy, it is 
important to look into the details how it has been carried out and assess whether the 
approach achieves what it ought to achieve. The discussions about these concerns 
will be presented in the next sections.  
                                                          
231
 Danilo Gabiana, Head of DWUP, in terview by the author, Cebu City, May 9, 2008.  
232 Tomas Osmeña, “State of the City Address”, Cebu City, July 1, 2002.  
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Delivery Mechanism  
 Two points will be highlighted with regard to the delivery mechanism of 
housing program. Firstly, DWUP partners with NGO to facilitate complementarity 
of functions. Secondly, the mayor authorized the awarding of certificates of land 
ownership to many beneficiaries.  
 
Partnership with FORGE 
 In 2001, following his election as mayor, Osmeña identified the Fellowship 
for Organizing Endeavors (FORGE) – an NGO based in Cebu City – to partner with 
DWUP in implementing the housing program. To understand the contex t of 
partnership, a brief background of this NGO will be presented. FORGE started 
organizing the urban poor since 1988. FORGE’s mission is to ‘empower 
communities for poverty alleviation and improve the quality of life’. It has long 
experience in community organizing in almost all parts of Cebu City for over two 
decades. In 1988, two years after the EDSA Revolution, few community organizers 
took the initiative of setting up a social development agency that would pursue the 
empowerment agenda. In view of this, FORGE started a “Training and Community 
Organizing Program” in Cebu City. “This program was anchored on the conviction 
that strong POs are indispensable building blocks to a people -centered and 
sustainable development. Hence, the capacity of community leaders and mass 
members needs to be enhanced.”233  
 In order to accelerate acquired knowledge and skills for its urban poor 
partners, FORGE adopted an education methodology called Study Circles , where 
sharing of knowledge and experience is given greater emphasis than providing 
                                                          
233 Fellowship for Organizing Endeavors, “FORGE Story”, http://forgecebu.wordpress.com/about/ 
(Accessed November14, 2012).  
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lecture. FORGE actively engages in networking and coalition work to enhance its 
advocacy. In view of this, FORGE is a member and convenor of various sectoral and 
multi-sectoral groups both national and local levels. It supports full implementation 
of UDHA, including efficient delivery of housing and basic services to the urban 
poor. With the LGC as legal framework, FORGE promotes participatory governance 
through its community organizing activities. It works for the creation and 
reactivation of Barangay Development Council which entails multi -stakeholder’s 
participation. In particular, “FORGE assists the Barangay Development Council 
towards formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the Barangay 
Development Plan.”  234 FORGE also commits to empower communities for poverty 
alleviation by enabling marginalized communities to mobilize and manage their 
resources sustainably for decent living.
235
 
In implementing the Cebu City Housing Program, FORGE is the key 
collaboration partner of DWUP as shown in Figure 6.4. This collaboration puts 
greater emphasis on the complementarity functions  of government and NGO. The 
idea behind complementarity is that city government should not perform the 
                                                          
234 Urban Poor Associates, “Philippine NGO Network Report on ICESCR”, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/PhilippinesNGOCoalition41.pdf (Accessed November 18, 
2013).  
235 In realizing these commitments, FORGE puts emphasis on the following goals: (i) self -
reliant and sustainable POs, (ii) strengthened cap abilities of POs for meaningful participation in 
all aspects of decision -making and governance, (iii) efficient and effective pro -poor policies and 
programs, (iv) child -friendly, gender -sensitive, and ecologically -sound communities, (v) 
organizational sustainability, (6) holistic wellness of the staff and partner groups, and (vii)  
development of an urban poor resource center. Charmae Pyl Nercua, interview by the author, Cebu 
City, May 2008.  
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activities which it has no expertise. In the same token, if an NGO does the activity 
well, then the local government  should pursue collaboration with that NGO. This is 
the kind of partnership the DWUP and FORGE have agreed in principle. While the 
government has greater funds and resources, it is lacking some expertise in 
community organizing, livelihoods generation, and community support activities 
such as counseling and community building.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Complementarity between DWUP and FORGE 
 
As far as the housing program is concerned, FORGE is primarily engaged in 
two local government functions. These functions are in policymaking and 
implementation. In the policymaking function, FORGE is represented in the local 
housing board, which sets the policies.
236
 In the implementation function, FORGE is 
                                                          
236  Cebu City Ordinance No.1762 is known as “An Ordinance Creating th e Cebu City 
Housing Board, Providing for its Composition, Defining its Powers and Functions, and for Other 
Purposes”, enacted in May 19, 1999. It empowers the City Mayor to appoint representatives from 
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actively engaged in program delivery through identification of beneficiaries and 
organizing them. However, in terms of budgeting function, FORGE is excluded. 
This indicates that the DWUP-FORGE partnership is not fully integrated into the 
governance system.  
 
Awarding of Certificates 
 Based on DWUP’s record, about 38,983 squatter families have been “served” 
by the program since 1993 (Table 6.10). Such number can be understood  better  by 
looking at  what DWUP meant by “served” . 237  There are three approaches by 
which beneficiaries can be served by the program, namely through: (i) housing 
provision, (ii) certificate of land ownership, and (iii) lot ownership. By housing 
provision, it means that qualified beneficiaries are provided housing units, often 
through a socialized housing mechanism. In this case, the government facilitates the 
construction of house with minimal payment by beneficiaries. In other words, the 
provision of housing units is subsidized by the government along with the support 
from different national agencies. By certificate of land ownership, it means that a 
group of qualified beneficiaries are given a piece of paper indicating that they are 
legally entitled to stay in the land that they are currently occupying. The certificate 
is awarded to an association and the rights belong to the association. Th is certificate 
merely indicates “right to own the land”  – so it is not a certificate of ownership per 
se. Until a rigid procedure is completed, which can be completed for varying 
periods of time, beneficiaries can legally own a piece of land through the transfer of 
land titles to individual beneficiaries. Finally, by lot ownership, it means that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
the NGOs and POs to the Local Housing Board.  
237 This is an accumulated number of total qualified beneficiaries to the housing program 
since 1993. See “Cebu City Shelter Framework Plan 2008 -2010”.  
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piece of ‘titled land’ is provided to each qualified household/family, where they can 
build their house.  
If observers are wondering why Cebu can serve so many beneficiaries (Table 
6.10), it is because “served” means ‘provision of certificates’ to beneficiaries. This 
approach has been practiced in the city in the delivery of housing program.  
 
Table 6.10 Estimated Number of Beneficiaries Served in Cebu City  
Term / Period  Certificates of Land Ownership  
1993-1995 7,123 
1996-1998 12,423 
1999-2001 6,942 
2002-2004 8,075 
2005-2007 4,420 
Total  38,983 
Source: Department for the Welfare of Urban Poor,  2008  
 
By using such definition of “served”, what happens is that if a squatter family 
is a registered beneficiary of the program, and has decided to avail the services, that 
squatter family is automatically considered as “being served”. While there is no 
available segregation of data as to how many were served under the low -cost 
socialized housing and how many were served by merely belonging to an association, 
there is a general impression that most of the beneficiaries were served by giving 
them “certificates of land ownership”. The idea is simple. If the squatter families 
belong to a registered association, DWUP will assess them, and if they qualify in 
certain criteria, DWUP will facilitate the awarding of certificates.  The certificate 
belongs to the association and it allows all its members to stay in th e land with a 
possibility of owning the land. Under this arrangement, neither the association nor 
the squatter family owns the land unless the land titles are transferred. Sometimes, 
this kind of arrangement can be confusing because some of those considered “served” 
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can be actually “un-served” if ultimately they gave up belonging to the association  
or are moving to other areas.  
 
Benefits of Complementarity 
The DWUP-FORGE complementarity created synergy in the areas of 
policymaking, project implementation, and community engagement. Synergy is 
created in policymaking because FORGE is represented in the city’s LHB  to provide 
inputs in the formulation of policies and guidelines for the housing program.
238
 The 
representation of FORGE in this body facilitates the combination of perspectives, 
resulting to the prioritization of social housing concerns. The most tangible output 
of perspectives sharing is the Cebu City Comprehensive Shelter Plan, which was 
formulated with inputs from FORGE. There are many other concrete results from the 
combination of perspectives. Among them are the ordinances passed by the City 
Council (e.g. complying with the UDHA provisions) and policies of the city 
government concerning housing issue (e.g. measures to minimize the sale of census 
rights in DWUP project areas) that received inputs from FORGE representatives, 
who participated in the LHB.  
Synergy is also created in program implementation, as FORGE complements 
DWUP by offering basic skills in handling community organizing activities.  While 
DWUP focuses on the logistics  and funding support, FORGE focuses on social 
implications of the program, including livelihood activities for the beneficiaries.  
Additionally, synergy is further created at the community level through their 
positive response to the housing program.
239
 DWUP-FORGE complementarity 
                                                          
238 For all other functions of the Cebu City Local Housing Board, refer to Ordinance No. 
1762, enacted May 19, 1999 .  
239 International Youth Exchange Organization of Japan, “Strategic Partnership in Program 
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harnessed active engagement of people who are benefiting the program, and this has 
been recognized by the city government. In particular, FORGE complements DWUP 
in increasing the urban poor’s level of awareness on housing program that enables 
them to be organized into associations. In fact, as of December 2007, about 807 
homeowners associations (HOAs) were organized by FORGE and assisted by DWUP. 
Furthermore, HOAs were represented in meetings and various committees of UDHA 
and LHB at the city government. The DWUP-FORGE collaboration has supported 
and encouraged these associations to develop their housing development plans. 
Considering the outcomes of complementarity, DWUP-FORGE collaboration is seen 
as necessary component to realize the vision of provid ing decent housing for all.
240
 
The collaboration has enticed the citizens to participate and to become more aware 
of the services that the local government offers.  
 
6.2.4 Policy Indecisiveness of Osmeña 
While the program shows a promising approach under the leadership Osmeña, 
its overall achievement can be considered less successful  because the number of 
squatters in Cebu has continually increased despite the program (Table 6.11).  
 
Table 6.11 Estimated Number of Squatters in Cebu 1993~2007 
Year  1993 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007 
Total  29,832  33,608  55,329  56,662 57,442  57,663 58,712  
 Source: Department for the Welfare of Urban Poor  2008 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and Project Implementation in Cebu City”,  http://www.iyeo.or.jp/Ren/2004/Dev/Ren04-Dev-Maria-
philippines.PDF (Accessed November 18, 2013).   
240 Francisco Fernandez, interview by the author, Cebu City, May 2008.  
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Although there are several reasons to explain why the number of  squatters 
continues to increase, including the fact that Cebu is a developing city, the 
leadership style of Osmeña is a key factor. Firstly, Osmeña did not prevent the entry 
of new squatters. In fact, squatters (who are attracted to the city because of new 
projects and industries) are welcome. As a result, the number of squatters has been 
continually expanding. From this observation, it can be inferred that welcoming 
squatters can be viewed as a political investment so that it can pay off during 
elections.  
Secondly, Osmeña divide rather than multiply the actors in program 
implementation - an action that promotes gridlock rather than unity of purpose.  One 
illustration of this is how FORGE became a partner of the city government. 
Although FORGE has been in existence for over 20 years in Cebu City, it was only 
in 2001 that it obtained Osmeña’s approval to be represented at  the LHB. This 
indicates a gap between Osmeña’s policy of alliance and his actions. In fact, 
FORGE’s representation at the LHB was a result of long years of advocacy work 
and lobbying, demanding to be included in the planning and implementation of the 
urban poor programs of the city government. Only in 2001 that Osmeña 
demonstrated his influence by allowing FORGE to be represented at the LHB so as 
to encourage complementarity. It was a decision that considered political advantage 
because FORGE was becoming stronger with greater political clout. Seeing such 
advantage, Osmeña facilitated the allocation of regular budget for complementary 
activities.
241
 It should be noted that prior to FORGE’s official representation at 
LHB there was no locally-designed operations framework for land and housing 
development. Therefore, at that time, Osmeña simply adopted the UDHA 
                                                          
241  The budget allocation amounts to Php10 Million annually.  Francisco Fernandez, 
interview by the author, Cebu City, May 2008.  
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framework.
242
 If complementarity was done earlier, the collective strategy could 
have been facilitated through joint agreements such as accessing various modes of 
land acquisition (e.g. mortgage and resettlement) . Additionally, options for housing 
could have contributed to the development of locall y designed operations framework.  
Finally, Osmeña lacked a clear vision on eradicating squatter problem. One 
illustration is how NGOs were treated in the alliance or partnership arrangements. 
NGOs were essentially not involved in agenda-setting and planning. While Osmeña 
initiated the practice of alliance with NGOs, this alliance has not been integrated 
into the governance system. In fact, there were times when Osmeña departed from 
the usual legal procedures  by allocating funds for NGOs, which he did in 2002 and 
2003 with corresponding amounts of PhP10 million and PhP9.6 million  
respectively.
243
 For most observers, the decision was a clear sign of patronage 
politics. While many NGOs did not the access the fund, som e accessed it with 
accountability mechanism in place such as the NGO called “Kaabag”. 244  Although 
with that funds and support, NGOs can participate in political process and 
complement government agencies, “some NGOs were disappointed because their 
involvement, as envisioned by Osmeña, was only encouraged at the final stage or 
approval of development projects.”245  
                                                          
242 Cebu City Shelter Framework Plan 2008 .   
243
 Danilo Gabiana, interview by the author, Cebu City, May 2008.  
244  Kaabag, “Kaabag strategic planning workshop output,” unpublished report, November 
13, 2003.  
245  Felisa U. Etemadi “Urban governance and poverty allevia tion: The Cebu City 
experience”, in  Urban Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Southeast Asia: Trends and 
Prospects,  edited by Emma Porio (Manila: Global Urban Research Initiative in Southeast Asia, 
1997).  
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6.3 Summary 
This chapter showed that policy indecisiveness hinders program delivery from 
being effective, as illustrated in the cases of Mandaluyong and Cebu. In particular, 
policy indecisiveness is attributed as the main reason why housing programs in 
these cities are considered less successful. This chapter illustrated that there are 
three common characteristics of policy indecisive leaders. First , they are unable to 
take definitive decision and actions to  substantially reduce the number of squatters. 
Second, they are unable to take full responsibility to unify stakeholders towards a 
common vision. Third, they are unable to show commitment and consistent policy 
stand on housing issue.  With these observations, this chapter positively showed that 
if the leader does not exercise policy decisiveness, program delivery will be less 
effective.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Earlier, this research hypothesized that if the leader exercises policy 
decisiveness, program delivery will become more effective . Now bringing together 
the lessons from the four case studies, this chapter draws some conclusions and 
recommendations. It is expected that the findings of this research will be useful  for 
both academics and practitioners who are interested in the structure-agency debate. 
In particular, this chapter highlights the insights concerning policy decisiveness and 
collaboration in housing program delivery.  
 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
Findings of this research point to policy decisiveness as the crucial factor that 
affects housing program delivery (Figure 7.1). In view of this, it is important to 
reflect how policy decisiveness and collaboration can complement each other by 
finding the middle ground, where both can effectively operate. It is also important 
to understand how policy decisiveness can be achieved in order to promote its value.  
Figure 7.1 Summary of Findings 
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7.1.1 How does policy decisiveness facilitate effective program delivery? 
 One of the key findings of this research is that  cities with policy decisive 
mayors (Marikina and Naga) are able to decrease the number of squatters while 
cities with policy indecisive mayors (Mandaluyong and Cebu) failed to do so (Table 
7.1). The analysis of case studies offers three observations.  
 
Table 7.1 Comparative Number of Squatters Before and After the Program  
 
CITY 
Number of Squatters 
at the Start of the 
Program  
Number of 
Squatters as of 
2007 
Terms of Office 
Covered  
MARIKINA 
(Policy Decisive) 
23,000  1,271 
 
5 terms  
(1993-2007) 
NAGA 
(Policy Decisive) 
11,000  3,972 
 
4 terms  
(1995-2007) 
MANDALUYONG  
(Policy Indecisive) 
22,000  22,641  
 
1 term  
(2004-2007) 
CEBU  
(Policy Indecisive) 
29,000  58,712  
 
5 terms  
(1993-2007) 
 
 Firstly, policy decisive mayors ensure that the entry of new squatters in the 
city is prevented. This is presented in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 wherein Marikina and 
Naga have respectively showed a decreasing trend in the number of squatters, as the 
year progresses. In doing so, the mayors ascertain that corresponding ordinance, 
budget, and implementing mechanism – with proper monitoring and evaluation 
schemes – are put in place. In Marikina, city ordinances that restrict squatting are 
strictly implemented with concrete actions and results, such as the following: ( i) any 
group of squatters who tries to build a shanty is immediately demolished, (ii) 
beneficiaries are discouraged to bring family relatives by limiting the standard size 
of homelot allocation, and (iii) only the originally identified beneficiaries are 
serviced by the program, hence, new squatters are considered illegal and to be 
rightfully removed. Likewise in Naga, illegal squatters are rightfully denied access 
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to government and private lands. Only qualified beneficiaries are serviced through 
its “strategy of focus”  approach.  
 
  Table 7.2 Estimated Number of Squatters in Marikina 1993~2007  
Year 1993 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Total 19,974  14,501  11,016 6,490 1,271 
 Source: Marikina Settlements Office 2009 
 
Table 7.3 Estimated Number of Squatters in Naga City 1995~2007  
Year  1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Total  11,000 6,591 5,295 4,081 3,972 
 Source: Urban Poor Affairs Office 2008  
By contrast, policy indecisive mayors failed to prevent the entry of new 
squatters as shown in Table 7.4 and Table 7.5. This trend obviously indicates a 
loophole in the delivery of  housing program. Why is that? Essentially, the mayor 
failed to gather a unified support from different key players because of lack of clear 
vision on how to stop squatting. In both Cebu and Mandaluyong, there is no 
definitive ordinance to prevent squatters ’ entry, thus, actions such as demolition of 
shanties are not enforced. As a result, the  number of squatters is increasing. 
Furthermore, both mayors allowed expanding the number of qualified beneficiaries 
to the housing program, as observed annually. It covers not only the originally listed 
beneficiaries but also the new squatters. It can be said that in the absence of a clear 
vision to stop squatting, definitive legislative framework and working arrangements 
are far from being adopted or implemented .  
 
Table 7.4 Estimated Number of Squatters in Mandaluyong City 2004~2007 
Year  2004 2007 
Total  22,000 22,641  
 Source: Mandaluyong Housing Development Board  2008 
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Table 7.5 Estimated Number of Squatters in Cebu 1993~2007 
Year  1993 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007 
Total  29,832  33,608  55,329  56,662 57,442  57,663 58,712  
 Source: Department for the Welfare of Urban Poor 2008 
 
Secondly, policy decisive mayors ensure that squatters are “actually” 
benefitting from the housing program services. These mayors are guided with a clear 
objective of minimizing the number of squatters, if not totally eradicating the 
squatting situation. In doing so, they adopted the most substantial approach of 
serving the beneficiaries through ‘lot ownership’ as indicated in Table 7.6. Policy 
decisive leaders understand that lot ownership ensures greater security of land 
tenure compared with housing provision or awarding of certificates (of land 
ownership). Lot ownership is substantial because once the beneficiaries owned the 
land, they will immediately become non-squatters. In other words, they will 
graduate from being squatters. There is actually nothing new in the approach. In fact, 
it is plain common sense. If the entry of new squatters is  prevented through city 
regulations, the existing squatters can be given more opportunity to own a small 
piece of land. In doing so, the issue of squatting will become more manageable.  
 
Table 7.6 Estimated Number of Beneficiaries Served in Four Cities 
Term / 
Period  
Estimated Number of Beneficiaries Served  
Marikina  
(lot ownership)  
Naga 
(lot ownership)  
Mandaluyong  
(housing 
provision)  
Cebu  
(certificates of 
land 
ownership)  
1993-1995 2,023 1,913 - 7,123 
1996-1998 5,473 2,496 - 12,423  
1999-2001 3,485 1,296 - 6,942 
2002-2004 4,526 1,817 - 8,075 
2005-2007 4,467 1,214  710 4,420 
Total  19,974  8,736 710 38,983  
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In both Marikina and Naga, the actual benefits that the recipients received 
included, land titles of homelots (signifying legal ownership), adequate in -city 
relocation that is accessible to work and basic facilities, and services such as 
livelihood and capacity building programs, potable tap water and electrical 
connections, solid waste disposal, health and sanitation, garbage collection, and 
other social services.  
By contrast, policy indecisive mayors provided less-substantial short-term 
benefits such as housing units and certificates of land ownership (Table 7.6). The 
limitations of these benefits are apparent. Housing units , constructed in a land not 
owned by squatters, do not guarantee legal tenure. In fact, there are many cases 
where beneficiaries sold their housing units to other families. In like manner, the 
awarding of certificate of land ownership does not actually guarantee legal 
ownership. What the certificate offers is a “temporary right of stay” on the land 
until all legal requirements are met. Unless the land titles are transferred to the 
beneficiaries, they technically remain as squatters.  
 Thirdly, policy decisive mayors ensure that original squatters are empowered. 
Empowerment as used in this context is that housing program beneficiaries do not 
only graduate from being squatters but they are also mainstreamed in the community 
by giving them job opportunities and making them active partners of the city 
government. In both Marikina and Naga, a number of beneficiaries work as staffers 
in the city government, specifically at MSO and NCPC respectively. In addition, 
many of the beneficiaries became actively engaged in program and services delivery 
because they were organized into community associations with working structure 
and leadership. By belonging into associations, the beneficiaries become more 
empowered and are represented in the city government functions of budgeting, 
planning, and implementing development programs.  
177 
 
 By contrast, policy indecisive mayors generally treated squatter s as mere 
“beneficiaries” without defini tive agenda for job creation or a comprehensive 
development package for them.  
 
7.1.2 Should we accept policy decisiveness and reject collaboration?  
 Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the findings of this research indicate 
that collaboration in itself does not guarantee effective program delivery. The 
following observations support this claim. Firstly, collaboration alone cannot 
explain why Marikina has effectively delivered its housing program. As shown in 
the case study, Marikina has significantly reduced the number of squatters despite 
the fact that it did not collaborate with NGOs. What Marikina did was that it 
maximizes the use of its own resources with clear intention that all beneficiaries can 
own a piece of land. Secondly, collaboration can be effective only if the leader 
exercises policy decisiveness. The case of Naga has clearly illustrated this point. 
Collaboration, as applied in Naga, is successful because a policy decisive mayor has 
engaged POs and NGOs in planning, budgeting, and implementing the housing 
program. In doing so, the mayor empowered the people and facilitated a unity of 
purpose that rendered tangible achievements in land ownership. Finally, even if 
collaboration is applied, without exercising policy decisiveness, program delivery 
can be less effective. The case of Cebu  illustrates this point, where collaboration 
has failed to successfully deliver the housing program because the mayor is policy 
indecisive. Even though the NGOs, the POs, and the private sector collaborated with 
the city government, without clear and unifying purpose from the mayor, the 
implementation of housing program remains uncoordinated. As a result, housing 
program delivery was less successful. Putting all these findings together, it can be 
concluded that collaboration is not a determinative factor for effective program 
delivery. Therefore, the notion that “collaboration determines effective program 
178 
 
delivery” must be rejected. At this point, it is clear that policy decisiveness matters, 
and that it is the key determining factor for effective program delivery.  At the onset, 
this paper argued that housing issue is highly political because of active socio -
political dynamics among various interest groups in housing. In this regard, the 
crucial action of the leader is to appropriately manage the socio-political dynamics. 
Having said this, the main difference between policy decisive and policy indecisive 
leaders is ability of the leader to manage socio-political dynamics – the former 
unites the interest group into common vision (unity of purpose) while the latter 
divides them (gridlock). In the general, it can be stated that policy decisiveness 
needs greater emphasis over collaboration in terms of housing program delivery.  
So why was collaboration adopted in Naga and Cebu? The case studies imply 
that collaboration was adopted to complement the cities’ limited institutional 
resources. Based on local income, both Naga and Cebu have demonstrated lesser 
resources and are still greatly depending on IRA, as means of financial support. On 
this basis, collaboration – as adopted by these cities – is viewed as a strategy to 
address limited institutional resources. Based on these observations, collaboration is 
never taken as the core strategy to achieve effective housing program delivery. It 
can be said that in other two cities, namely Marikina and Mandaluyong, 
collaboration is not deemed necessary because they have enough institutional 
resources (based on local income and revenues).  These cities do not depend on IRA 
and have demonstrated strong capacity to implement and manage the housing 
program using their own resources alone.  
 
7.1.3 How to achieve policy decisiveness? 
Policy decisiveness is essentially achieved through leadership  (in this context, 
leadership is applied as ‘verb’ and not as ‘field of study’) . The findings of this 
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research identified the following indicators of policy decisiveness based on the 
actions exhibited by BF (Marikina) and Robredo (Naga).   
Firstly, policy decisiveness is exercised by leaders who tried to understand 
the root cause of the problem in order to come up with effective solutions. BF and 
Robredo understood that the root cause of squatting is the absence to  land to build a 
house. It is with this understanding that both leaders are committed deliver “lot 
ownership” to beneficiaries . Additionally, these leaders prevented the entry of new 
squatters in their respective cities so that the problem will not recur.  
Secondly, policy decisiveness is exercised by leaders who can unify the veto -
players and non-veto players to achieve a common vision. BF manages the socio-
political dynamics and unifies interest groups by showing visual examples of what 
works. Robredo empowers interest groups and made them partners of city 
government.  
Thirdly, policy decisiveness is exercised by leaders who use their 
backgrounds in business and management to achieve results. BF is a businessman 
who owned a successful group of companies in  constructions. When he became 
mayor, he applied his knowledge in business management by mandating all 
employees of the city government to follow his “Guidance to Lead” .  In like manner, 
Robredo has worked in the private sector and applied his management s kills in 
implementing the programs in Naga.  
However, as observed from the case studies, policy decisiveness cannot be 
achieved if the leader is unable to: (i) take definitive decision and actions to 
substantially reduce the number of squatters, (ii) take full responsibility to unify 
stakeholders towards a common vision, and (iii) show commitment and consistent 
policy stand on housing issue.  
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7.1.4 Contributions of the Findings to the General Knowledge  
 This research challenges the conventional wisdom about collaboration by 
presenting policy decisiveness to counter collaboration’s prevailing arguments. In 
terms of general knowledge, the finding that collaboration is not the only solution 
to the problems encountered in program delivery  is an important contribution to the 
discussions on ‘structure-agency’ analysis in political science. In particular, this 
finding offers new insight revealing that structural mechanisms such as 
collaboration are not stand-alone tools for solving problems. This study found that 
structural mechanisms need to be steered by a policy decisive leader who has the 
ability to manage socio-political dynamics. Other contributions of the research 
findings include: (i) it provides specific example of how to apply structure-agency 
analysis to understand highly political issues, such as the politics behind housing 
program delivery in the Philippines; (ii) it explores and expound s the concept of 
policy decisiveness which is relatively new and emerging concept in the context of 
political science; and (iii) it provides new insights on how the leader facilitates 
‘unity of purpose’ among interest groups as well as how the leader handles socio-
political dynamics by exercising policy dec isiveness.  
 Although the cases covered in this research are limited to the Philippine 
context, the practical lessons on how to facilitate effective program delivery may be 
applied to areas with similar conditions (e.g. developing countries, situations with 
long history of patronage politics, contexts that are pursuing political reforms, and 
approaches to delivery that give emphasis on institutions).   
 
7.2 Recommendations 
On the basis of the findings, this paper suggests that policymakers and  
researchers may have to rethink the current strategy for achieving effective program 
delivery. One option to do this is to further review the benefits of exercising policy 
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decisiveness, and how this can be effectively facilitated by leaders. It should be 
made clear that policy decisiveness, as discussed in this paper, never takes place in 
a void. It always interacts with institutions (i.e. structures, policy frameworks, and 
delivery mechanisms). However, the complementarity functions of policy 
decisiveness and collaboration are not yet covered in this research. In fact, this 
paper aims to assume that studies along this area (i.e. the process of 
complementarity of functions) are limited, and it therefore poses knowledge gaps.  
Considering these limitations, it is expected that the conclusions of this 
research will face several dilemmas both in theoretical and practical applications. 
These dilemmas, as presented below, should be further clarified in governance 
policies and should be addressed in future research.  
 
7.2.1 Policy Recommendations  
The first dilemma is whether to extensively pursue collaboration after it is 
indicated that collaboration is not a determinative factor for effective program 
delivery. There have been so many efforts to institutionalize collaboration through 
policy frameworks and regulations, but the question is whether to continue such 
approach, or give more emphasis to promote policy decisiveness, or integrate policy 
decisiveness into collaboration initiatives. This dilemma will continue to surface as 
long as there are knowledge gaps about collaboration and policy decisiven ess. It is 
particularly recommended that the policy on collaboration should be reviewed and 
revised accordingly.  
The second dilemma stems from the nature of policy decisiveness itself.  
While this paper built the case for policy decisiveness for effective program 
delivery, the question whether policy decisiveness can be effectively promoted 
remains. It is viewed that policy decisiveness is facilitated  by leadership, and 
leadership is generally a subjective matter. This, therefore, means that policy 
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decisiveness is subjective – affected by circumstances and contexts. There are still 
many questions that need to be clarified as far as policy decisiveness is concerned 
such as: How to know a policy decisive leader? Can leaders be trained to become 
more policy decisive? Can leaders remain policy decisive? Essentially, these 
questions need answers to further strengthen the case of policy decisiveness.  
The third dilemma pertains to the contexts in which policy decisiveness 
maybe fitting. Cultural and political dynamics can be critical factors that may 
determine whether policy decisiveness can thrive. In the current Philippine context, 
open discussions on promoting policy decisiveness may face resistance or 
substantive debate from various spheres (e.g. academics and activists)  for fear that 
it may bring back the bad experiences of dictatorship and patronage. Additionally, 
with a government focusing its strategies more on institutions (structure), it is 
expected that promoting policy decisiveness (agency) as strategic option can be very 
challenging.  
 
7.2.2 Recommendations for Further Research  
 Reflecting on the dilemmas, this paper recommends that future research may 
consider the following: (i) understanding the barriers to policy decisiveness; (ii) 
analyzing whether incentives and capacity building program can play a significant 
role in enhancing policy decisiveness; and (iii) exploring workable mechanisms that 
promote integration of policy decisiveness and collaboration as an approach to 
program delivery.  
 
Understanding the Barriers 
Policy decisiveness as described in the case studies indicates added value to 
making program delivery more effective. Yet, why is policy decisiveness not 
commonly practiced by local leaders? To answer this question, i t is therefore 
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suggested that future research may investigate factors that hinder policy 
decisiveness. Future research may look into the details and analyze whether laws, 
policies, and regulations are restricting policy decisiveness. Additionally, this paper 
suggests that more case studies and evidence-based analysis can be undertaken on 
how policy decisiveness can be promoted and what are the essential conditions to 
make it work.  
 
Incentives and Capacity Building 
Emphasizing on the serious merits of policy decisiveness, this paper suggests 
that future research may analyze whether incentives and c apacity building program 
are feasible approach to promote policy decisiveness. It is helpful if future studies 
can address the following questions: Can policy decisiveness be encouraged through 
giving awards and recognitions? Is policy decisiveness a skill  that can be honed 
through appropriate capacity building program? It is expected that answers to these 
questions can improve knowledge, confidence, aptitude, and understanding  for 
leaders desiring to exercise policy decisiveness.  
 
Promoting Appropriate Balance 
One of the observations in this paper is that policy decisiveness is something 
that cannot be imposed nor legislated. Unlike collaboration, policy decisiveness 
cannot be structured to satisfy the needs of public accountability. There has been a 
tendency of too much rhetoric about policy decisiveness and collaboration. On the 
extremes, policy decisiveness may be viewed as leaning towards dictatorship and 
collaboration may be viewed as leaning towards perennial gridlock.  The key 
challenge therefore is finding the middle ground where policy decisiveness and 
collaboration can effectively complement. The major gap about policy decisiveness 
and collaboration is the operationalization of these concepts. At the academic level, 
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these concepts can be properly debated and analyzed. However, at the practical level, 
it creates different sorts of tensions among policymakers and local leaders. This 
paper suggests that future studies may look into these gaps so that appropriate 
balance is promoted.  
In view of all these, there is a need to review and readjust the current trend 
that highly favors collaboration. This research has shown that collaboration and 
policy decisiveness are complementary. Collaboration without policy decisiveness 
will not be effective. Likewise, policy decisiveness alone, especially in a context 
where resources are limited, will not be effective without collaboration. For greater 
understanding of the dynamics between policy decisiveness and collaboration , it  
is  important to address the emerging issues through further studies .   
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Annex 1 Website Links of Four Mayors  
 
 
 
 
 
Bayani Fernando at Wikipedia  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayani_Fernando  
 
Bayani Fernando at E-notes 
http://www.enotes.com/topic/Bayani_Fernando  
 
A Day in the Life of Bayani Fernando  
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=568118&publicationSubCategoryId=
63 
 
Profile of Bayani F. Fernando  
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/botomo/05/13/09/profile-bayani-bf-flores-fernando 
 
Bayani Fernando Blogspot  
http://bayani-fernando.blogspot.jp/  
 
Bayani Fernando “Getting Things Done”  
http://bobuy.co/blog/index.php/78-heroes/84-bayani-fernando-getting-things-done 
 
Up Close with Bayani Fernando  
http://gervacio.wordpress.com/2009/08/29/upclose -chairman-bayani-fernando/ 
 
Bayani Fernando’s Keynote at Asian Development Bank  
http://www2.adb.org/projects/e-toolkit/bayani-fernando-speech.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAYANI F. FERNANDO, Mayor of Marikina City, Philippines  
(1992-1995) (1995-1998) (1998-2001) 
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Jesse Robredo at Naga City Website  
http://www.naga.gov.ph/cityhall/mayor.html  
 
Robredo sacks 3 Camarines Sur police chiefs for ‘jueteng’ 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/168753/robredo-sacks-3-camarines-sur-police-chiefs-
for-%E2%80%98jueteng%E2%80%99 
 
Robredo: Gov’t won’t question SC’s decision on 16 cities 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/113065/robredo-govt-wont-question-scs-decision-on-16-
cities 
 
Camarines Sur Gov Villafuerte fires back, says Sec Robredo twisted facts 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/23498/camarines-sur-gov-villafuerte-fires-back-says-
sec-robredo-twisted-facts 
 
Local governments have 20-yr-old law to thank for development, says Robredo 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/68843/local-governments-have-20-yr-old-law-to-thank-
for-development-says-robredo 
 
Senator: Robredo as ‘acting’ DILG chief a ‘slap on the face’   
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20100907 -290978/Senator-
Robredo-as-acting-DILG-chief-a-slap-on-the-face 
 
Robredo vows action vs criminals on motorbike 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/95281/dilg-chief-orders-police-to-step-up-measures-vs-
%E2%80%98riding-in-tandem%E2%80%99-criminals 
 
Jesse Robredo at Wikipedia  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesse_Robredo  
 
News for Jesse Robredo  
https://www.google.com/#q=jesse+robredo&hl=en&prmd=imvnso&source=univ&tb
m=nws&tbo=u&sa=X&ei=9E3ZT5fdD-_EmQXdy-
H7Ag&ved=0CDsQqAI&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=bf13e320bb03
8589&biw=1280&bih=905 
 
Demolition of QC Homes Suspended  
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/metro-manila/06/13/12/24-homes-demolished-
qc 
 
World Mayor Jesse Robredo  
http://www.worldmayor.com/contest_2010/comments-naga-city.html 
JESSE M. ROBREDO, Mayor of Naga City, Philippines  
(1988-1992) (1992-1995) (1995-1998)  
(2001-2004) (2004-2007) (2007-2010) 
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Why Jesse Robredo is an excellent choice for DILG Secretary 
http://balatucan.wordpress.com/2010/06/21/why-jesse-robredo-is-an-excellent-
choice-for-dilg-secretary/  
 
Innovations for Successful Societies  
http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/focusareas/CI/oralhistories/vie
w.xml?id=327 
 
Digital Collection as Magsaysay Awardee  
http://www.rmaf.org.ph/madc/collections/show/41  
 
Biography of Jesse Robredo  
http://www.rmaf.org.ph/madc/archive/files/biography_f51a17024f.pdf  
 
Strategy Against Poverty 
http://www.rmaf.org.ph/madc/archive/files/article -4-4a_464b9d6c5d.pdf 
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Neptali Gonzales, II Official Website  
http://www.nmgonzales.com/profile.asp  
 
Neptali Gonzales at Wikipedia  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neptali_Gonzales_II  
 
Defense wants House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II cited for contempt  
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/251247/news/nation/defense-wants-house-
majority-leader-neptali-gonzales-ii-cited-for-contempt 
 
Neptali “Boyet” Gonzales  
http://mindsetsminds.blogspot.jp/2010/04/who-i-am-voting-for-this-election.html 
 
News Info for Neptali Gonzales, Jr.  
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/tag/house-majority-leader-neptali-gonzales-jr 
 
 
 
 
 
  
NEPTALI GONZALES II, Mayor of Mandaluyong City , Philippines  
(2004-2007) 
210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tomas Osmeña Wikipedia Information  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomas_Osme%C3%B1a 
 
Moro Moro: The Battles between Mayor Tomas Osmeña and Governor Gwen 
Garcia  
http://gervacio.wordpress.com/2008/11/22/moro-moro-the-battles-between-mayor-
tomas-osmena-and-gov-gwen-gracia/ 
 
Osmeña opposed conversion of Cebu province as economic zone  
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cebu/local-news/2011/11/06/tomas-against-proposal-
convert-entire-province-economic-zone-188974 
 
News on Tomas Osmeña at Inquirer 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/tag/rep-tomas-osmena/page/2 
 
Political Alliance Collapses  
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/11569/political -alliance-collapses 
 
Osmeña: I’ll make sure Rama loses  
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/93167/osmena-i%E2%80%99ll-make-sure-rama-loses 
 
Match my record first, Osmeña dares Rama 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/90355/match-my-record-first-osmena-dares-rama 
 
Tomas, Mike at odds over Osmeña shrine 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/82125/tomas-mike-at-odds-over-osmena-shrine 
 
Tom O. accepts Guardo apology, drops libel case against him 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/40943/tom-o-accepts-guardo-apology-drops-libel-case-
against-him 
 
Tomas: SRP lots sold at a higher price 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/206435/tomas-srp-lots-sold-at-a-higher-price 
 
Osmeña: Cebuanos won’t settle for showbiz 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/196167/osmena-cebuanos-won%E2%80%99t-settle-for-
showbiz 
 
Tom O gripes: Cebu lacks support from Liberal Party 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/138481/tom-o-gripes-cebu-lacks-support-from-liberal-
party 
TOMAS OSMEÑA, Mayor of Cebu City, Philippines  
(1988-1992) (1992-1995) (1995-1998)  
(2001-2004) (2004-2007) (2007-2010) 
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News Reports on Tomas Osmena at Philippine Star  
http://www.philstar.com/YahooSearch.aspx?p=tomas%20osmena  
 
News Reports on Tomas Osmena at Sunstar  
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/search/google/tomas%20osmena?query=tomas%20osmen
a&cx=002466650891154542549%3A1kyajibber0&cof=FORID%3A11&sitesearch=w
ww.sunstar.com.ph&safe=off  
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Annex 2 List of Mayors in Four City Cases, 2010-2013* 
 
 
 
Marikina City  
Del R. de Guzman  is Marikina City’s 20th local chief executive.  His vision for 
Marikina is “Tunay na Kaunlaran, Tao Naman”, ensuring that every Marikenos reaps 
the gains of progress and achieves a high quality of life.  
URL: http://www.marikina.gov.ph/  
 
 
Naga City  
John Garcia Bongat , the eight local chief executive of Naga City, entered 
public service as a city councilor in 2001.  
URL: http://naga.gov.ph/ 
 
 
Mandaluyong City 
Benjamin Abalos, Jr . (born 19 July 1962) is a politician known locally as 
"Benhur". He currently serves as the Mayor of  Mandaluyong City. 
URL: http://www.mandaluyong.gov.ph/  
 
 
Cebu City  
Michael "Mike" Lopez Rama  (born October 28, 1954) currently serves as 
the Mayor of Cebu City.  
URL: http://www.cebucity.gov.ph/  
 
 
--------------------------  
* During the 2010 elections, all four city cases had new city mayors.  
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